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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FISCAL FEDERLISM AND THE ROLE OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays, each examining a unique question 
relating to the role of intergovernmental transfers in fiscal federalism. 
Using a panel of the 48 contiguous U.S. states along with recent advances in 
nonstationary panel and spatial econometric methods this dissertation offers a number 
of important insights into the workings of intergovernmental transfers and therefore a 
clearer understanding of the interactions among the different layers of government. 
The third chapter examines the relationship between intergovernmental revenues from 
the federal government and intergovernmental expenditures to local governments. As 
observed by Wildasin (2010), there remains remarkable stability in the ratio of state-to-
local transfers to federal-to-state transfers despite the disparate programs being 
financed by each. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to examine the extent to which 
states serve as a conduit for funds from the federal government to local governments. In 
particular, the research question asks to what degree do federal transfers stimulate 
transfers to local governments.   
The fourth chapter explores the direction of causality between tax revenues and 
expenditures in answering the four hypotheses set forth in the literature: tax-spend, 
spend-tax, fiscal synchronization, and institutional separation.  Furthermore, along with 
exploring the role served by intergovernmental transfers within the revenue-expenditure 
nexus, this essay also examines differences relating to the revenue-expenditure nexus 
between states with relatively higher debt levels and states with low debt levels, in order 
to better understand the fiscal causal links favorable for debt accumulation. 
The purpose of the fifth chapter is to ascertain the effect interstate fiscal interactions on 
the stimulative effect of grants on state level expenditures.  The vast literature on fiscal 
competition suggests that states do not make decisions in isolation, therefore, spatial 
 
 
econometrics are used to capture spillovers and mimicking behavior across states.  
Following Boarnet and Glazer (2002), the effect of informational externalities arising from 
grants awarded to neighboring states are examined as well as the effect of spending 
spillovers from neighboring states.  The results show that the flypaper anomaly (i.e. the 
stimulative effect of grants greater than a pure income effect) can be explained by 
interstate fiscal interactions. 
KEY WORDS: intergovernmental transfers; flypaper effect; fiscal federalism; dynamic 
panel estimation. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The growth in government spending in the U.S. has been substantial over the past sev-
eral decades, particularly at the state level. For instance, state spending has increased
from fifteen percent of total government spending in 1960 to twenty-four percent in
2008. The composition of spending has also changed dramatically within this time
frame. For example, the federal government has shifted away from defense spending
and toward spending on social insurance programs. Along with these changes spend-
ing responsibilities have devolved down to subnational governments and the use of
intergovernmental transfers have increased. Federal transfers were fifteen percent of
total state revenues in 1951 and twenty-six percent in 2008. This large increase in
federal transfers as a funding source for states warrants an investigation as to the in-
fluence of these transfers on other fiscal variables, namely expenditures and revenues.
The increased use of transfers have the potential to elicit perverse behavior among
grant recipients through the shifting of spending and own revenues over programs and
over time. For instance, federal grants in the US are used to a large extent to inter-
nalize spillovers; however, the “cognitive distance” between the central government
and its residents pose questions as to what extent the federal government possesses
knowledge of the optimal level of local public goods and therefore can effectively pro-
vide the correct level of grants necessary to internalize interstate spillovers. Recently,
however, the federal government has moved away from matching grants and toward
block grant programs such as in the case of welfare, affording states more autonomy
in creating more state-specific welfare programs. Moreover, the special role served
by transfers in linking all three layers of government together offers many interesting
questions as to the interactions of each layer of government. For example, federal
grants also have the potential of introducing additional externalities (see Chapter 4
for more details on this idea), which further complicate state fiscal policy. Therefore,
given the state’s unique position as an intermediary between the federal and local
governments, understanding how policy makers at this level spend grants is of special
interest throughout this dissertation.
The main focus of this dissertation is understanding how states allocate federal
transfers. My findings shed light on the use of transfers, which, in turn, should assist
in the development of more efficient transfer policies and provide an understanding of
how citizen preferences are being represented by government. Furthermore, through
the use of recent developments in nonstationary panel and spatial econometric tech-
niques, this dissertation offers a better understanding of the dynamic and spatial
relationships among fiscal variables across states. A number of these fiscal interac-
tions take place over time, while displaying an appreciable amount of adjustment
following fiscal shocks. By focusing solely on snap shops of these relationships, as
is common with past studies, overlook the informative adjustment process unfolding
over time as fiscal variables return to equilibrium.
1
1.2 Theory of State and Federal Government Interaction
1.2.1 Fiscal Federalism
Fiscal federalism, according to Wildasin (2008), is concerned with the division of pol-
icy and responsibility among different levels of government as well as the interactions
among the layers of government. Earlier works in this area focus on the allocative
benefits of decentralization. For instance, Hayek (1945) discussed advantages of de-
centralized decision making as the best way to utilize what is essentially localized
knowledge. Similarly, local governments are in the best position to utilize this knowl-
edge as they are “closer to the people.” In accordance with Oates’ Decentralization
Theorem lower-level governments are in a better position to provide the level of pub-
lic services that match the local benefits and costs that vary across locations with
different demographic composition, income and technologies. Moreover, local gov-
ernments may also be more informed and responsive to local demands (Wildasin,
2008). An added benefit of decentralization is that of revealed preference by mobile
households. Tiebout (1956) argued that efficient provision of public goods can be
generated through the sorting of households among heterogeneous localities in which
their decision where to reside reveals their preference for local public services.
Later works involved addressing the tax/expenditure assignment problem. In
reference to Musgrave’s (1959) three branches of government activity the general
consensus, according to (see Oates, 1972), is that the highest level of government
should be responsible for the stabilization function (i.e. macro and monetary poli-
cies) and higher levels of government should be responsible for the distribution of
income. Alternatively, lower-level governments should be responsible for the alloca-
tive function in which they provide public services and correct market failures. Of
course, grants are an important instrument in fiscal federalism that can be used by
higher level governments to serve a number of purposes. The literature, according
to Oates (1999), outlines three such roles served by grants in fiscal federalism: (1)
internalizing spillover benefits to other jurisdictions; (2) fiscal equalization across ju-
risdictions; and (3) improved overall tax system. Federal-to-state grants in the U.S.
have been less focused on equalization and instead distributed for specific programs,
but state-to-local grants do possess equalization features such as with school districts
(Oates, 1999). One disadvantage of fiscal decentralization is the possibility of inter-
jurisdictional spillovers leading to inefficient levels of public goods. For instance, Case
(1993) discusses possible externalities arising from spending on highways, education
and welfare. Within a federation, however, higher-level governments can use intergov-
ernmental grants to correct these externalities and achieve an efficient level of public
goods (Breton, 1965). Also, according to Buettner (2006), these intergovernmen-
tal transfers can be used as instruments to elicit certain behavior among recipient
governments. For example, consistent with the stabilization function, higher-level
governments can also use intergovernmental grants to induce spending by lower level
governments with the intentions of increasing aggregate demand in times of recession
(Hines, 2010).
Given the global trend of decentralization through the use of intergovernmental
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transfers, instead of tax devolution, the literature has recently stressed the impor-
tance of using own revenues sources to finance expenditures. Recently, the literature,
particularly, Weingast (1995) and McKinnon (1997), has articulated the dangers in-
herent in fiscal federalism when decentralized governments rely too heavily on grants
from upper-level governments. Moreover, Rodden et al. (2003) declares that inter-
governmental grants tend to distort rather than illuminate the link between taxes
and benefits increasing the likelihood of fiscal illusion. Further, he argues that local
governments have incentives to exaggerate costs and information to reign in more
transfers from higher-level governments. The perverse incentives and problems of
soft budget constraints has encouraged discussions on how to remedy these issues by
relying on more “market-based” approaches like private credit markets.1
Aside from the many advantages associated with decentralization including in-
creased accountability, decentralization also creates spillovers and competition among
jurisdictions that potentially offset the efficiency gains from decentralization. Alterna-
tively, Brennan & Buchanan (1980) argue that instead of being benevolent planners,
governments are budget maximizers trying to extract as much tax revenues as pos-
sible. If this view is correct then fiscal competition among governments would be
efficiency enhancing by constraining the Leviathan. Also, the nature of decentraliza-
tion matters. For instance, Rodden et al. (2003) tax and expenditure devolution is
necessary to constrain Leviathan by encouraging tax competition among jurisdictions
and thus tightening up the link between taxes and benefits.
1.2.2 The Flypaper Effect
To understand the uses of intergovernmental transfers the median voter model is
typically used to empirically model the demand for local public goods, where the
government is assumed to maximize the representative citizen’s utility subject to
a budget constraint consisting of grant income and community income. The first
order conditions therefore delineates the representative demand for public goods and
describes the marginal propensity to spend grant income and community income.
Bradford & Oates (1971) provide the theoretical framework for understanding the
response of subnational governments to increases in intergovernmental aid. They
show that the effect of matching grants on subnational government spending can
be decomposed into an income effect and a reinforcing substitution effect, and will
therefore have a larger effect on spending than an increase in lump-sum grants which
result in a pure income effect. Furthermore, Bradford & Oates (1971) show that
intergovernmental aid distributed at a fixed rate to individuals in the community will
have the same effect on disposable income and public goods as intergovernmental aid
distributed directly to the citizens. Moreover, if lump-sum grants to a collectivity are
allocated based on individuals’ tax share, the effect of an increase in lump-sum grants
and a comparable increase in income should have an equivalent effect on government
spending.
1For more discussion on market-preserving fiscal federalism see Weingast (1995) and McKinnon
(1997).
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However, much of the empirical evidence contradicts the theoretical predictions
of Bradford & Oates (1971) (see, e.g., Gramlich, 1977; Inman, 1979; Fisher, 1982;
Hines & Thaler, 1995). Instead, the empirical estimates consistently find that the
stimulative effect of federal transfers is much greater than that of community income.
After Gramlich presented his findings that grants-in-aid stimulate local government
expenditures more than an equivalent increase in income, Arthur Okun coined this the
“Flypaper effect,” since money tends to “stick” where it hits, or in other words, money
to the public sector stays in the public sector and money in the private sector stays
in the private sector. The empirical literature to date has found that the marginal
propensity to spend $1 of private income is in the range of $0.05-$0.10, whereas the
marginal propensity to spend $1 of grant income is between $0.30 and $1.00 (Inman,
2008).
More recently, asymmetric responses to federal transfers have been examined (see,
e.g., Shaw, 2005; Heyndels, 2001). For instance, Gramlich (1987) found that for local
government spending in the US, when unconditional grants decreased, fiscal replace-
ment with own-source revenues was less than 100%. Looking at local governments
in Pennsylvania, Stine (1994) finds evidence that grant cuts lead to a decrease in
own-source revenues and Deller & Maher (2006) finds evidence of fiscal replacement
of unconditional grants in county governments of Wisconsin. Furthermore, a working
paper by Tuttle (2004) finds asymmetric responses to grants-in-aid of state and local
governments, finding evidence of a flypaper effect only when grants-in-aid are rising.
As discussed by Bradford & Oates (1971), the strength of the flypaper effect relates
to the degree of grants fungibility. The program being stimulated by federal grant
funds is also distorted by grant fungibility. For instance, if transfers are completely
fungible it is not clear that transfers are ameliorating problems associated with inter-
state spillovers as intended. Moreover, displacement of fiscal resources brought about
by federal grants has important implications pertaining to grant effectiveness. Using
pooled cross-country time-series data (see, e.g., Feyzioglu et al., 1998) and country-
specific time series data (see, e.g., Pack & Pack, 1990, 1993) many studies have
investigated the degree of fungibility with respect to grants and the relationship with
government expenditures and find a significant amount of fungibility with respect to
grants.
There has been a number of possible explanations (both empirically and theoret-
ically) for the existence of a flypaper effect. Inman (2008) notes several explanations
common in the literature. The first is that researchers tend to confuse matching grants
as lump-sum grants. However, the flypaper effect still remains even after correcting
this misclassification (Wyckoff, 1991). Omitted variables are another explanation for
finding a flypaper effect. Variables that are determinants of government spending and
correlated with income or aid can bias the estimates of income and grants. Though,
Inman (2008) assures that the omitted variable bias alone is not sufficient to explain
the flypaper effect. A third explanation is that citizens perhaps do not understand
the complexity of grants. For instance, Oates (1979) maintains that the flypaper
effect is valid and can be explained by citizens misinterpreting lump-sum grants as
matching grants as what he calls a fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion is when citizens
view exogenous grants as lowering the marginal price of the public good as well as
4
increasing community resources. By interpreting lump-sum grants as having a sub-
stitution effect can then translate to a flypaper effect (Tresch, 2002). Fisher (1982)
disagrees with the idea of fiscal illusion and instead suggests that voters are savvy
enough to understand that grants increase community income and that grants come
from taxes collected from higher levels of government. Consequently, the net increase
in resources would be the difference between tax payments to the government and
the increase in grants. Therefore, a general equilibrium approach is more appropriate
to that of partial equilibrium.
Alternatively, politics could explain the flypaper effect. As discussed by Inman
(2008), the flypaper effect is a consequence of the inability for voters to write complete
contracts with their elected officials. Bae & Feiock (2004) present findings consistent
with political institutions explaining the flypaper effect within a median voter model.
Brooks & Phillips (2010) also provide an institutional explanation for the flypaper
effect, but instead they find that governments use grant income to supplement total
expenditures and therefore are not likely to return augmented revenue from grants to
citizens in the form of tax cuts. Furthermore, Tovmo & Falch (2002) conclude that
a unified political environment reduces the flypaper effect. Finally, Aragon (2008)
provides a theoretical model explaining the existence of the flypaper effect to be a
by-product of costly tax collections. In sum, the flypaper effect remains a robust
empirical finding throughout the literature.
1.3 Chapter Summaries
This dissertation offers a number of contributions to the public finance literature, par-
ticularly in understanding the states’ use of federal transfers. This section highlights
the contribution and results from each chapter.
1.3.1 Chapter 3: Exploring the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Linkages: Is the
State a Conduit for Funds?
The third chapter examines the extent to which states funnel federal transfers down
to local governments. As observed by Wildasin (2010), there exhibits a close stable re-
lationship between federal-to-state transfers and state-to-local transfers that persists
over multiple decades. For example, since 1992 the ratio of state-to-local transfers to
federal-to-state transfers has never dipped below eighty percent. These observations
bring forth questions concerning the states role as a “conduit” for funds from the
federal to local governments. The results indicate that in the short run states use
transfers to fund their own-expenditures, but the long run is consistent with the idea
that states are serving as a conduit for funds, since federal transfers are, to a large
degree, being funneled down to local governments. For instance, about $0.09 of every
federal transfer dollar is spent on aid to local governments in the short run, whereas
in the long run about $0.60 of every federal transfer dollar is used to fund intergov-
ernmental expenditures to local governments. This result shows that although the
flypaper effect exists in both the short and long run, the use of grant funds is very
different. In accordance with the demands from the median voter state governments
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appear to funnel federal transfers to local government in the long run. This result is
consistent with idea that governments closer to the people are in a better position to
be controlled and held accountable by the citizens. Furthermore, in line with Oates’
Decentralization theorem, local governments are better able to match the costs with
the benefits of providing local public goods. Disaggregated transfers unveil evidence
of resource diversion in which federal transfers allocated to specific programs are fun-
neled to local governments in the form of transfer expenditures allocated to programs
far removed from which they were originally intended. The most striking result is the
use of federal public welfare and health and hospital transfers used to fund education
transfers to local governments. To this effect, the intermediary role that states serve
between federal and local governments offers an avenue for resource diversion, which
could potentially exacerbate, rather than alleviate, inter-state spillovers, especially
in the presence of fiscal competition. However, this could be efficiency enhancing if
state governments possess more knowledge of the efficient level of public services and
is therefore given the autonomy to internalize these spillovers through block grants
from the federal government.
1.3.2 Chapter 4: The Dynamics of the Revenue-Expenditure Nexus in State Gov-
ernment Finances
The fourth chapter examines the Granger causality between taxes and expenditures
in answering the four hypotheses set forth in the literature: tax-spend; spend-tax;
synchronization; institutional separation. Aside from being the most recent look at
the revenue-expenditure nexus, this essay contributes to the literature by providing a
more comprehensive look at the effect of federal transfers within the tax-spend nexus,
as opposed to previous studies which assume a more passive role for transfers. Fur-
thermore, this essay contributes to the literature by providing a deeper understanding
of the revenue-expenditure dynamics that are conducive to debt accumulation. The
large increases in federal-to-state transfers and the problems of debt plaguing most
U.S. states makes this is a very timely topic. Overall, the results display evidence in
favor of the tax-spend hypothesis (i.e. unidirectional causality from taxes to expendi-
tures) which is consistent with Friedman (1978) hypothesis that governments exploit
tax increases by increasing spending. In contrast, the short run exhibits institutional
separation (i.e. the absence of a causal relationship between taxes and expenditures).
Transfers also play a key role in returning state budgets back to equilibrium. More-
over, the results reveal that high debt states exhibit more precarious budget setting
dynamics compared to low debt states. Specifically, not only is there evidence of
institutional separation in the short run, but taxes and expenditures are diverging.
Also, tax revenues are used to retire debt obligations in low debt states, whereas high
debt states use federal transfers to retire debt obligations revealing potential moral
hazard problems. These results suggest to policy makers that the proper response to
budget deficits include adjusting taxes in the long run in order to bring the budget
back to equilibrium. Alternatively, in the short-run some combination of tax and
expenditure adjustment might be necessary with specific focus on reestablishing the
short-run link between taxes and expenditures. With respect to the high debt states,
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the primary focus should be in reversing the divergent time paths between taxes and
expenditures in order to return these states back on a sustainable path in the short
run. However, a long run approach should include some form tax cuts and loosening
the link between transfers and the revenue-expenditure nexus.
1.3.3 Chapter 5: An Empirical Investigation of Fiscal Interactions and the Flypaper
Effect
The fifth chapter explores the influence of fiscal competition on the stimulative ef-
fect of federal transfers on state expenditures. Traditional estimates of the flypaper
effect assume governments make decisions in isolation. Following Boarnet & Glazer
(2002), this is relaxed by considering spatial interactions over expenditures and by
considering the informational externalities provided by federal transfers awarded to
neighboring states. This essay expands on the work done by Boarnet & Glazer (2002)
in a number of ways. First, given that expenditures don’t instantaneously adjust to
grant stimulus, and instead, exhibit signs of significant adjustment over time, the
assumption of instantaneous adjustment is relaxed and instead partial adjustment is
assumed. Second, the indirect effect of spending spillovers on federal grant stimulus
is estimated. Last, the robust econometric technique used offers a number of ben-
efits such as circumventing problems associated with measurement error and weak
instruments, correcting for endogeneity of the explanatory variables, and allowing for
dynamic relationships. The results suggest that federal transfers to recipient gov-
ernments serve as an important informational externality that voters use to evaluate
policies of elected officials. Consequently, transfers to recipient governments miti-
gate federal transfer stimulus on own-expenditures. Furthermore, neighboring state
expenditures produce significant spillovers that also dilute the stimulative effect of
grants. The omitted variable bias, from neglecting neighboring state policies offer a
complete explanation for the flypaper phenomenon.
1.3.4 Contributions and Policy Relevance
The results of this dissertation motivate further research on the dynamic interrela-
tionships among important fiscal variables including intergovernmental grants with
each chapter addressing a unique question pertaining to the effect of federal grants
on state level fiscal policy. Particularly, one of the issues plaguing the majority of
studies in fiscal federalism is the lack of dynamics in the analysis. The effect of grants
on fiscal variables is a process that unfolds over time and therefore any study using
cross-sectional averages or single year snap shots are only capable of offering a very
limited understanding of fiscal federalism, which is itself a very dynamic process. To
help fill this void, each chapter in this dissertation views this as a dynamic process
with an appreciable amount of adjustment unfolding over time. The results, there-
fore, inform policy makers with the underlying adjustment process of many important
fiscal variables.
For instance, the third chapter examines the possibility that states funnel fed-
eral grants down to local governments; the fourth chapter looks at the state’s use of
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transfers within an intertemporal budget constraint in order to understand how grants
influence such fiscal variables as own-revenues, expenditures and debt; and the fifth
chapter tests whether grants to recipient governments give off informational exter-
nalities and to what extent spending spillovers from neighboring states inhibit grant
stimulus. In regard to the debate about decentralization, Chapter 3 looks at what
fraction of federal aid the median voter demands to be allocated to local governments.
This chapter also looks at disaggregated transfer categories to understand the inter-
relationships among the various programs funded by transfers at the different levels
of government. The considerable degree of autonomy possessed by state and local
governments serve as an impetus to divert resources away from where higher level of
governments originally intended. This of course could mean that inter-jurisdictional
spillovers are not corrected and therefore matching grants,as opposed to block grants,
should be used, or that lower-level governments possess more knowledge of the lo-
cal situation and thus block grants would be efficiency enhancing. Furthermore, the
overall destination of grant funds varies over time since federal grants immediately
stimulate direct expenditures, but over time flow to local governments for various pro-
grams that are, at times, far removed from their original intended allocated by higher
level governments. From the perspective of the federal government grants should be
restructured to include, not only a matching component, but also a time component.
The matching and time component could be interdependent so that the longer the
expenditures on a certain project are maintained the larger is that matching rate.
However, the state governments offer a level “closer to the citizens” in which they
can better provide an efficient level of public goods and therefore block grants would
be more appropriate.
The fourth Chapter examines the role of federal grants in the state government’s
intertemporal budget constraint. Specifically, this chapter addresses the direction of
causality among the various fiscal variables. The results inform on issues such “soft”
budget constraints and perverse incentives that are at times and outcome of inter-
governmental grants. For example, states that possess relatively more debt appear
to rely more heavily on federal grants to finance outstanding debt. Moreover, the
causal direction between taxes and expenditures favors Friedman’s (1978) hypothe-
sis in which state governments use tax revenues to increase the size of government,
therefore tax cuts are necessary to reign in spending and control budget deficits. This
chapter provides some evidence in favor decentralization through tax devolution in-
stead of using federal grants consistent with that found by Rodden et al. (2003). The
two advantages of tax devolution, according to this analysis, would be a tighter match
between taxes and benefits and, the increase in tax competition that would limit the
resources state governments can use to encourage overspending. This would miti-
gate the need for bailouts by higher-level governments and force state governments
to instead rely on the discipline given off by private credit markets.
Chapter 5 examines the effect of fiscal interactions on the flypaper phenomenon.
Specifically, this chapter looks at externalities generated by the federal government
through distributions of federal grants as well as spending spillovers from neighboring
states. The results in this chapter find that grants give off extensive informational ex-
ternalities that, although increase own-state spending, limit neighboring state spend-
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ing. Consequently, grants used for the purposes of increasing aggregate demand would
have limited effects on total state spending during times of recession. Moreover, as
the federal government internalizes interstate externalities through the use of grants
in one state, they subsequently, generate additional externalities as neighboring states
respond to these grants by lowering their expenditures. These results suggest pos-
sible efficiency gains from a further devolution of taxing authority and less reliance
on grants. Since grants themselves generate externalities then it would appear to be
more efficient to allow states to determine the level of taxes that match spending and
forces states to be more diligent in matching taxes with spending, especially during
times of recession. Furthermore, the externalities associated with grants as well as
spending spillovers are able to explain, almost completely, the flypaper phenomenon
commonly found in the empirical literature. Therefore, it is important to consider
neighboring state policies when examining the flypaper effect as well as in designing
and distributing grants.
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2 An Overview of State-level Spending and Revenue Trends
2.1 Introduction
The data used throughout this dissertation are based at the state level. State level
observations are an interesting case within a federation as states are an intermediary
between the federal and local governments. This intermediary position between the
federal and local governments allows one to better understand the linkages among
these governments. For instance, the state can be seen as a means for aligning the in-
centives of the central government and local governments or as a mechanism through
which citizen preferences are relayed from local governments to the central govern-
ment. Moreover, while examining the dynamics and spatial relationships across fiscal
variables it is important to separate out local governments as they have a significant
amount of tax and spend autonomy and deserve to be studied separately. States
in the US offer a very rich data set both across time and cross-sections allowing
researchers to exploit the variation across both dimensions. Moreover, being in a
federation, states are largely homogeneous which help mitigate problems of estimator
identification.
2.2 Description of the Data
The data consist of annual observations of the forty-eight contiguous U.S. states over
the period 1951 to 2008. Hawaii and Alaska were omitted due to their lack of suffi-
cient data and lack of spatial neighbors. State level variables are collected from the
Annual Survey of State Government Finance and Census of Governments from the
US Census Bureau. These include, total expenditures, direct expenditures (i.e. inter-
governmental expenditures to local governments subtracted from total expenditures),
intergovernmental expenditures to local governments (local government aid), inter-
governmental revenue from the federal government (federal aid), own revenues (i.e.
transfer revenues subtracted from total revenues), tax revenues, total personal income
and total debt outstanding. Control variables collected from the the UK poverty Cen-
ter (http://www.ukcpr.org/) include the poverty rate and a dummy variable for the
governor being a member of the democratic party. Population and land area by state
(used to construct population density) along with the GDP deflator were collected
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Population demographics used to calculate
the dependency ratio (population aged 0-19 and 65+ divided by the population aged
20-64) were collected from the Census Bureau. Finally, the unemployment rate is
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2.3 Summary Statistics
This section provides a number of summary statistics. Table 1 breaks down the
summary statistics, per capita and as a percent of income, by decade from 1960
to 2008. The first thing to note is the extraordinary increase in the size of state
level governments in terms of expenditures and own revenues on a per capita basis.
Moreover, debt and federal transfers have increased tremendously from a per capita
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mean of $27 and $13, respectively, in the decade 1960-1969 to $2721 and $1290 in the
decade 2000-2008. The largest increase in expenditures and transfers was from the
1960’s to the 1970’s. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is the decade President Johnson
signed the Equal Opportunity Act of 1964 into law as a means of attacking American
poverty and then shortly after Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law. Debt,
on the other hand, had the largest increase in the decades following the 1970’s. The
last two columns show the mean and standard deviation for each fiscal variable as
a percent of personal income. One thing to note is the increase in the size of state
governments over time. Expenditures went from ten percent of income in the 1960’s
to fifteen percent of income in the 21st century. Similarly, debt has also increased
as a fraction of income, going from five percent in the 1960’s to eight percent in the
2000’s. In contrast, own revenues increased from eight percent to only twelve percent
and tax revenues remained remarkably constant at approximately six percent over
the time period. This suggest that states are relying more heavily on other revenue
sources other than tax revenues to finance expenditures and debt.
Table 2 provide the mean and standard deviation of three major revenue sources
as a percent of total revenue before 1980 and after 1980. It is interesting to note
that where federal transfers increased slightly, the mean of tax revenues decreased
by eight percentage points and other revenues increased by eight percentage points,
again, suggestive of the increase reliance on other revenues as opposed to tax revenues
to finance expenditures and debt.
2.4 Spending and Revenue Trends
This section documents trends over time using cross-sectional averages. Figure 1
shows per capita trends in tax revenues, other revenues and transfer revenues. Notice,
that tax revenues and federal transfers follow a smooth increasing trend, whereas other
revenues are more erratic and tend to follow business cycle fluctuations. For example,
other revenues dropped off significantly in recessionary periods in the early and the
latter part of the 2000’s. Tax revenues also dropped off slightly coinciding with the
recession in the early 2000’s.
Figure 2 shows the time-series relationship between expenditures and revenues.
Notice not only the increase in expenditures and revenues over time, but also the
close relationship between transfer revenues and transfer expenditures and between
own expenditures and own revenues. These observations hint at the idea that states
use own revenues to finance own expenditures and transfer revenues to finance transfer
expenditures.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Decade
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Per Capita % Income
Period 1960-1969
Expenditures 53.86 21.36 9.94 2.65
Federal Transfers 13.25 7.42 2.48 1.20
Own Revenues 41.93 16.02 7.70 1.73
Other Revenues 13.50 6.83 2.45 0.95
Tax Revenues 28.43 10.67 5.25 1.20
Debt 27.04 24.00 4.81 3.42
Period 1970-1979
Expenditures 239.50 119.59 11.96 2.38
Federal Transfers 61.67 33.49 3.11 1.00
Own Revenues 190.18 102.13 9.34 1.73
Other Revenues 65.50 42.75 3.13 1.03
Tax Revenues 124.68 63.69 6.21 1.14
Debt 108.79 110.46 5.29 4.08
Period 1980-1989
Expenditures 987.48 357.65 12.24 2.67
Federal Transfers 222.98 84.72 2.83 0.90
Own Revenues 861.71 344.55 10.55 2.51
Other Revenues 351.35 173.10 4.29 1.59
Tax Revenues 510.36 194.68 6.26 1.26
Debt 601.13 483.05 7.12 4.69
Period 1990-1999
Expenditures 2460.80 649.66 13.70 2.64
Federal Transfers 606.18 212.39 3.40 1.11
Own Revenues 2110.29 638.50 11.64 2.26
Other Revenues 930.51 367.23 5.12 1.56
Tax Revenues 1179.78 339.53 6.53 1.14
Debt 1426.36 1028.81 7.72 4.73
Period 2000-2008
Expenditures 4797.06 1309.24 14.74 2.98
Federal Transfers 1290.78 494.69 4.02 1.42
Own Revenues 3787.79 1290.89 11.54 2.98
Other Revenues 1672.40 860.57 5.09 2.43
Tax Revenues 2115.38 638.76 6.44 1.20
Debt 2721.03 1746.54 8.02 3.93
Notes: Values in columns 1 and 2 are per capita 2005 dollars and values
as a percent of income are in columns 3 and 4.
Figure 3 normalizes each fiscal variables by total personal income. All three vari-
ables display an increasing trend over time suggesting that state governments are
spending a larger share of the state’s income. For instance, expenditures as a per-
centage of income ranged from a low of 7.5% to a high of 16%; own-revenues as a
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Sample Split
Standard
Mean Deviation
Period 1951-1980
Federal Transfers 21.94 6.32
Tax Revenues 52.51 8.02
Other Revenues 24.45 7.24
Period 1981-2008
Federal Transfers 22.74 5.19
Tax Revenues 44.24 6.93
Other Revenues 32.14 7.12
Notes:Values are a percent of total rev-
enues.
0
5
10
15
%
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
Expenditures Own Revenues
Transfer Revenues
Figure 3: Fiscal Variables as Percent of Income
percentage of income ranges from a low of 6% to a high of 13%; and intergovernmental
revenues as a percentage of income ranged from a low of 1.5% to a high of 5%. These
trends illustrate that the rise in expenditures is more than can be explained by the
increase in demand for public services brought about by the rising incomes (assuming
public services are a normal good).
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot along with the best fit line between federal transfers
and total expenditures and own revenues and total expenditures. Both show a strong
positive relationship, and interestingly the slope of the fitted line for federal transfers
is greater than that of own revenues reflective of the flypaper phenomenon. Of course
this observation is potentially a result of the matching component of federal trans-
fers which results in both a substitution and income effect, but when public welfare
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transfers (including Medicaid, the largest matching grant program) were subtracted
from total federal transfers the slope was still larger than own revenues.
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2.5 Cross-sectional Dependence
Recently, the concern over cross-sectional dependence has received a lot of atten-
tion among researchers (see Eberhardt & Bond, 2009). Cross-sectional correlation
among US states can arise from a number of sources including common global shocks
(e.g. changes in federal regulations, changes in federal fiscal policies, and federal
transfer policies) which may have heterogeneous impacts across states. Alternatively,
cross-sectional correlation can be a result of local spillover effects between states (see
Moscone & Tosetti, 2009 for a survey and application of cross-sectional dependence
tests). Failure to correct for cross-sectional dependence can lead to inefficiencies and
biased standard errors in conventional estimators like OLS (Moscone & Tosetti, 2009).
Furthermore, Andrews (2005) finds that OLS is inconsistent and the t-statistics are
no longer asymptotically normal in the presence of cross-sectional dependence re-
sulting from global shocks. Conceivably, failure to account for cross-sectional could
provide an overestimate of the stimulative effect of grants on expenditures, which is
commonly found in the literature. This is especially true since one of the functions
of grants is to internalize interstate spillovers. Therefore, a significant contribution
to the literature is checking the robustness of previous findings while accounting for
cross-sectional correlations across states.
To account for cross-section dependence Pesaran (2004) suggests to use cross-
sectional averages of the variables. To this end, cross-sectional averages are sub-
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tracted from each variable to dilute the effects of cross-sectional dependence on
model estimators. Table 3 provides the cross-sectional correlation before control-
ling for cross-sectional dependence (column 1) and after subtracting cross-sectional
averages from each variable (column 2). Before controlling for cross-sectional depen-
dence, cross-sectional correlation is very high for each variable, but after controlling
for cross-sectional dependence the correlations are close to zero. These tests reveal a
significant amount of CSD with respect to each variable and thus the need to control
for CSD in order to inhibit identification of model parameters.
Table 3: Cross-Sectional Correlations
(1) (2)
Expenditures 0.995 -0.001
Tax Revenues 0.992 0.016
Other Revenues 0.956 0.006
Income 0.999 0.012
Transfer Revenues 0.989 0.069
Transfer Expenditures 0.986 0.061
Notes: Values are per capita 2005 dollars. Col-
umn 1 is cross-sectional correlation without con-
trolling for cross-sectional dependence and Column
2 is the cross-sectional correlations when cross-
sectional averages were subtracted from each vari-
able following the advice of Pesaran (2004).
Spatial dependence, a subset of cross-sectional dependence, is also of concern.
Evidence of spatial dependence suggests that cross-sectional dependence is greater
among states that are “neighbors,” in which neighbors can be described in terms of
geographic or economic measures. The following eight figures illustrate the spatial
correlations among states. It is interesting to note that instead of state policies
converging they are instead becoming more clustered with their contiguous neighbors.
On the other hand, income’s spatial patterns appears to be fairly consistent in both
periods. Although both periods exhibit signs of spatial correlation it appears that the
nature of the spatial correlation has changed between the two periods thus warranting
a dynamic analysis of the spatial correlations among fiscal variables.
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2.6 Discussion of Spending and Revenue Trends
A look at the raw data reveal interesting patterns that warrant a more rigorous
statistical analysis to unfold important fiscal relationships and adjustments over time.
The first major observation is the large increase among fiscal variables (per capita
and as a percent of income) including debt over time. State governments are directing
a large fraction of economic resources, and thus understanding how these resources
are being spent by state governments is imperative for understanding state based
economic growth. Furthermore, based on the raw data it appears that states are
relying more heavily on revenue sources other than taxes to finance expenditures
and debt. To better understand these fiscal relationships and dynamic adjustments
Chapter 4 provides a statistical analysis of the intertemporal budget constraint. Also,
the close relationship between transfer revenues and transfer expenditures exhibited
over time is suggestive that states are using transfer revenues to finance transfer
expenditures, which is quite surprising given the different programs each are intended
to fund. This idea is developed more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
The other major revelation from the preliminary analysis is the significant amount
of cross-sectional dependence inherent in the data, which is typically ignored in the
current literature. To this end, the remainder of this dissertation all the variables are
demeaned using cross-sectional averages as suggested by Pesaran (2004). Further-
more, the spatial maps above indicate further cross-sectional dependence in the form
of spatial dependence. To better understand these spatial correlations and their effect
on state government spending behavior Chapter 5 employs developments in spatial
econometrics to estimate spillovers from grants and expenditures in neighboring states
and their effect on own-state fiscal policies.
21
3 Exploring the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Linkages: Is the State a Conduit
for Funds?
3.1 Introduction
The growth in government spending and composition has changed substantially over
the years. In large part, government spending has moved away from defense spend-
ing and towards social insurance programs. What is particularly pronounced is the
increasing role of state spending, both as a percentage of gross domestic product
and of total government spending. In particular, state spending has increased from
fifteen percent of total government spending in 1960 to twenty-four percent in 2008.
Moreover, intergovernmental transfers have significantly increased over the past five
decades as shown in Figure 13. From the states’ perspective–being a donor and re-
cipient of transfers–both transfer revenues and transfer expenditures have increased
substantially since the late 1960’s. Furthermore, the relationship between these two
series remains remarkably synchronized over time.
In association with Musgrave’s (1959) allocative branch of the public sector, fiscal
resources are being devolved to state and local governments at an ever increasing
rate. Of course this devolution of spending responsibilities to state and local gov-
ernments can be efficiency enhancing as described by Oates’ (1972) Decentralization
Theorem that states that non-uniform provision of public goods provided by local-
level governments is more efficient than a uniform provision of public goods provided
by more centralized governments, since local-level governments are in a better posi-
tion to match local benefits with local costs. As noted by Oates (1999), “provision of
public services should be located at the lowest level of government encompassing, in
a spatial sense, the relevant benefits and costs.” In addition, Tiebout (1956) showed
that individuals will sort themselves across heterogeneous jurisdictions according to
their preferences. Therefore, the option to “vote with ones’ feet” enables preference
revelation with respect to public goods that is efficiency enhancing.2
However, efficiency gains provided by decentralization can be diminished by the
externality nature of many public goods that induce spillover benefits to neighboring
jurisdictions (see Chapter 5 for more on externalities in fiscal federalism).3 Of course,
in the presence of inter-state externalities the federal government can choose to pro-
vide the public good directly (e.g. national defense) or they may choose to internalize
the spillover through the use of intergovernmental transfers. In fact, one of the four
distinct roles served by the national government, according to Baicker et al. (2010),
involve structuring intergovernmental transfers to correct interstate spillovers. This
role is of particular interest as states and the federal government use intergovern-
mental transfers to encourage (or discourage) spending by lower level governments.
Among the most common state-level expenditures that potentially exhibit external-
ities and are among the highest recipients of government grants include, education,
2For an extensive survey of the consistency of the current empirical literature with the Tiebout
model consult Baicker et al. (2010).
3Using US state-level data, Case (1993) finds significant evidence of interstate spillovers.
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health and hospital, highway, and public welfare.
Interestingly, as noted by Wildasin (2010), despite the disparate programs fi-
nanced by federal and state transfers, there exists a surprisingly stable relationship
between federal-to-state transfers and state-to-local transfers as shown in Figure 14.
This proportion, aside from pre-1960, has never dropped below 60% and even steadily
approaches 100% in the late 2000’s. Even more astonishing is the persistence of this
relationship against a backdrop of an ever changing political, economic, and demo-
graphic environment. Over this period the US has been through multiple wars, twelve
presidents with varying political ideologies, multiple business cycles, technological ad-
vancements, and the aging “baby boomer” generation, to name a few.
This persistent stable nexus between federal-to-state transfers and state-to-local
transfers, as observed by Wildasin (2010), brings forth the question: do states act as
a “conduit” for funds from the federal government to local governments? Figure 15 il-
lustrates the potential channels through which federal aid can be allocated. As shown,
federal aid can be used by the state government to: (1) increase state spending on own
sources (channel 1); (2) increase aid expenditures to local governments (channel 2)
and (3) cut own revenues (e.g. tax cuts) (channel 3). The conduit hypothesis concerns
itself with the second channel in which federal aid is funneled to local governments
in the form of transfer expenditures. This question is of interest as federal-to-state
transfers serve very disparate programs compared to state-to-local transfers. For ex-
ample, the largest federal-to-state grant category is assigned to public welfare (which
includes Medicaid), whereas the largest state-to-local grant category is devoted to
education. Consequently, resources directed towards public welfare spending could
potentially be captured by the state and diverted towards education in the form of
transfer aid to local governments. To further motivate this idea, Figure 16 displays
the time-series plots of the largest transfer revenue category (i.e. public welfare) and
largest transfer expenditure category (i.e. education). Although these two transfer
categories are inherently unrelated, they follow a strikingly synchronized relationship
that persists over time.
Recently, the US has moved away from matching grants and toward block grants
for such programs as welfare. For example, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 converted
the welfare program titled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from
a matching grant to a block grant program titled Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). This switch gave states considerable more autonomy in their welfare
spending. Conceivably, the initiation of this program could potentially exacerbate
the issue of resource diversion away from welfare and towards other expenditure
categories if the interests of the federal government and state government do not fully
align. Decentralized governments, such as state governments, also have an incentive
to provide benefit levels less than neighboring states to prevent migration of welfare
recipients into the state. For instance, there is an extensive literature on competition
among states which incentivize states to divert spending away from non-competitive
resources and towards competitive resources (e.g. to encourage or discourage mobility
23
0
5
10
15
20
pe
r C
ap
ita
 (2
00
5 d
oll
ars
)
1940 1960 1980 2000 20201951 1970 1990 2008
Year
Federal-State Transfers State-Local Transfers
Figure 13: Federal and State Transfers
40
60
80
10
0
0
20
Pe
rc
en
t
1940 1960 2000 20201951 1970 1980 1990 2008
Year
Figure 14: State Transfers as a Percent of Federal Transfers
24
Federal Government 
State Government 
Local 
Governments 
Intergovernmental 
Transfers 
Intergovernmental 
Transfers 
Direct 
Expenditures 
Own 
Revenues 
1 2 3 
Citizens 
State  
Programs 
Figure 15: The Conduit Hypothesis
0
5
10
pe
r C
ap
ita
 (2
00
5 d
oll
ars
)
1940 1960 1980 2000 20201951 1970 1990 2008
Year
Public Welfare (Federal-State) Education (State-Local)
Figure 16: Public Welfare Transfer Revenues and Education Transfer
Expenditures
25
of certain residents).4
This brief look at the relationship between transfer revenues and transfer expen-
ditures motivates a more rigorous analysis to uncover the underlying relationship
between transfer revenues and transfer expenditures. Knowing how lower level gov-
ernments spend transfers, as discussed by Inman (2008), helps in the design of more
efficient government transfer policies; and in understanding how governments spend
citizens’ income provides valuable insight into how citizen preferences are being rep-
resented by government. As opposed to the current literature, which looks at the
stimulative effect of total transfers on total expenditures at the state and local lev-
els, this study examines the extent to which federal aid to states is spent on aid
to local governments. The substantial amount of autonomy afforded to local gov-
ernments in their taxation, expenditures and borrowing (see Wildasin, 2008) offer
another channel for fiscal resources to be mis-directed, thus further distorting the
final funding destination of federal aid. Furthermore, answering this question exposes
a deeper understanding of the flypaper effect as it applies to federal aid spent on
aid to local governments. Recent developments in non-stationary panel time-series
techniques allow for exploiting the underlying dynamic relationships while allowing
for heterogeneous state responses to federal aid, which provide further insight into
the relationship between aid to states and aid to local governments that assists in the
proper design and implementation of transfers.
3.1.1 The Conduit Hypothesis
Transfers link all levels of government within a federalist system. The state is a spe-
cial case as they are a recipient of grants from the federal government and donor of
grants to local governments. The position of the state government, between a cen-
tralized government and many decentralized local governments, allows it to better
align incentives and reduce transaction costs.5 Presumably, state governments have
more knowledge concerning the demands of the median voter, either directly or in-
directly through local governments, for which they could increase efficiency through
their autonomy in allocating federal grants to its own expenditures or by funneling
these funds down to local governments to internalize local spillovers and satisfy the
demands of the median voter. Furthermore, it is conceivable that state governments
possess more knowledge, relative to the central government, of the local benefits
and costs associated with public services (Oates, 2005). This observation warrants
an analysis of the degree to which states, instead of using grants to fund its own
projects, funnel the grants to local governments. It is imperative to disaggregate the
response of own expenditures and aid expenditures since funneling federal aid to local
4With respect to fiscal competition, mobility of resources is of particular interest. For example,
Baicker (2005) shows that mobility is the best predictor of interstate interaction and Hoyt (1993)
shows that the mobility of residents affects the outcomes of tax and expenditure competition. For
an extensive review of the empirical evidence of fiscal competition see Brueckner (2003).
5See Oates (2005) for an extensive review of the literature on Second Generation Theory of Fiscal
Federalism.
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governments provides another avenue for resource diversion.6 The conduit hypothesis
is closely related to the flypaper effect. In fact, the conduit hypothesis corresponds to
a flypaper effect with respect to transfer revenues stimulating transfer expenditures
greater than a pure income effect. In what follows, a closer investigation of the fly-
paper effect is given to ascertain the allocation of transfers through various potential
channels of distribution. For instance, is federal aid used to stimulate direct spend-
ing (or tax cuts) or instead being funneled to local governments in the form of aid
expenditures? Differentiating the stimulative effect on direct spending and spending
on aid to local governments is necessary since federal aid funneled through the states
allow autonomous local governments to determine the final use of federal resources.
Previous studies of the fungibility of intergovernmental transfers and the flypaper
effect certainly raise the possibility that aid to state governments, for whatever os-
tensible purpose, may in the end be spent wholly or partially in the form of transfers
to local governments. Consistent with the “flypaper” notion, such a use of federal
assistance to states would suggest that “money that originates in the public sector
stays in the public sector”, even as, consistent with the principle of fungibility, that
assistance might ultimately support public purposes far removed from those of the
programs through which states receive fiscal transfers. The goal of the present study
is to investigate this “conduit” hypothesis, ascertaining the impact of federal aid to
states on state assistance to localities. Using disaggregated data, it is possible to
study not only the total impact of federal aid on local government revenues, but to
determine, by state, and by source of federal funds (such as welfare or Medicaid)
the impact of such aid on specific categories of state assistance to localities for such
purposes as education or highways.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 constructs the error correction model
using the partial adjustment mechanism; Section 3.3 discusses the data, methodol-
ogy and results, which include short-run and long-run estimates, an analysis of the
flypaper effect, and impulse response functions; Section 3.4 provides a discussion of
the results; and concluding remarks are given in Section 3.5.
3.2 Partial Adjustment and Error Correction Model
To guide the construction for the long-run model, both theory and previous empirical
findings were used in the selection of the variables and beyond that, parsimony and
ease of interpretation were considered.7 The long-run model is based on a simplified
version of Black’s (1948) Median Voter model in which the state government maxi-
mizes the utility of the median voter subject to the median voter’s full income (i.e.
personal income and the median voter’s share of the intergovernmental grants from
the federal government). The assumption in the model here is that the median voter
6A related and equally important question relates to how the local governments use these grants.
Conceivably, local governments can then further divert resources. This question is beyond the scope
of this paper and a topic for further inquiry.
7While determining the response of a change in federal aid it’s important to note that certain
programs will elicit price and income effects, but for purpose here the only interest is in the overall
effect.
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demands a certain amount of spending resources to be devolved to local governments.
According to Oates (1985), in reference to a discussion with the American economic
historian John Wallis, individuals have more control over public decisions made at
the local level and thus will demand a wider range of functions and responsibilities
at localized governments as opposes to state and national governments. Therefore,
the following model is a linear stochastic equation of the Median voter’s demand for
local government aid (in expenditure form):
E∗it = ai + β1Git + β2Iit + β3EXit + γXit + it (1)
where i and t index state and time, respectively. E∗it is desired level of intergovern-
mental expenditures from the median voter perspective; Git include intergovernmental
transfers from the federal government; Iit represents personal income; EXit is residual
expenditures, which is assumed to serve as a substitute for transfer expenditures; and
Xit is a vector of control variables that are important shifters of the median voter’s
demand curve, and include the unemployment rate, population density and depen-
dency ratio. The parameters β1 and β2 represents the long-run impact of changes
in federal aid and income on transfer expenditures. Therefore, β1 represents the
marginal propensity to spend federal aid on aid to local governments, thus providing
an estimate of the state’s propensity to serve as a conduit for funds. The long-run
depends on factors such as resource fungibility, state autonomy, and changes in the
environment relating to demographics, economics, and politics.
In order to make equation (1) operational the partial adjustment mechanism is
used. The partial adjustment mechanism is defined as:
Eit − Eit−1 = λ(E∗it − Eit−1) (2)
where the left hand side represents the actual change in expenditures and the right
hand side represents desired change in expenditures. The parameter, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
is the coefficient of adjustment. When λ = 1 the adjustment from Eit−1 to Eit is
instantaneous and when λ = 0 there is no adjustment. Solving equation (2) for E∗it
gives:
E∗it =
1
λ
Eit − 1− λ
λ
Eit−1 (3)
Substituting equation (3) into equation (1) (ignoring control variables) yields:
Eit = λai + (1− λ)Eit−1 + λβ1Git + λβ2Iit + λβ3EXit + λit (4)
where the short-run multipliers are b1 = λβ1, b2 = λβ2 and b3 = λβ2 and the long-run
multipliers are β1 =
b1
λ
, β2 =
b2
λ
and β3 =
b3
λ
. Subtracting Eit−1 from both sides of
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(4) yields:
∆Eit = λai + λEit−1 + λβ1Git + λβ2Iit + λβ3EXit + λit (5)
then adding and subtracting λβ1Git, λβ2Iit, and λβ3EXit equation (5) can be re-
written as:
∆Eit = λai + b1∆Git + b2∆Iit + b3∆EXit + λ(Eit−1 + β1Git−1 + β2Iit−1 + β3EXit) + λit (6)
Equation (3.6) is the error correction representation of equation (1). The short-run
multipliers are given by b1 through b3 and the parameters β1 through β3 represent
long-run multipliers. Both b1 and β1 measure the degree of pass-through from federal
aid to aid to local governments. Finally, the coefficient of adjustment, λ, provides a
measure of the adjustment to long-run equilibrium.
3.3 Empirical Section
3.3.1 Data
The variables used in this chapter include residual expenditures (i.e. intergovernmen-
tal expenditures to local governments subtracted from total expenditures), intergov-
ernmental expenditures to local governments (local aid) and intergovernmental rev-
enue from the federal government (federal aid). These two intergovernmental transfer
series are then disaggregated into public welfare, highway, health and hospital and
education in order to examine the relationship among the diverse aid categories.8
All variables are in per capita constant 2005 dollars. Other control variables in-
clude population density, unemployment rate, and the dependency ratio, which are
understood to be important determinants of state-level spending. Table 4 provides
the summary statistics for each variable (in per capita constant 2005 dollars) under
consideration. Notice the similarities between the mean of transfer revenues and the
mean of transfer expenditures. Also note that public welfare is the largest transfer
revenue category and education is the largest transfer expenditure category, whereas
health and hospital is the smallest for both.
To proceed in examining the underlying dynamic relationship between transfer
revenues and transfer expenditures, the next section explores the long-run cointegrat-
ing relationship among the variables in equation (1).
3.3.2 Aggregate Sample
Cointegration Analysis
Prior to estimation the variables must be stationary, therefore the Fisher-type
tests by Choi (2001), Breitung (2000) and the Im et al. (2003) are used to test for
8Census definitions of each can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Aggregates
Own Expenditures 1033.31 1351.00
Own Revenues 1143.15 1474.16
Transfer Revenues 356.83 500.99
Transfer Expenditures 359.85 472.85
Personal Income 10124.60 12147.70
Disaggregated Intergovernmental Revenues
Education 60.12 82.18
Highway 42.51 58.67
Health and Hospital 18.35 30.51
Public Welfare 181.64 270.48
Disaggregated Intergovernmental Expenditures
Education 249.17 325.97
Highway 17.52 26.73
Health and Hospital 10.41 25.48
Public Welfare 22.58 65.57
Disaggregated Own Expenditures
Education 198.37 257.81
Highway 99.68 123.82
Health and Hospital 78.76 106.37
Public Welfare 263.25 388.69
Residual Expenditures 1033.31 1351.00
Notes: Values are per capita 2005 dollars.
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unit roots (see Appendix B for details). According to these tests the variables are
all integrated to order one in levels and stationary in first differences. Given this
fact, in conjunction with the synchronized relationship between transfer revenues
and transfer expenditures as shown in Figures 13 and 16, it’s possible there exists
a long-run relationship among these variables. In other words, it is possible that
a linear combination of the non-stationary variables may be stationary and thus
cointegrated. Indeed, theory predicts a cointegrated relationship among federal aid,
personal income, and state expenditures as described by the median voter demand
equation. Stationarity of the error term, it, is a necessary condition for equation
(1) to represent a long-run relationship.9 According to the Pedroni’s (2000) residual-
based cointegration tests the equations are indeed cointegrating (see Appendix C for
details). Evidence of cointegration is indicative of a long-run relationship among the
variables which can be represented by the simplified median voter’s demand equation
(1) rewritten here.
Eit = αi + β1Git + β2Iit + β3EXit + γXit + it (7)
The parameter β1, β2, β3 and γ represent the cointegrating vectors, where the pa-
rameter β1 provides a measure of long-run pass-through from federal aid to local
governments. 10
A necessary and sufficient condition for the conduit effect is evidence of flypaper
behavior with respect to the stimulative effect of transfer revenues on transfer ex-
penditures. In other words, rejection of the equivalence theorem (β1 = β2) suggests
that federal aid stimulate aid to local governments more than can be explained by a
pure income effect, therefore favoring the conduit hypothesis. The conduit effect can
be broken down into the “strong” and “weak” form. The strong form of the conduit
effect can by tested by the restriction, β1 = 1 meaning complete pass-through of
federal aid to local governments. The weak form allows for incomplete pass-through
and is tested by the restriction 1 > β1 > β2.
Long-run Estimates
Given significant evidence in favor of cointegration, the long-run equation (7) is es-
timated using a number of methods: (1) Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV)(2)
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) of Kao & Chiang (2000) and Chiang & Kao (2002); (3) Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS): and (4) Pooled Mean Group (PMG) of Pesaran et al.
(1999). Cointegrated relationships have the nice feature of super consistency, there-
fore LSDV is used to estimate the cointegration vectors; however, these estimates
suffer from an asymptotic bias making the standard errors invalid. Using Monte
Carlo simulations Kao & Chiang (2000) show that fully modified OLS (FMOLS)
does not improve on OLS and DOLS outperforms FMOLS in small samples. DOLS
is estimated by augmenting the cointegrating equation (7) with lags and leads of the
9Of course, evidence in favor of cointegration could also mean there is a third factor not accounted
for that is driving the cointegration.
10The use of control variables substantially limits the number of observations and are therefore used
only as a robustness check.
31
first differenced regressors, which capture the dynamics around the equilibrium and
circumvents problems associated with endogenous feedback and serial correlation.
Recent attention has been focused on the endogeneity of grants and the correc-
tion thereof (see, e.g., Knight, 2002). Although DOLS remains robust in the presence
of endogeneity it does not correct for it. To correct for the possible endogeneity of
grants 2SLS is used. Given the lack of “good” instruments, lags of transfer revenues
are used as instruments. For this estimation technique the Hansen J test for overi-
dentifying restrictions is reported to ensure the moment conditions are satisfied and
the instruments are valid. Finally, the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran et al.
(1999) estimates the error correction representation of the cointegrating equation and
constructs the cointegrating vectors from the short-run coefficient estimates using
maximum likelihood. The PMG estimator allows the short-run dynamics, adjustment
coefficients, and error variances to vary across groups while constraining the long-run
coefficients to be equal across groups. Therefore, the PMG estimators permits inves-
tigation of the homogeneous long-run coefficients without imposing homogeneity in
the short run.
Panel A of Table 5 provide the resulting estimates of the cointegrating vectors
using each estimation technique. Columns 1-4 give the resulting cointegrating vectors
excluding the control variables. Columns 1 uses LSDV to estimate the cointegrating
vectors with an estimated pass-through of 0.50; however, given that this estimate is
potentially biased, Columns 2-4 use techniques that are more robust. Dynamic OLS,
in Column 2, shows a pass-through estimate of 0.604, which is surprisingly close
to the 2SLS estimate of 0.606 in Column 3. This finding supports the robustness
of DOLS in the presence of endogeneity. Column 4 reports the cointegrating vectors
using the PMG estimator. This method shows a much higher estimate for the conduit
effect with a magnitude of 0.80. The coefficient associated with income falls in the
range of 0.01-0.03 and is significantly smaller than each coefficient associated with
federal aid. Also, the coefficient on residual expenditures is negative suggestive of
the substitutability between direct expenditures and intergovernmental expenditures.
Specifications in Columns 5-8 include the control variables. Although smaller, the
estimates confirm the findings in columns1-4.11 Tests of the conduit hypothesis in
Panel B reject the strong form of the conduit effect, but also reject the equivalence
theorem for each specification, thus yielding in favor of the weak form of the conduit
effect and the incomplete pass-through of federal aid to local governments.
Table 6 provides cointegrating estimates by state using 2SLS. The results show a
total of fifteen states supporting the conduit hypothesis. Of the fifteen states, nine
states support the complete pass-through of federal transfers (FL, ME, MD, MA,
NY, UT, WA, WV) and the other six support incomplete pass-through (CT, IL, MI,
MS, PA, MN). However, with only fifty-three observations caution should be given
to concluding anything from these estimates. One thing of particular interest and
perhaps deserves more attention is that of the fifteen states that support the conduit
11Appendix D reports the cointegration estimates when own revenues are the dependent variables.
The results suggest a complementarity between own revenues and intergovernmental revenues,
which is consistent with the findings of Stine (1994)
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hypothesis, only one of them is a republican state (UT) (based on the average margins
of victory for presidential elections from 1992 to 2008)12 and two were swing states
(FL and WV).
12These calculations were based off estimates from Wikipedia.
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Table 6: Cointegration Estimates by State
Residual
State Grants Income Expenditures β1 = β2 β1 = 1
AL -0.205 (0.646) 0.055** (0.024) -0.301 (0.366) 0.173 [0.677] 3.483 [0.062]
AZ -0.145 (0.103) 0.015 (0.017) -0.123* (0.064) 2.481 [0.115] 122.9 [0.000]
AR -6.142** (3.087) -0.135** (0.057) 1.600*** (0.597) 3.927 [0.048] 5.354 [0.021]
CA -0.167 (0.504) 0.200*** (0.023) -0.322 (0.272) 0.575 [0.448] 5.351 [0.021]
CO -0.015 (0.128) -0.029*** (0.004) 0.056 (0.068) 0.0131 [0.909] 63.26 [0.000]
CT 0.495*** (0.183) -0.008 (0.008) -0.004 (0.090) 8.183 [0.004] 7.594 [0.006]
DE -0.232 (0.255) -0.037*** (0.011) -0.006 (0.022) 0.571 [0.45] 23.33 [0.000]
FL 1.744*** (0.490) 0.041 (0.026) -0.404** (0.196) 12.28 [0.000] 2.311 [0.128]
GA -0.367** (0.183) 0.024** (0.009) 0.278*** (0.059) 4.736 [0.030] 56.01 [0.000]
ID 0.154 (0.451) -0.006 (0.012) 0.168 (0.176) 0.126 [0.722] 3.52 [0.061]
IL 0.601** (0.301) -0.020* (0.012) -0.21 (0.223) 4.178 [0.041] 1.753 [0.186]
IN -0.713 (0.637) 0.067*** (0.012) 0.036 (0.229) 1.512 [0.219] 7.241 [0.007]
IA -0.612* (0.366) 0.041** (0.017) -0.048 (0.095) 2.937 [0.087] 19.36 [0.000]
KS -0.389 (0.274) -0.029 (0.033) 0.171* (0.090) 1.542 [0.214] 25.63 [0.000]
KY 0.387 (0.466) 0.039*** (0.003) -0.229*** (0.042) 0.563 [0.453] 1.73 [0.188]
LA 0.79 (1.176) 0.087 (0.067) -0.719 (1.095) 0.4 [0.527] 0.032 [0.858]
ME 0.850*** (0.300) 0.037*** (0.013) -0.702*** (0.128) 7.356 [0.007] 0.248 [0.618]
MD 0.852*** (0.313) 0.008 (0.010) 0.091 (0.234) 7.736 [0.005] 0.223 [0.637]
MA 1.182*** (0.360) 0.082** (0.033) -0.729*** (0.267) 11.11 [0.001] 0.256 [0.613]
MI 5.416*** (1.993) 0.046 (0.048) -2.824*** (0.431) 6.985 [0.008] 4.91 [0.027]
MN 0.672** (0.298) 0.207*** (0.016) -0.636*** (0.150) 2.673 [0.102] 1.211 [0.271]
MS 0.289*** (0.090) 0 (0.007) -0.045 (0.103) 12.19 [0.000] 62.91 [0.000]
MO 0.157 (0.206) 0.119*** (0.009) 0.134*** (0.035) 0.0335 [0.855] 16.81 [0.000]
MT -0.235* (0.127) 0.007 (0.015) -0.011 (0.142) 4.205 [0.040] 95.21 [0.000]
NE -1.431** (0.612) 0.139*** (0.050) 0.635*** (0.107) 5.867 [0.015] 15.79 [0.000]
NV -0.247* (0.131) 0.037*** (0.007) 0.141*** (0.053) 5.191 [0.023] 90.32 [0.000]
NH 1.139 (0.864) -0.081** (0.032) -1.017*** (0.220) 2.138 [0.144] 0.0259 [0.872]
NJ 2.366*** (0.610) 0.018* (0.010) 0.282** (0.110) 15.23 [0.0001] 5.025 [0.025]
NM 0.059 (0.536) -0.048*** (0.011) 0.27 (0.253) 0.0401 [0.841] 3.078 [0.079]
NY 1.331** (0.621) 0.085** (0.040) -0.449 (0.583) 4.441 [0.035] 0.284 [0.594]
NC 1.737 (3.362) 0.087*** (0.033) -0.611 (0.607) 0.245 [0.620] 0.0481 [0.826]
ND -1.047*** (0.207) -0.032** (0.014) 0.330** (0.130) 25.55 [0.000] 97.82 [0.000]
OH -1.386*** (0.197) -0.025** (0.010) 0.261 (0.186) 46.14 [0.000] 146.1 [0.000]
OK -0.806*** (0.188) 0.053*** (0.009) 0.1 (0.089) 20.56 [0.000] 92.38 [0.000]
OR -0.059 (0.172) 0.012 (0.022) 0.290*** (0.107) 0.138 [0.71] 37.95 [0.000]
PA 0.359** (0.171) -0.048*** (0.017) -0.303*** (0.080) 6.546 [0.011] 14.12 [0.000]
RI 1.119 (0.798) -0.091 (0.076) -0.419*** (0.162) 2.055 [0.152] 0.0221 [0.882]
SC -0.377 (0.325) 0.047*** (0.009) 0.13 (0.114) 1.635 [0.201] 17.95 [0.000]
SD -0.508* (0.300) 0.042*** (0.015) 0.811*** (0.069) 3.632 [0.057] 25.26 [0.000]
TN -0.304*** (0.104) 0.048*** (0.016) 0.244*** (0.048) 9.513 [0.002] 156.5 [0.000]
TX 0.566 (1.142) 0.022 (0.029) 0.217 (0.318) 0.236 [0.627] 0.145 [0.704]
UT 0.963*** (0.131) 0.011** (0.005) 0.026 (0.068) 49.81 [0.000] 0.0802 [0.777]
VT 0.664 (0.629) 0.425*** (0.055) 0.247 (0.287) 0.151 [0.698] 0.285 [0.593]
VA -0.202 (0.218) 0.008 (0.019) 0.257 (0.195) 0.988 [0.32] 30.51 [0.000]
WA 0.794** (0.327) 0.025 (0.036) 0.207 (0.132) 6.947 [0.008] 0.4 [0.527]
WV 0.558* (0.297) 0.043*** (0.012) -0.194*** (0.065) 3.258 [0.071] 2.216 [0.137]
WI -1.848*** (0.345) 0.378*** (0.059) -0.413* (0.223) 32.34 [0.000] 68.19 [0.000]
WY 0.359 (0.314) -0.015 (0.011) 0.57 (0.476) 1.449 [0.229] 4.17 [0.041]
Notes: Each state has 53 observations. Robust standard errors using the Huber-White sand-
wich estimator are in parentheses and probability values are in brackets. Asterisks denote
significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel Error Correction model
Given estimates of the cointegrating model, the panel error correction model of
equation (3.6) is estimated using the panel analogue of the Engle & Granger (1987)
two-step method by first estimating the long-run model specified in equation (7) in
order to obtain the estimated residuals and then incorporating the lagged predicted
residuals as an additional regressor into the error correction model to capture adjust-
ment to long-run disequilibria. Therefore equation (3.6) can be generalized into the
following error correction model:
∆Eit =
n∑
k=1
ai,1,t−k∆Eit−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,1,t−k∆Git−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,2,t−k∆Iit−k+
n∑
k=0
bi,3,t−k∆EXit−k + λi̂it−1 + uit
(8)
The short-run multipliers are given by a1, b1, b2, and b3 and the inclusion of ̂it−1
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from the cointegrating equation is the error correction term.13 The residuals uit for
each equation are a composite error of the following form:
uit = αi + αit+ ωit
in which the residuals are a function of state-specific intercepts represented by αi, a
state-specific time trend αit and a white noise error term ωit.
In estimating the error correction model, estimators such as SURE are infeasible
due to the large T and large N structure of the panel. To accommodate the large
T and large N structure of the data while exploiting dynamic properties, the mean-
group (MG) estimator developed by Pesaran & Smith (1995) is used to estimate the
short-run coefficients, state-specific intercepts and long-run adjustment coefficient.
Therefore, the estimation strategy for estimating the error correction model is in the
spirit of Pesaran et al. (1999)’s pooled mean-group (PMG) estimator, in which the
short-run coefficients are allowed to be heterogeneous while constraining the long-
run coefficients to be homogeneous across states.14 The main benefit of the PMG
estimator is that it relaxes the homogeneity assumption imposed on short-run coeffi-
cients. The large variances across transfer revenues and transfer expenditures found
in Table 4 suggest the heterogeneity assumption on the short-run dynamics is more
appropriate. PMG estimation of the short-run dynamics involves estimating equation
(8) separately for each state and constructing the coefficients using an un-weighted
average of the state-specific coefficients. According to Pesaran & Smith (1995) these
unweighted averages of the group-specific regressions provide a consistent estimate of
the average of the state-specific estimators. Furthermore, estimating the error correc-
tion model using the PMG estimator in first differences and including sufficient lags
ensures the residuals are free from serial correlation and the explanatory variables are
exogenous (Pesaran et al., 1999).
Short-run Estimates
Results from estimating the error correction model of equation (8) are in Table 7.
The results from Table 7 show strikingly different results compared to the long-run
estimates. Here, $1 of federal aid stimulates transfer expenditures by only $0.09. Tests
of Granger causality support that federal aid Granger-cause aid to local government;
however, the accumulated short-run estimates (the sum of the contemporaneous and
lagged coefficients) show that the effect of federal aid is insignificantly different from
zero. In Panel B the test results show support for the incomplete pass-through of
13The optimal lag length of two for the variables in the error correction model was chosen by the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and verified by Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The
results do not appear to be influenced by the choice of the lag length.
14Other competing estimators include dynamic fixed effects and the mean-group estimators. The
fixed effects estimator assumes heterogeneous group-specific intercepts, but constrains the error
variances and all other coefficients to be homogeneous. The mean-group estimator assumes both
the short-run and long-run coefficients are heterogeneous along with the long-run adjustment
coefficient, error variances and intercepts. The pooled mean-group estimator, developed by Pesaran
et al. (1999), offers an intermediary between the two by constraining the long-run coefficients to be
homogeneous while allowing for heterogeneous short-run slope coefficients, which usually increases
efficiency.
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Table 7: Mean-Group Estimates of the Short-Run Pass-Through
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Residual
Grants Income Expenditures
Panel A: Contemporaneous Pass-through
bit 0.092* 0.000 0.043
(0.049) (0.007) (0.027)
Panel B: Tests of the Conduit Effect
H0 : bit = bit−1 = 0 8.382** 1.569 3.805
[0.015] [0.456] [0.149]
bit + bit−1 -0.019 0.009 0.009
(0.070) (0.010) (0.010)
Panel C: Error Correction and MAL
it−1 -0.101***
(0.021)
Mean Adjustment Lag 9.00 10.00 9.50
Observations 2,688 2,688 2,688
Number of States 48 48 48
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and probability values are
in brackets. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
federal aid to aid to local governments given by the rejection of the equivalence
theorem.
Panel C of Table 7 displays the estimate of the speed of adjustment to equilibrium.
The speed of adjustment is negative, statistically significant, and less than one in
absolute value, suggesting a dynamically stable long-run relationship. To put these
estimates in perspective, panel C provides estimates for the mean adjustment lag.
The mean adjustment lag is calculated as (1−b0)
λ
and provides a measure of the lag
transmission. In other words, the mean adjustment lag measures the average time
it takes changes in transfer expenditures to completely adjust to changes in transfer
revenues and income. For example, following an increase in income, it takes transfer
expenditures ten years to fully adjust whereas it takes only nine years for transfers
expenditures to fully adjust to changes in federal transfers. These results reconcile
the difference between the short and long-run results, as it takes many years for
federal aid to fully pass-through to local governments. With respect to the conduit
hypothesis, federal funds take as much as nine years to fully flow through the state
government down to local governments. Comparing the short-run estimates with the
long-run estimates, it appears to take many years for federal aid to fully transmit
to local governments, as evidenced by the mean adjustment lag. Consequently, the
conduit effect appears to be a long-run phenomenon. Given these long time lags,
the next section provides a more illustrative view of the underlying dynamics using
impulse response functions.
Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions are generated to visually examine the dynamics of
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transfer expenditures over time given a one-time shock to federal aid and income.
Following Jorda’s (2005) method, impulse response functions are created from one-
step-ahead forecasts using linear local projections. Linear local projections provide
consistent estimates using simple regression techniques, such as ordinary least squares.
Moreover, this method allows impulse response functions to be calculated from a single
equation (see, e.g., Brady, 2011), as opposed to a system of equations, and is robust
to various types of misspecification commonly found in VARs and VECMs. Following
Haug & Smith (2007) the local projections are applied to levels data by estimating
the following equation using OLS with state-specific intercepts.15
Eit+s = a
s
i +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,1,t−kGit−k +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,2,t−kIit−k +
1∑
k=1
bs+1i,3,t−kEXit−k + u
s
it
where s=1,2,...,h. The impulse response function is then calculated as:
ÎRF (i, t, s, d) = b̂si,t, s = 1, 2, ..., h (9)
where d represents a $1 shock in federal aid or income at time t and s denotes the
forecasting period. The standard errors and corresponding confidence bands are cal-
culated at each regression. For example, the response of intergovernmental aid to local
governments to a shock of federal aid is given by b̂s1,t for s = 1, 2, ..., h. The impulse
response functions illustrate the dynamics leading to the long-run equilibrium.
Figure 17: One-time Shock of Federal Aid
15Using a Monte Carlo approach, Lin & Tsay (1996) show that direct forecasts perform better in
the presence of unknown unit roots and cointegration and when unit roots and cointegration are
ignored completely. This is due to unit root tests recomending too few or too many cointegrating
vectors resulting in misspecification of the error correction model (Haug & Smith, 2007).
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Figure 18: One-time Shock of Personal Income
The impulse response functions uncover significant differences in the dynamics
over time in response to shocks of federal aid and income. Figure 17 shows the
response of transfer expenditures to a one-time shock in federal aid. Interestingly,
federal aid induces a small immediate increase in transfer expenditures, but produces
a much greater effect over time. In fact, after period t+9 the effect of federal aid
on transfer expenditures approaches one and these coefficients are all insignificantly
different from one which confirms the strong form of the conduit hypothesis. These
results illustrate the dynamics leading to long-run equilibrium. The mean adjustment
lag of nine years coincide with Figure 17 in that is takes roughly nine years before
converging to one. A $1 shock in community income shown in Figure 18 shows no
discernible response by transfer expenditures. The impulse response functions not
only confirm the previous estimates, but also show that transfer expenditures appear
to converge to unity after nine years, which coincides with the strong form of the
conduit hypothesis and confirm the long-run nature of the conduit behavior among
states.
Overall, the aggregate results reveal that a cut in federal aid to states has a large
effect on aid to local governments greater than a reduction in income. The statistical
relationship between aggregate federal-to-state transfers and state-to-local warrants
an analysis on the interactions among the different transfer categories. In order to
better understand the presence of resource diversion and the relationships among
the various programs funded by both transfer revenues and transfer expenditures,
the following sections repeat the analysis using disaggregate transfers revenues and
transfer expenditures.
3.3.3 Disaggregated Sample
In this section aggregate transfer expenditures and transfer revenues are disaggre-
gated, with parsimony in mind, into the four largest transfer categories including,
public welfare, education, highways, and health and hospitals (See Appendix A for
definitions). I take a more agnostic approach as to the theoretical relationship among
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these transfer categories and instead use an error correction model to reveal the
relationships in the data. For comparison purposes direct expenditures are also dis-
aggregated into the four categories. Given the differences relating to the funding of
each transfer revenue and transfer expenditure program this section unveils a more
clear picture of grant fungibility and resource diversion. For example, if interests
between the federal government and state governments are mis-aligned it’s possible
states use public welfare aid to fund education aid to local governments. The coin-
tegrating equation representing the disaggregated transfer categories is given by the
following equation:
Eit = αi + β1ED
r
it + β2HW
r
it + β3HH
r
it + β4PW
r
it + β5Iit + it (10)
where Eit is a vector of intergovernmental expenditures and direct expenditures disag-
gregated into, education, highway, health and hospital and public welfare. The right
hand side variables include intergovernmental revenues for education (ED), highway
(HW), health and hospital (HH) and public welfare (PW); personal income (I); and
State fixed effects (αi). The cointegrating vectors β1 to β4 provide a measure of long-
run pass-through from federal aid to local governments, and β5 measures the long-run
propensity to finance intergovernmental expenditures using community income (when
the dependent variable is transfer expenditures).
Estimates of the long-run pass-through of federal aid to local governments, using
DOLS, are in Table 8.16 Remarkably, education aid to local governments respond
positively to all federal aid (except aid given for highways). Specifically, a $1 increase
in federal aid assigned to health and hospitals and public welfare increase education
aid to local governments by $0.57 and $0.15, respectively. Likewise, federal aid for
education increases education aid to local governments by $1.73 for every $1 increase.
On the other hand, a reduction in federal aid given for the purposes of public welfare
and health and hospital aid would translate to a reduction in education aid to local
governments. In column 2, a $1 increase in highway and health and hospital federal
aid reduces public welfare aid to local governments by $0.57 and $0.47, respectively.
However, public welfare aid to local governments increases by $0.23 following a $1
increase in federal public welfare aid. In column 3, health and hospital aid to local
governments are stimulated by federal health and hospital aid by only $0.06 following
a $1 increase. However, health and hospital aid to local governments declines by
$0.15 following a $1 increase in federal highway aid. Curiously, an increase in federal
highway aid reduces highway aid to local governments by $0.14, but federal education
aid stimulates highway aid to local governments by $0.18.
Comparing these estimates with direct expenditures, located in columns 7 through
10, shows a number of disparities between transfer expenditures and direct expen-
ditures. For example, states funnel $1.73 of federal education aid to education aid
to local governments and spend only $0.90 on direct education expenditures. Fur-
16Given the similarities in estimators found in the previous section, only DOLS is used to estimate
the cointegrating equation. The DOLS estimates were confirmed by the 2SLS estimates, but these
are not reported.
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thermore, following a $1 increase in education grants, states increase public welfare
aid to local governments by $0.46 and decrease direct spending on public welfare by
$0.30. Alternatively, states increase direct highway expenditures by $1.42 following
a $1 increase in federal highway aid and decrease their highway expenditures to lo-
cal governments by $0.14. Interestingly, a $1 increase in federal health and hospital
aid results in an increase in education aid to local governments and direct education
expenditures by $0.57, whereas the response from direct and transfer expenditure for
health and hospital aid to local governments is only $0.29 and $0.06, respectively. On
the other hand, the same increase in health and hospital federal aid decrease public
welfare aid to local governments by $0.47, but increase spending on direct public
welfare expenditures by $1.12. Finally, a $1 increase in federal public welfare aid
increases education aid to local governments with no effect on direct education ex-
penditures. Furthermore, a $1 increase in federal public welfare aid stimulates public
welfare aid to local governments by $0.23 and direct spending on public welfare by
$0.97. Overall, these results show that states use federal aid to fund a number of dif-
ferent spending programs that are in some instances far removed from their intended
allocation. Federal education aid, to a large degree is funneled to local governments
which is consistent Oates’ Decentralization Theorem; however, state governments pre-
fer to use federal highway and public welfare aid to fund, largely, direct expenditures
in highway and public welfare. Conceivably, highways and public welfare programs
possess significant economies of scale and spillover effects beyond what can be inter-
nalized by state government grants and thus warrants state governments to direct
these programs to ensure an optimal level. Of course, these results only show the
long-run relationship. In the next section, the error correction model is estimated to
examine the short-run dynamics.
Panel Error Correction model
The error correction equation for the disaggregated expenditures and federal aid
is given by:
∆Eit =
n∑
k=1
ai,1,t−k∆Eit−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,1,t−k∆EDrit−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,2,t−k∆PW rit−k
+
n∑
k=0
bi,3,t−k + ∆HHrit−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,4,t−k∆HW rit−k +
n∑
k=0
bi,5,t−k∆Iit−k + λi̂it−1 + uit
(11)
where Eit is replaced by each of the four transfer expenditure categories along with
disaggregated direct expenditures.17 The short-run multipliers are given by b1 through
b5 and the error correction term is ̂it−1. The residuals uit for each equation are a
combination of a state-specific intercept, state-specific time trend and a white noise
error term.
Short-run Estimates
17Direct expenditures are also disaggregated into direct expenditures on education, highway, health
and hospital and public welfare.
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Table 8: DOLS Estimates of the Long-Run Pass-Through
Intergovernmental Expenditures Direct Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Public Health Public Health
Education Welfare Hospital Highway Education Welfare Hospital Highway
Education 1.727*** 0.459*** 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.895*** -0.296*** 0.304*** -0.154***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Highway -0.188* -0.564*** -0.145*** -0.140*** 0.226*** 0.169** -0.180*** 1.416***
[0.056] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.000] [0.000]
Health & Hospital 0.565*** -0.465*** 0.057* 0.142*** 0.566*** 1.119*** 0.293*** -0.044
[0.000] [0.000] [0.057] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.225]
Public Welfare 0.148*** 0.233*** 0.043*** -0.050*** -0.015*** 0.965*** 0.170*** -0.045***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Income 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.012*** 0.004*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.161] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tests of the Conduit Hypothesis
βeducation = βincome 14.88*** 11.35*** 6.23*** 8.69*** 11.34*** -3.55*** 5.51*** -3.81***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
βhighway = βincome -1.66** -9.86*** -5.92*** -6.51*** 2.80*** 1.77** -3.29*** 34.87***
[0.049] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.038] [0.001] [0.000]
βhealth&hospital = βincome 3.31*** -5.76 *** 1.48* 4.70*** 4.92*** 8.77*** 3.64*** -0.7
[0.000] [0.000] [0.07] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.241]
βpublicwelfare = βincome 3.24*** 10.27*** 4.35*** -6.44*** -0.5 29.54*** 8.17*** -2.82***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.308] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
βeducation = 1 6.28*** -39.15*** -34.18*** -9.42*** -1.32* 34.76*** -12.72*** -14.9***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.093] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
βhighway = 1 -10.03*** -53.28*** -45.43*** -26.64*** -9.55*** 10.200*** -21.11*** -9.35***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
βhealth&hospital = 1 -2.59*** -28.28*** -26.39*** -17.61*** -3.78*** -18.08*** -8.92*** 0.95
[0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.172]
βpublicwelfare = 1 -19.79*** -135.11*** -104.37*** -35.93*** -34.48*** -70.57*** -40.86*** -1.07
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.142]
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784 2,784
R-Squared 0.211 0.383 0.133 0.183 0.231 0.61 0.15 0.699
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: t-stats are in parentheses. One lag and lead of the differenced regressors are included in
each regression. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results from estimating the error correction model of equation (3.11) are in Table
15. Consistent with the “conduit” hypothesis and the results from the previous sec-
tion, the results from Table 3.6 reveal evidence of incomplete pass-through of federal
aid to local governments.18 Remarkably, the largest transfer expenditure category,
education, shows evidence of pass-through from the largest transfer revenue category,
public welfare. For example, a $1 increase in federal public welfare aid increases edu-
cation aid to local governments by $0.08. Furthermore, increases in federal health and
hospital aid increase health and hospital aid to local governments by $0.11. Turning
to direct expenditures, each federal aid category stimulates its corresponding direct
expenditures category almost exclusively. Tests of the conduit behavior reveal evi-
dence in favor of incomplete pass-through for federal public welfare aid to education
aid to local governments and federal health and hospital aid to health and hospital
aid to local governments. These results show limited evidence in favor of the conduit
hypothesis and instead suggest that federal aid, to a large extent, stimulates direct
expenditures in the short run. Also, each federal aid category stimulates, almost
exclusively, its corresponding direct expenditure category.
The short-run results shown here give the marginal propensity to spend on each
transfer and direct expenditure category. In particular, the marginal propensity to
18Appendix E reports estimates for the accumulative short-run effects. These are constructed as the
sum of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged variables.
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Table 9: Mean-Group Estimates of the Short-Run Pass-Through
Intergovernmental Expenditures Direct Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Public Health Public Health
Education Welfare Hospital Highway Education Welfare Hospital Highwayheight
Education 0.237 0.045 0.011 -0.033 0.340*** -0.460** 0.028 -0.044
(0.211) (0.035) (0.024) (0.034) (0.131) (0.205) (0.071) (0.093)
Highway -0.136 0.006 -0.013 0.007 0 0.115 -0.026 0.763***
(0.116) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.065) (0.105) (0.043) (0.062)
Health & Hospital 0.33 0.022 0.113** -0.004 0.400* -0.134 0.255** 0.011
(0.271) (0.053) (0.051) (0.040) (0.216) (0.423) (0.129) (0.213)
Public Welfare 0.084* 0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.03 0.678*** 0.038 0.037
(0.050) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.069) (0.036) (0.029)
Income -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.014** 0.001 0.006**
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Tests of the Conduit Hypothesis
beducation = bincome 1.303 1.566 0.185 0.865 6.886*** 5.324** 0.151 0.293
[0.254] [0.211] [0.667] [0.352] [0.009] [0.021] [0.697] [0.588]
bhighway = bincome 1.295 0.11 1.093 0.307 0.003 0.934 0.389 150.034***
[0.255] [0.741] [0.296] [0.580] [0.958] [0.334] [0.533] [0.000]
bhealth&hospital = bincome 1.512 0.158 4.952** 0.009 3.483* 0.122 3.873* 0.001
[0.219] [0.691] [0.026] [0.924] [0.062] [0.727] [0.049] [0.981]
bpublicwelfare = bincome 3.060* 0.218 0.344 0.049 0.882 92.534*** 1.049 1.127
[0.080] [0.641] [0.558] [0.825] [0.348] [0.000] [0.306] [0.288]
beducation = 1 13.149*** 737.576*** 1731.477*** 904.126*** 25.281*** 50.591*** 186.235*** 125.553***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
bhighway = 1 0.072* -0.003** -0.006* -0.013* 0.108* 0.762 0.074** -0.036*
[0.079] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.054] [0.107] [0.043] [0.047]
bhealth&hospital = 1 6.116** 339.811*** 308.124*** 642.599*** 7.705*** 7.170*** 33.151*** 21.477
[0.013] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000]
bpublicwelfare = 1 335.573*** 9962.722*** 16085.963*** 15617.752*** 713.466*** 21.822*** 718.294*** 1103.710***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
spend on local government aid shows that federal aid devoted to public welfare are
partially captured by the state and diverted to education in the form of local gov-
ernment aid. Also, federal health and hospital aid is partially spent on health and
hospital aid to local governments. In confirmation of the conduit hypothesis these
results reveal significant funneling of federal aid to local governments beyond what
is expected from an income effect. Moreover, state’s are partaking in cross-program
substitutions by diverting resources from their intended allocation and re-directed to
such expenditures as education aid to local governments. Taken literally, the results
suggest that the median voter demands the level of education to be determined at
the local level, whereas public welfare and highway should largely be determined by
the state. Also, the median voter prefers, at least in part, that federal health and
hospital and public welfare aid be used to finance education aid to local governments.
This is perhaps due to the importance that the median voter places on education
and thus prefers local governments to be responsible for education since they not
only have more knowledge of the costs and benefits of providing education, but gives
the median voter more control over the decision making process, therefore enhancing
accountability as well.
Compared to the long-run estimates,the short-run estimates reveal strikingly dif-
ferent spending behavior. There exhibits limited evidence of grant fungibility as fed-
eral aid stimulates its corresponding direct expenditure category with limited effect
on aid to local governments. Alternatively, long run estimates exhibit an appreciable
amount of fungibility associated with federal aid suggesting that states have more
43
Table 10: The Speed of Adjustment and Mean Adjustment Lag
Intergovernmental Expenditures Direct Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Public Health Public Health
Education Welfare Hospital Highway Education Welfare Hospital Highwayheight
Panel A: Speed of Adjustment (Error Correction)
it−1 -0.098*** -0.026** -0.086*** -0.067*** -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.039* -0.261***
(0.028) (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.039) (0.041) (0.023) (0.039)
Panel B: Mean Adjustment Lag
Education 7.77 36.21 11.45 15.35 6.23 13.18 24.79 4.00
Highway 11.56 37.66 11.73 14.76 9.45 7.99 26.18 0.91
Health & Hospital 6.82 37.08 10.27 14.94 5.67 10.23 19.00 3.79
Public Welfare 9.32 37.70 11.63 14.85 9.16 2.90 24.55 3.69
Income 10.21 37.88 11.57 14.88 9.48 8.90 25.49 3.80
Average 9.14 37.30 11.33 14.96 8.00 8.64 24.00 3.24
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
flexibility in dictating the allocation of federal transfers in the long run, thus federal
transfers appear to be more fungible over time. This time period specific spending
behavior can be masked when using static analysis, but by examining the dynamics
help differentiate between the long run and short run given the time it takes for funds
to be distributed and shifted among the many expenditure channels. The next section
uncovers the timing of adjustment for each aid category.
The Speed of Adjustment and Mean Adjustment Lag
In this section, estimates of the speed of adjustment and the mean adjustment lag
are given. These two measures provide insight into the adjustment process of each
transfer expenditure and direct expenditures.
Panel A of Table 10 display estimates of the speed of adjustment to disequilib-
rium. All the estimates are negative, statistically significant, and less than one in
absolute value, suggesting a dynamically stable long-run relationship. Education ap-
pears to adjust the fastest among the transfer expenditure categories, whereas public
welfare aid is the slowest to adjust. To put these estimates in perspective, Panel B
provides estimates for the mean adjustment lag. Recall, that the mean adjustment
lag is calculated as (1−b0)
λ
and provides a measure of the lag transmission. For exam-
ple, it takes education aid given to local governments anywhere from seven to twelve
years to fully adjust to changes in federal aid. On the other hand, public welfare aid
to local governments exhibits extremely slow adjustment. Health and hospital and
highway aid to local governments take as much as eleven to fifteen years, respectively,
to fully adjust. In contrast, direct expenditures exhibit relatively faster mean adjust-
ment lags, except with respect to federal health and hospital aid. With respect to
the conduit hypothesis, funds transferring from federal to local governments take on
average eighteen years to fully flow to local governments; however, federal aid used to
adjust direct spending take on average eleven to adjust. To illustrate the time paths
of each transfer expenditure category following shocks in federal aid, the next section
reports impulse response functions.
Impulse Response Functions
Impulse response functions are generated to visually examine the dynamics of each
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transfer expenditure over time given a one-time shock to each federal aid category
and income. Impulse response functions are estimated using the following ARDL
equation:
Eit+s = a
s
0 +
1∑
k=1
as+1i,1,t−kEit−k +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,1,t−kED
r
it−k +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,2,t−kPW
r
it−k (12)
+
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,3,t−kHH
r
it−k +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,4,t−kHW
r
it−k +
1∑
k=0
bs+1i,5,t−kIit−k + u
s
it
where s=1,2,...,h. The impulse response function is then calculated as:
ÎRF (i, t, s, d) = b̂si,j, s = 1, 2, ..., h, j = 1, ..., 5 (13)
where d represents a $1 shock to federal aid j at time t. For example, the response
of education aid to local governments to a shock of federal public welfare aid is given
by b̂s2,t for s = 1, 2, ..., h. The standard errors and corresponding confidence bands are
calculated at each regression. Four of the impulse response functions are reserved for
discussion here with the remainder located in Appendix F.
Figure 19: Response by education aid to local governments
Figures 19 and 20 give the response by education aid to local governments to
shocks from federal education and public welfare aid, respectively. The first graph
shows an initial positive response by education aid to local governments in excess
of $0.40 which reaches around $0.80 by year three. After three years the response
increases to a high of $2.81 in year eight and then slowly dissipates to zero thereafter.
The following graph shows an initial positive response by education aid to local gov-
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ernments ranging from a low of $0.20 to a high of $0.28 and not decaying to zero
until year six. Interestingly, the response dips below zero after fifteen years.
Figures 21 and 22 reveal the response of public welfare aid to local governments
following shocks to federal health and hospital and highway aid, respectively. The
first graph shows an initial negative, although statistically insignificant, response by
public welfare aid to local governments, but in year eight the response falls to -$0.80
before returning back to zero in year ten. Finally the last graph shows an initial
negative response by public welfare aid to local governments following a shock of
federal highway aid which remains around -$0.30 until year seven. The first two figures
illustrate the increases in resources devoted to education aid to local governments.
The latter two figures, on the other hand, illustrate the diversion of resources from
public welfare distributed to local governments.
Overall, the impulse response functions uncover significant dynamics over time in
response to shocks to each of the four federal aid categories. Consistent with the prior
findings many of these dynamics take many years before decaying to zero, which is an
indication as to why the long-run pass-through results appear to be much larger than
the immediate short-run pass-through, as it takes many years for states to adjust
their aid expenditures in response to shocks of federal aid.
3.4 Discussion
The purpose of this study is to better understand how states spend federal aid,
focusing on the degree to which state’s serve as a conduit for federal funds funneled
to local governments. It is assumed that that median voter demands a certain amount
of federal aid to be funneled to local governments. This idea is in accordance with
Oates’s Decentralization theorem and the idea that the median voter has more control
over more localized governments thereby making them more accountable. Moreover,
it is assumed that local governments are more informed of the demands of the median
voter, which explains why the median voter would prefer that federal grants be spent
by local governments as opposed to the state, except in cases of spillovers. The
dynamics also prove to be important as these decisions on how to allocate federal
aid unfold over time resulting in an adjustment process. Indeed, the results show
strikingly different spending behavior following a shock of federal aid in the short run
compared to the long run. For instance, in the long run approximately $0.60 of every
dollar of federal aid is funneled through the state down to local governments. However,
in the short run, the stimulus from federal aid amounts to only $0.09. Therefore, the
conduit behavior observed by state governments is a long-run phenomenon.
There are many possible explanations for this observed behavior. For example,
perhaps administratively it is cheaper to allocate distributional responsibilities of
federal aid down to local governments, or more in line with Oates’ Decentralization
Theorem in which lower level governments are in a better position to match the
local benefits and costs of providing local public goods. Local governments are also
perceived as being more informed and responsive to local demand. Furthermore,
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Figure 20: Response by education aid to local governments
Figure 21: Response by public welfare aid to local governments
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according to Oates (1985), referencing John Wallis, citizens have limited oversight of
expenditures in more centralized governments and therefore wish to have spending
done at local levels government for which they maintain more control and oversight
on the decision making. Consistent with this view, the results in this study suggest
that the median voter demands $0.60 of every federal aid dollar to be spent by local
governments leaving only $0.40 for the state government to allocate.
Also, as some have suggested, the median voter can differ among the different lay-
ers of government in a federalist system. Here, however, the results differ in the short
and long run suggesting different objective functions in each period. For instance,
in the short run states capture the federal aid and finance their own expenditure
projects, but in the long run states primarily finance local government aid with aid
from the federal government. This seems plausible since short-run political pressures
could persuade government bureaucrats to fund state level projects in order to max-
imize the chances of being re-elected, but in the long run where the cost of mobility
of lower, government bureaucrats prefer to funnel the federal aid down to local gov-
ernments. Consequently, a cut in federal aid would translate to a reduction in aid
to local governments and since local governments have limited taxing authority this
could lead to inefficient levels of local public goods.
Alternatively, it’s possible local governments (e.g. schools districts, municipali-
ties, county governments) are lobbying for state aid, which in turn provokes states to
lobby for federal aid. In this case, local governments convey information of the de-
mands from the median voter, distorted by political motives, which then translate to
the observed spending behavior by states. In other words, the states’ understanding
of the median voter is viewed through the distorted lens of their local government
constituents. Furthermore, over time the federal government’s oversight in the al-
location of federal aid is loosened allowing for a greater degree of fungibility in the
dispersion of federal aid. This is consistent with the idea that state policy makers
use federal aid to stimulate direct expenditures in the short run in order to reap the
political benefits, but in the long run policy makers funnel federal aid down to local
governments.
Disaggregating direct expenditures and transfer expenditures into expenditures on
education, health and hospital, highway and public welfare, further uncovers inter-
esting aspects of state level spending behavior. For instance, federal aid distributed
for the purposes of education, health and hospital and public welfare were all used to
stimulate education aid to local governments in the long run. On the other hand, fed-
eral highway aid reduces aid to local governments in all categories. Also, federal health
and hospital aid reduces public welfare aid to local governments. Consequently, grant
fungibility makes it impossible to know which programs are actually being funded
and at which level of government. Therefore, federal grants intended to mitigate
interstate spillovers should include provisions that encourage state spending on that
particular program through the use of matching grants, for instance, so as to offset
the incentive to engage in cross-program substitution; and including a time dimension
as an additional provision forcing states to maintain certain spending levels for an
extended period of time. However, block grants issued to states could be efficiently
enhancing if states possess greater knowledge of the optimal level of public services.
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Given the externality nature of such public goods as education, health and hos-
pital, highways, and public welfare states could be using federal aid to encourage
spending by local governments in an attempt to dictate their spending behavior and
internalizing these spillovers. Coordination among local governments in a federation
can be costly therefore states can use these federal grants to induce more efficiently
provided public goods among local governments (Breton, 1965).
These results show that, consistent with Oates’ Decentralization Theorem, states
funnel federal aid to local governments primarily allocated toward education, even fed-
eral aid far removed from its intended allocation, such as, public welfare and health
and hospital aid. On the other hand, states to a large degree appear to allocate high-
way and public welfare aid to their corresponding state level expenditures. Of course,
the economies of scale attributes of highways and the externalities associated with
public welfare validate the control by state governments in dictating the appropriate
allocation of these funds. Especially when one considers highway infrastructure as
a public input used to attract businesses into the state (see, e.g., Hauptmeier et al.,
2008). Furthermore, generous public welfare benefits attract welfare recipients (see,
e.g., Saavedra, 2000). For instance, Blank (2001) showed that higher benefit levels
lead to a higher number of welfare recipients, incentivizing a race-to-the-bottom in
welfare benefits. Education, on the other hand, is intrinsically different in that resi-
dents’ are very diverse in their demand for different types of education and funding
sources (e.g. public versus private). Likewise, Alesina & Spolare (1998) argue for
decentralized decision making in the case of heterogeneous populations due to the
informational benefits. Furthermore, allowing local governments to dictate the allo-
cation of funds provides added efficiency gains through the use of Tiebout sorting in
determining the optimal level and type of education.
The conduit effect is closely related to the flypaper behavior associated with state
spending. Understanding state behavior following an increase in federal grants serves
as a check on the efficacy of the median voter model. The complication arises in feder-
alist systems when there exists layers of government. For instance, state governments
need to take into consideration the actions of their corresponding local governments
to ensure the median voter’s utility is maximized. Consequently, local governments
have the incentive to lobby state governments for transfers to satisfy their residents.
Moreover, this funneling of federal aid to local governments mean the perverse incen-
tives of aid are transfered to local governments as well, such as, a “softening” of local
budgets as in cases of bailouts (see Bird et al., 1998). This particular study high-
lights the importance of intergovernmental linkages when understanding the flypaper
anomaly. By disaggregating state level expenditures into direct expenditures and
transfer expenditures unveils interesting characteristics of the flypaper effect, both
over expenditure categories and over time. This chapter highlights the importance of
both dynamics and spending categories in understanding the flypaper effect. States
effectively funnel between $0.60 and $1.00 of federal aid down to local governments,
consistent with the conduit hypothesis, however, direct expenditures exhibit a fly-
paper effect in the short run. These intricacies have the potential to inform on the
current theoretical and empirical models of the flypaper effect in order to further the
understanding of government behavior within a federalist system.
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3.5 Conclusion
This study sheds light on the dynamics underlying the relationship between state-level
intergovernmental transfer revenues and expenditures. In particular, the remarkably
stable relationship observed between these two series motivates the possibility that
states serve as a conduit for funds from the federal government to local governments.
This idea is investigated using recent non-stationary panel time-series techniques. The
results reveal statistically significant evidence in favor of states, to a large degree, us-
ing federal aid to finance local government expenditures beyond what is predicted by
a pure income effect. Approximately, $0.60 of every federal aid dollar is funneled to
local governments in the long run. Moreover, the impulse response functions show
evidence of states completely passing-through federal aid to local governments after
ten years. This disparity highlights the importance of examining the relationships dy-
namically, as opposed to using static analysis. Moreover, these results reveal evidence
that the conduit nature of state behavior of funneling federal aid to local governments
is a long-run phenomenon. The results in this chapter inform the current literature
on the flypaper effect in that states are using federal aid to finance local government
expenditures in amounts greater than explained by a pure income effect. This chan-
nel if of interest as local governments possess a large degree of autonomy in taxation,
spending and borrowing and therefore these funds can potentially finance programs
far removed from their original intent by the federal and state government. Further-
more, there is a fairly extensive literature discussing the use of federal transfers to
“soften” the budget of state and local governments inciting possible risky behavior on
behalf of local governments. Therefore, funneling of federal aid to local governments
also transfer the perverse side effects of federal aid.
Disaggregating both direct expenditures and transfer expenditures further uncov-
ers interesting disparities in that states use federal aid allocated to education, health
and hospital and public welfare to finance education aid to local governments. The
most profound and robust result is the stimulative effect of public welfare aid on
education aid to local governments in both the short run and long run. The inter-
action between these two series implies that if the federal government decided to cut
its funding to public welfare this could lead to a reduction in education aid to local
governments. These resource diversions serve as revealed preferences on the part of
the state to allocate sufficient resources to local governments for the purposes of ed-
ucation. Alternatively, given the externality nature of public welfare and highways,
states appear to allocate these funds directly to the program as opposed to going
through the local governments to ensure an optimal amount is produced.
The results in this paper also serve to inform the median voter model. For instance,
in a federalist system these intergovernmental linkages need to be exploited in order to
better understand the objective functions of the different layers of government. From
the state’s perspective, maximizing the median voter’s utility is done partially through
financing local governments to ensure an optimal level of public goods necessary to
satisfy the median voter, but these outcomes vary over time.
A topic for future research is then how local governments respond to these grants.
Conceivably, local governments use their discretion to reallocate fiscal aid to fund
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different programs not originally intended for by the state government. Also, in or-
der to disentangle the price and income effects of public welfare grants the Medicaid
component (major matching grant) of public welfare can be subtracted from public
welfare and the equations can be re-estimated with the Medicaid component inter-
acted with state-specific FMAPS (Federal Medical Assistance Percentages) along with
the remaining public welfare transfers.
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3.6 Appendix A
Below includes the Bureau of Census definitions of Intergovernmental transfers.
Intergovernmental Expenditure: Amounts paid to other governments as fiscal
aid in the form of shared revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimbursements for perfor-
mance of general government activities and for specific services for the paying govern-
ment, or in lieu of taxes. Excludes amounts paid to other governments for purchase
of commodities, property, or utility services, any tax imposed and paid as such, and
employer contributions for social insurance–e.g., contributions to the Federal Gov-
ernment for Old Age, Survivors’, Disability, and Health Insurance for government
employees.
Intergovernmental Revenue: Amounts received from other governments as
fiscal aid in the form of shared revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimbursements for
performance of general government functions and specific services for the paying gov-
ernment (e.g., care of prisoners or contractual research), or in lieu of taxes. Excludes
amounts received from other governments for sale of property, commodities, and util-
ity services. All intergovernmental revenue is classified as General Revenue.
Education: Schools, colleges, and other educational institutions (e.g., for blind,
deaf, and other handicapped individuals) and educational programs for adults, vet-
erans, and other special classes. Higher Education includes activities of institutions
operated by the state, except that agricultural extension services and experiment sta-
tions are classified under Natural Resources, and hospitals serving the public are clas-
sified under Hospitals. Revenue and expenditure for dormitories, cafeterias, athletic
events, bookstores, and other Auxiliary Enterprises financed mainly through charges
for services are reported on a gross basis. Direct Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion comprises direct state payments (rather than intergovernmental. payments to
local governments) for operation of local public schools, construction of school build-
ings, purchase and operation of school buses, and other local school services. Direct
state expenditure for Other Education includes state educational administration and
services, tuition grants, fellowships, aid to private schools, and special programs.
Health: Outpatient health services, other than hospital care, including: public
health administration; research and education; categorical health programs; treat-
ment and immunization clinics; nursing; environmental health activities such as air
and water pollution control; ambulance service if provided separately from fire protec-
tion services; and other general public health activities such as mosquito abatement.
School health services provided by health agencies (rather than school agencies) are
included here. Sewage treatment operations are classified under Sewerage.
Hospitals: Financing, construction, acquisition, maintenance or operation of
hospital facilities, provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.
Own Hospitals are facilities administered directly by the government concerned; Other
Hospitals refers to support for hospital services in private hospitals or hospitals owned
by other governments. However, see Public Welfare concerning vendor payments
under welfare programs. Nursing homes are included under Public Welfare unless they
are directly associated with a government hospital. Expenditures of state hospitals
from Federal Medicaid funds are reported in this category.
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Highways: Construction, maintenance, and operation of highways, streets, and
related structures, including toll highways, bridges, tunnels, ferries, street lighting,
and snow and ice removal. However, highway policing and traffic control are classed
under Police Protection.
Public Welfare: Support of and assistance to needy persons contingent upon
their need. Excludes pensions to former employees and other benefits not contingent
on need. Expenditures under this heading include: Cash Assistance paid directly
to needy persons under the categorical programs (Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) and under any other welfare programs; Vendor Payments made directly
to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other commodities and services
provided under welfare programs; and provision and operation by the government of
welfare institutions including nursing homes not directly associated with a government
hospital. Other Public Welfare includes payments to other governments for welfare
purposes, amounts for administration, support of private welfare agencies, and other
public welfare services.
Health and hospital services provided directly by the government through its own
hospitals and health agencies, and any payments to other governments for such pur-
poses are classed under those functional headings rather than here. Expenditures
from Federal Medicaid funds, including distributions to local governments and pay-
ments to private medical vendors, are reported under Public Welfare except those
spent by state hospitals (see Hospitals).
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3.7 Appendix B
3.7.1 Unit Root Test
To test for stationarity among the variables the Fisher-type augmented Dickey-Fuller
test by Choi (2001) is used along with the Breitung (2000) test and Im et al. (2003)
test. These tests are conducted using the following autoregressive equation:
yit = ait + ρiyi,t−1 + eit (14)
where yit is the variable of interest, and ρi is the autoregressive parameter to be
estimated. These tests assume the variables are nonstationarity under the null hy-
pothesis and stationary under the alternative. The Dickey-Fuller test conducts unit
root tests on each individual state and then combines the p-values from each test to
produce and overall test. The Breitung (2000) test uses a standard t statistic and
assumes that all panels have a common autoregressive parameter. However, Breitung
& Das (2005) state that this test has power in the heterogeneous case as well. In
order to relax the homogeneity assumption of the autoregressive parameter, Im et al.
(2003) is used. The Im et al. (2003) test assumes each panel has its own ρi. The
alternative hypothesis is then a fraction of panels are stationary. In order to miti-
gate the impact of cross-sectional dependence each series is demeaned by subtracting
the cross-sectional average from the series, as suggested by Levin et al. (2002). The
results of the three unit root tests, preformed are found in Table 12 and 11. The
results show overwhelming evidence in favor of each variable possessing properties of
integration of order one in levels and stationary in first differences.19
19As robustness checks both the Harris & Tzavalis (1999) and Choi (2001)’s Phillips-Perron test
were also conducted, which confirm the results found by the three reported unit root tests. The
results are available upon request.
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Table 11: Disaggregate Unit Root Results
Disaggregated Intergovernmental Revenues
Dickey-Fuller Brietung IPS
Education 7.01 8.96 11.91
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Education -35.93 -29.88 -37.51
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Highway 0.01 2.9 2.35
[0.502] [0.998] [0.991]
∆Highway -38.05 -32.16 -40.36
[0.000] [0.00] [0.000]
Health & Hospital 6.34 8.73 13.18
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Health & Hospital -28.47 -24.24 -27.21
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Public Welfare 6.01 8.96 14.56
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Public Welfare -28.26 -24.76 -28.09
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Disaggregated Intergovernmental Expenditures
Dickey-Fuller Brietung IPS
Education 8.80 8.07 15.12
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Education -23.96 -23.63 -23.36
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Highway 6.80 10.01 13.51
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Highway -30.67 -22.05 -30.85
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Health & Hospital 6.92 8.77 12.52
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Health & Hospital -26.72 -24.48 -24.63
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Public Welfare 5.43 21.08 29.17
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Public Welfare -20.50 -16.79 -20.26
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Disaggregated Own State Expenditures
Dickey-Fuller Brietung IPS
Education 8.56 13.11 18.99
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Education -26.44 -22.16 -26.15
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Highway 0.54 4.12 3.41
[0.706 [1.000] [1.000]
∆Highway -35.02 -29.58 -36.06
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Health & Hospital 6.80 10.22 15.75
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Health & Hospital -25.39 -23.39 -26.58
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Public Welfare 3.73 9.53 14.39
[0.999 [1.000] [1.000]
∆Public Welfare -25.70 -24.60 -25.29
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Dickey-Fuller is the Augmented Dickey full test; Breitung is
the Breitung test; and ips is the Im-Pesaran-shin test. The variable is
assumed stationary under the null hypothesis for all tests. Probabil-
ity values are enclosed in brackets. With respect to the Dickey-Fuller
test, only the inverse normal statistic is reported.
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Table 12: Aggregate Unit Root Results
Dickey-Fuller Brietung IPS
Transfer Revenues 8.26 26.94 45.60
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Transfer Revenues -8.42 -9.71 -8.05
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Transfer Expenditures 8.01 28.21 48.54
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Transfer Expenditures -4.42 -6.66 -4.09
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Income 8.88 13.81 21.44
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
∆Income -15.89 -15.51 -15.30
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Dickey-Fuller is the Augmented Dickey full test; Breitung
is the Breitung test; and ips is the Im-Pesaran-shin test. The vari-
able is assumed stationary under the null hypothesis for all tests.
Probability values are enclosed in brackets. With respect to the
Dickey-Fuller test, only the inverse normal statistic is reported.
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3.8 Appendix C
3.8.1 Cointegration Test
To test for cointegration the Pedroni (1999, 2004) heterogeneous panel cointegration
test is employed to determine whether equation (7) is indeed a cointegrating rela-
tionship. The Pedroni test is a residual based test performed on the the predicted
residuals from equation (7). The following unit root test is used to test for the ab-
sence of cointegration (ρ = 1) against the alternative that equation (7) is cointegrating
(ρ < 1).
ˆjit = ρˆ
j
it−1 + ωit (15)
The Pedroni test reports seven statistics. The first four panel statistics (v, ρ, pp, adf)
are within dimension based statistics. These statistics assume a common value for ρ
by pooling all the ρ′s across the different members. The next three group statistics (ρ,
pp, adf) are between dimension based statistics, which allow for heterogeneity across
the individual cross-sections by averaging individual ρ coefficients for each member.
The results for Pedroni’s cointegration test are in Table 18.
The highly statistically significant test statistics, in Table 18, show strong evidence
in favor of cointegration for each equation. These results indicate there is a clear long-
run relationship among the variables of interest that can be represented by equation
(7). Evidence of cointegration validates that the error correction model of equation
(6) is correctly specified with the inclusion of the error correction term.
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Table 13: Pedroni’s Heterogeneous Panel Cointegration tests
Panel A: Aggregated Data
Transfer Own Own
Variables Expenditures Expenditures Revenues
Panel v-statistic 10.21 20.36 12.87
Panel ρ-statistic -6.37 -28.32 -8.45
Panel PP-statistic -5.60 -23.03 -6.84
Panel ADF-statistic -6.05 -16.72 -6.16
Group ρ-statistic -7.94 -30.76 -8.57
Group PP-statistic -7.33 -29.00 -8.01
Group ADF-statistic -11.13 -21.07 -9.24
Panel B: Intergovernmental Expenditures
Public Health
Variables Education Welfare Hospital Highway
Panel v-statistic 5.98 4.49 3.44 1.23
Panel ρ-statistic -10.26 -5.86 -5.54 -5.40
Panel PP-statistic -13.84 -9.28 -9.35 -9.47
Panel ADF-statistic -5.43 -2.16 -4.52 -4.64
Group ρ-statistic -10.38 -6.15 -5.89 -7.48
Group PP-statistic -16.52 -11.23 -11.90 -13.49
Group ADF-statistic -7.54 -2.28 -7.99 -8.14
Panel C: Own Expenditures
Public Health
Variables Education Welfare Hospital Highway
Panel v-statistic 7.47 7.74 4.11 5.32
Panel ρ-statistic -11.41 -9.93 -6.68 -10.22
Panel PP-statistic -16.25 -15.80 -11.46 -15.50
Panel ADF-statistic -8.79 -11.71 -5.69 -8.52
Group ρ-statistic -10.71 -10.52 -8.70 -9.99
Group PP-statistic -17.85 -19.87 -16.32 -17.83
Group ADF-statistic -9.62 -14.37 -9.97 -8.15
Notes: All test statistics are distributed standard normal. Asterisks denote
significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.9 Appendix D
Table 14: Estimates of Long-Run Pass-Through for Own-Revenues
Panel A: Estimates for Cointegrating Vectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Fixed Effects Dynamic OLS 2SLS PMG Fixed Effects Dynamic OLS 2SLS PMG
Grants 0.893*** 1.035 1.131*** 1.033*** 0.695*** 1.022 1.026*** 0.870***
(0.036) (0.075) (0.107) (0.044) (0.050) (0.082) (0.123) (0.050)
Income 0.086*** 0.084 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.090*** 0.084 0.089*** 0.069***
(0.003) (2.780) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (2.192) (0.008) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000)
Dependency Ratio -766.714 -390.111 -185.695 -917.341***
(495.947) (160,229.285) (578.625) (301.379)
Population Density 38.408 55.770 517.361 1,174.707***
(534.753) (228,886.155) (599.106) (420.234)
Hansen J Statistic 6.278 5.857
[0.099] [0.119]
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,544 2,640 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,440
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Panel B: Tests of the Conduit Hypothesis
H-0: β1 = 1520.6 ∗ ∗∗ 4.00*** 97.98*** 474.0*** 142.6*** 0.268 60.03*** 247.6***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.606] [0.000] [0.000]
H-0: β1 = β2 9.089 15.74 1.509 0.550 36.96 11.14 0.044 6.793
[0.003] [0.000] [0.219] [0.458] [0.000] [0.999] [0.000] [0.009]
Notes: t-stats are in parentheses. One lag and lead of the differenced regressors are included in
each regression. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.10 Appendix E
Table 15: Accumulated Mean-Group Estimates of the Short-Run
Pass-Through
Intergovernmental Expenditures Own Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Public Health Public Health
Education Welfare Hospital Highway Education Welfare Hospital Highway
Education 0.183 0.034 0.047 -0.052 0.312 -0.576 -0.045 0.029
(0.275) (0.041) (0.035) (0.043) (0.179) (0.291) (0.100) (0.143)
Highways -0.238 0.002 -0.007 0.026 -0.001 0.098 0.024 0.654
(0.162) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.086) (0.157) (0.069) (0.110)
Health & Hospital 0.273 0.077 0.104 0.015 0.483 -0.073 0.509 -0.021
(0.404) (0.087) (0.072) (0.055) (0.300) (0.599) (0.206) (0.336)
Public Welfare 0.072 -0.003 -0.006 -0.013 0.108 0.762 0.074 -0.036
(0.079) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.054) (0.107) (0.043) (0.047)
Income 0.012 0 0.001 0 -0.005 0.009 0.004 0.008
(0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 22: Response by highway aid to local governments
62
  
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20
Impulse: Federal Education Transfers +90% -90%
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20
Impulse: Federal Public Welfare Transfers +90% -90%
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20
Impulse: Federal Health & Hospital Transfers +90% -90%
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20
Impulse: Federal Highway Transfers +90% -90%
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15 t+16 t+17 t+18 t+19 t+20
Impulse: Personal Income +90% -90%
Figure 23: Response of Education Transfer Expenditures
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Figure 24: Response of Public Welfare Transfer Expenditures
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Figure 25: Response of Health & Hospital Transfers Expenditures
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4 The Dynamics of the Revenue-Expenditure Nexus in State Government Finances
4.1 Introduction
Surmounting budget deficits among US states have become a major concern for policy
makers and the public in general. A recent report from the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities claim that forty-four states project budget shortfalls for fiscal year
2012 totaling $125 billion. The correct policy response to budget deficits rests on the
underlying relationship between revenues and expenditures. For instance, are deficits
caused by overspending or insufficient revenues? In relation to the generation of
budget deficits a strand a literature emerged known as the tax-spend debate, otherwise
known as the revenue-expenditure nexus, which has focused on the intertemporal
relationship between revenues and expenditures. Specifically, this literature focuses
on the direction of causation between revenues and expenditures. Understanding this
intertemporal relationships provide policy makers information on the correct policy
response necessary to return budgets to equilibrium. For example, if government
spending is determined by expenditure demand then the proper policy response to
budget deficits would be to cut spending. Alternatively, if government spending is
instead determined by resource supply then a cut in revenues would be necessary to
reign in spending and return to a balanced budget.
In order to understand the intertemporal relationship between revenues and ex-
penditures it is important to understand the institutions in which governments par-
ticipate. Governments at all levels are subject to a variety of different constraints and
incentives that elicit very different behavior among government officials that subse-
quently impact the tax-spend relationship. Particularly, US states face constitutional
and legislative constraints that help to limit budgetary imbalances. In fact, all states,
with the exception of Vermont, have, on an annual basis, a formal balanced budget
requirement; however, these requirements vary considerably (Hines, 2010).
Also, within a hierarchical governmental system intergovernmental transfers pro-
vide another mechanism utilized by states to finance budget deficits and therefore
need to be included in any examination of budgetary dynamics. In particular, over
the past few decades US states have witnessed a dramatic increase in federal aid as
percent of revenues. Recently, a report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
explains that part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) enacted
in February 2009 provides $135 to $140 billion to assist states in maintaining current
activities. The guidelines under which grants are distributed also influence incentives
that would effect the tax-spend relationship. For example, block grants, as opposed
to matching grants, have become more prevalent in the context of the United States
since the initiation of the United States Welfare Reform of 1996 which converted the
welfare program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from a matching
grant to a block grant, thereby giving considerable more autonomy to states in the
design of more appropriate welfare programs.
Using data on the contiguous forty-eight US states over five decades along with
recent advances in non-stationary panel time series techniques, the task at hand is to
understand the underlying dynamics of the revenue-expenditure nexus in answering
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the four hypotheses relating to the direction of causality between revenues and ex-
penditures. In addition, as federal grants have become an important revenue source
among states, a closer examination of grants is given to ascertain the interrelation-
ships among revenues, expenditures and grants. For example, are grants distributed
to the community in the form of tax cuts or instead used to finance expenditures?
Furthermore, this chapter uses a stratified sample based on the debt-to-population ra-
tio to elucidate differences in the intertemporal tax-spend relationship between states
with relatively high debt and those with low debt levels. In short, the results favor
the absence of a short-run causal relationship between revenues and expenditures,
but in the long run expenditures along with grants and other revenues, but not taxes,
bear the adjustment burden. When the sample is stratified by the debt-to-population
ratio the causal dynamics suggest high debt states rely on more precarious budget
setting methods compared to low debt states, thus providing an fiscal environment
favorable for debt accumulation.
Results from this analysis offer a number of important policy implications. An
understanding of the relationship among the variables in the budget constraint allows
policy makers greater ability to control state budgets. For instance, if causality
is from taxes to spending (tax-spend) then a tax cut will reduce spending, but if
causality is from spending to taxes (spend-tax) then a tax cut (or tax limit) will lead
to deficits or poorly planned spending cuts. Therefore the results in this chapter
inform policy makers as to the correct policies conducive to maintaining balanced
budgets. Moreover, an understanding of the interactions between federal grants and
other fiscal variables will assist policy makers in developing more appropriate methods
of grant design and distribution so as to produce more efficient outcomes. Finally,
understanding budgetary dynamics unveil important dynamic relationships that could
be helpful in explaining and preventing the current evolution of unsustainable debt
levels associated with many US states.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the
tax-spend hypotheses along with a survey of the prevailing literature. Section 4.3
describes the empirical model. Section 4.4 provides the data and results. Sections
4.5 discusses the results based on the same split with respect to debt and concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Tax-Spend Debate
In the wake of mounting budget deficits both at the national and state levels it is
imperative to examine the adjustment of either revenues, expenditures or both to
budgetary shocks. Sustainability rests on the ability of revenues and expenditures to
adjust to budgetary imbalances thus an examination of these adjustment dynamics
is warranted. A related topic concerns itself with the temporal causality between
revenues and expenditures. In answering this question and addressing the direction
of causality there are currently four hypotheses: tax-spend , spend-tax, fiscal syn-
chronization, and institutional separation.
The tax-spend hypothesis, argued by Friedman (1978), declares that increases in
tax revenues lead to increases in expenditures. Friedman claimed that an increasing
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amount of revenues provides governments with more resources for which they could
exploit. Thus, a cut in taxes is necessary to force a reduction in expenditures to restore
budgetary equilibrium. An alternative explanation championed by Buchanan et al.
(1977) and Wagner (1976), argues that raising tax revenues reduce expenditures via
fiscal illusion. In this case the public perceives the use of indirect taxation to finance
expenditures as being cheaper than direct taxation even though they bear the costs
via higher interest rates, private crowd-out, and inflation. For both explanations
there is unidirectional causation running from revenues to expenditures.
Next, the spend-tax hypothesis states that the direction of causality runs from
expenditures to revenues. For this hypothesis, expenditure decisions are made first
then tax revenues are adjusted to meet those demands. According to Ricardian
equivalence, advanced by Barro (1979), expenditures financed by deficits, ultimately
lead to increases in tax revenues. Therefore, any increase in expenditures results in
an increasing tax bill at some point in the future. In this case the way to reduce
budget deficits is through expenditure cuts. Others such as Peacock & Wiseman
(1979) declare that during periods of crisis the increase in spending leads to higher
taxes that then become permanent.
The fiscal synchronization hypothesis stresses that revenues and expenditures are
determined contemporaneously resulting in bidirectional causality. Musgrave (1966)
and Meltzer & Richard (1981) argue that voters weigh the marginal benefits against
the marginal cost of government programs when deciding the appropriate level of
expenditures and revenues. Last, institutional separation results in the absence
of causality since separate institutions make the revenue and expenditure decisions
(Baghestani & McNown, 1994; Wildavsky, 1988).
Using different data sets, at both national and sub-national levels, and method-
ology, studies in this area provide mixed results with respect to the direction of
causality.20 The bulk of the empirical literature utilizes vector autoregressive or vec-
tor error correction models to ascertain directional causality. To a lesser extent focus
on the sub-national level (e.g. US states) have been studied. Payne (1998) employs
the Engle-Granger error correction model framework and analyzes the time series
relationship between the forty-eight contiguous state and local governments for the
period 1942 to 1992. He finds evidence of the tax-spend hypothesis for twenty-four
states; the spend-tax hypothesis for eight states; the fiscal synchronization hypoth-
esis for eleven states; and the remaining five states failed the diagnostic tests for
error correction modeling. Earlier studies such as Marlow & Manage (1987, 1988)
find unidirectional causality from tax revenues to expenditures at the state level with
no evidence of directional causality at the local level. Chowdhury (1988) provides
evidence of bidirectional causality between local revenues and expenditures. Ram
(1988) finds unidirectional causality from expenditures to revenues using annual and
quarterly data from the U.S.
More recently, Buettner & Wildasin (2006) examine the dynamic fiscal adjust-
ment of local jurisdictions using a panel of over 1,000 US municipalities over 25 years
within a vector error correction model framework. They find that expenditures re-
20For an extensive review of the revenue-expenditure nexus literature see Payne (2003).
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spond to budgetary imbalances and, to a large extent, intergovernmental revenues
play an integral role in financing imbalances, especially for larger cities. Westerlund
et al. (2011) (WMF hereafter) are the first to use an error correction framework within
a panel of U.S. state-local governments for the period 1963 to 1997. While control-
ling for a number of variables, including grants, they find evidence in favor of the
tax-spend hypothesis. Specifically, WMF find that expenditures adjust to budgetary
disequilibrium in the long run and also to short-run deviations in tax revenues, other
funding sources, and output. In other words, the size of state-local governments is
determined by resource supply rather than expenditure demand. Chowdhury (2011)
also examines the revenue-expenditure nexus with respect to each state in the US and
finds that forty percent of the states show an absence in causality between revenues
and expenditures; eighteen percent support the spend-tax hypothesis; sixteen per-
cent favor spend-tax hypothesis; and twenty-six percent show bidirectional causality
between revenues and expenditures.
When focusing on sub-national governments grants from higher-level governments
can have a significant impact on the tax and spending decisions of sub-national gov-
ernments. Hines (2010) finds that balanced budget rules have very limited influence
on state level spending, though intergovernmental grants continue to have a robust
impact on state spending across different specifications. Moreover, grants not only
have a significant effect on spending, but grants exhibit feedback from expenditures,
thus confusing the direction of causality between grants and expenditures. For in-
stance, states can rationally anticipate increases in transfers (i.e. bailouts) when
debt levels are excessive and therefore choose debt levels that are too high (Poterba,
1995). In this case the direction of causality would run from federal transfers to debt
through the use of either expenditures and/or taxes. Others have found that local
governments choose inefficient policies intending to attract more transfers as part of
a bailout package (Wildasin, 1997; Qian & Roland, 1998; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2010).
For these reasons a more active look at the role served by grants is necessary when
studying the tax-spend debate among sub-national governments within a federation.
This study expands the literature in a number of ways. This is the first study
to examine the revenue-expenditure nexus using state-level panel data, as opposed
to state and local combined, for over five decades within a panel error correction
framework. Second, this study uses a stratified sample to explore differences relat-
ing to the revenue-expenditure nexus in order to better understand the mechanism
behind significant debt accumulation among some states and not others. Third, the
important role served by intergovernmental transfers within the revenue-expenditure
nexus is closely examined. Fourth, the econometric technique used here circumvents
problems of aggregation by allowing for heterogeneity in the short-run adjustments
while constraining the long-run coefficients to be homogeneous, adhering to the long-
run balanced budget constraint. In addition, cross-sectional dependence in controlled
for to mitigate problems of identification and the short-run coefficients are estimated
to ascertain short-run elasticities and adjustments. Finally, policy implications are
provided based on the results.
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4.3 The Empirical Model
The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of the intertemporal state
government budget constraint, with the goal of testing the four aforementioned hy-
potheses. In other words, is the direction of causality (short run and long run) fa-
vorable for tax-spend, spend-tax, fiscal synchronization, or institutional separation?
The long-run model of the intertemporal budget constraint can be represented by the
following linear stochastic equation:
Eit = αi + βTit + δGit + γ
′
Xit + it (16)
where subscripts i and t indicate state and time period, respectively. The parameter
αi captures state fixed effects. The variables Eit and Tit represent total government
expenditures and total tax revenues. Git is intergovernmental transfers from the
federal government (grants). Xit is a vector of control variables including, total debt
outstanding, other revenues and personal income.21 it is the white noise error term.
The parameter β gives the stimulative effect of tax revenues on expenditures and δ
measures the extent that grants stimulate expenditures. As discussed in Chapter 1,
the extent that the coefficient on grants is greater than the coefficient on income is
commonly referred to as the “flypaper effect.”
To examine the dynamics of the underlying intertemporal budget constraint the
error correction model,
∆Xit = αi + αit+ piˆit−1 + βjBk∆Xit−k + uit (17)
is estimated, where ∆Xit is a vector including tax revenues, total expenditures, grants,
income, debt, and other revenues. The backshift operator is given by B and k is
the number of lags included in the error correction model. The variables αi and αit
control for state-fixed effects and state-specific time trends, respectively.22 The short-
run dynamics are provided by the lagged first differenced regressors of each variable
and the short-run Granger-causality of each variable on each other can be tested by
the joint significance of βj in equation (17). The inclusion of ˆit−1 in each equation
captures long-run budgetary imbalances and therefore the pi coefficients represent
the error correction process and adjustment to long-run budgetary equilibrium.23
Specifically, the degree to which each variable adjusts back to equilibrium rests on
21Ideally, equation (16) would include gross state product (GSP), instead of personal income, to
control for portions of tax revenue and spending that are sensitive to the level of economic activity;
however, the GSP series includes a discontinuity at 1997 when the Bureau of Economic Analysis
switched from calculating GSP using Standard Industrial Classifications industry definitions to
the North American Industrial Classification System definitions.
22The lag length of the short-run adjustment terms in equation (17) is three which was determined,
following WMF, using the following sieve approximation of Smith et al. (2004), 4(T/100)(2/9).
23Note that ˆit−1 is the predicted residual from equation (16) lagged one period representing budget
disequilibrium.
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the significance of the respective error correction terms and the magnitude provides
the speed and direction of the adjustment back to budgetary equilibrium.
4.4 Empirical Results for Full Sample
4.4.1 Data
The data consist of annual observations for a panel of the 48 contiguous US states over
the period 1951 to 2008 collected from the Census Bureau’s publication series “State
Government Finances.” Variables collected include total tax revenues, other revenues,
federal government grants, total expenditures, total personal income, population, and
total debt outstanding.24 The variables are converted to real per capita terms and
then converted to natural log.25 Normalizing each variable by population controls for
changes in taxes and spending due to changes in the population (e.g. migration and
public demand). As suggested by Levin et al. (2002), cross-sectional averages were
subtracted from each variable to mitigate the effect of cross-sectional dependence.
Table 16 provides the summary statistics.
Table 16: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Expenditures 1393.15 1793.40
Taxes 648.07 807.83
Grants 356.83 500.99
Income 10.12 12.15
Debt 796.92 1275.30
Other Revenues 509.17 728.28
Notes: Values are per capita 2005 dollars.
24State data, as opposed to aggregated state and local data, are used to separate out differences
between state and local budget setting dynamics given that both state and local governments
possess a high degree of fiscal autonomy.
25The price level used to normalize each variable is the GDP deflator collected from the Bureau of
Economics Analysis.
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4.4.2 Unit Root Tests
As is standard when testing for Granger causality the variables must be stationary
and therefore a series of panel unit root tests are conducted using the Breitung (2000)
test and the Hadri (2000) test. Both tests employ a simple autoregressive model given
by (18).
yit = ait + ρiyi,t−1 + eit (18)
where yit is total expenditures, tax revenues, total debt, grants, other revenues, or
income; ait can be either state fixed effects or a state-specific linear time trend; and
ρi is the autoregressive parameter to be estimated. The Breitung test assumes that
all panels contain a common ρi with a null hypothesis that the series contain a unit
root, ρi = 1, and the alternative hypothesis that the series are stationary, ρi < 1.
Although the Breitung test is optimal when all panels contain a common ρi, Breitung
& Das (2005) state this test has power in the heterogeneous case as well. According
to Hadri (2000), hypothesis testing requires strong evidence to the contrary in order
to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the Hadri test has as its null hypothesis that all
panels are stationary against the alternative that at least some of the panels contain
a unit root. The results of the two unit root tests, preformed with and without a
time trend, are shown in Table 17.
Table 17: Unit Root Tests
Breitung Hadri
H0:all panels contain unit roots H0:all panels are stationary
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
Exp -0.95 -3.09*** 53.42*** 25.30***
∆Exp -5.94*** -11.59*** -2.16 -0.92
Tax -1.01 -0.42 51.59*** 27.68***
∆Tax -9.54*** -13.09*** -1.5 -1.4
Grants 0.25 0.83 59.07*** 43.48***
∆Grants -6.75*** -14.14*** -0.28 -1.14
Inc 0.7 -1.65** 60.48*** 25.49***
∆Inc -4.28*** -10.54*** -0.88 -0.57
Debt -0.35 -0.8 45.28*** 32.97***
∆Debt -1.05** -6.00*** 0.73 3.62***
Other -0.08 5.47 53.72*** 23.56***
∆Other 7.52*** 1.37 -1.15 -0.52
Notes: The Breitung test includes 3 lags and The Hadri test uses the Prazen kernel
to calculate long-run variances. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In almost all cases, regardless of the inclusion of a linear time trend, the variables
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are all non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences. Since the evidence
suggests the variables are integrated to the same order (order one), it is possible
that a linear combination of the variables are stationary representing an equilibrium
relationship given by equation (16), thus the analysis proceeds to a formal test for
cointegration.
4.4.3 Cointegration Estimates
Cointegration of the variables in equation (16) is evident of a long-run relationship
between expenditures and the explanatory variables, namely, tax revenues, other
revenues and grant revenues. To test for cointegration the Pedroni (1999, 2004)
heterogeneous panel cointegration test is employed to determine whether equation
(16) is indeed a cointegrating relationship. The Pedroni test is a residual based
test similar to the Engle-Granger cointegration test, and is performed on the the
residuals from equation (16), where the residuals represent instances of budgetary
disequilibrium.26 Equation (19) is used to test for the absence of cointegration (ρ = 1)
against the alternative that equation (16) is cointegrating (ρ < 1).
jit = ρi
j
it−1 + ωit (19)
The Pedroni test reports seven statistics. The first four panel statistics (v, ρ, pp, adf)
are within dimension based statistics. These statistics assume a common value for ρ
by pooling all the ρ′s across the different members. The next three group statistics (ρ,
pp, adf) are between dimension based statistics, which allow for heterogeneity across
the individual cross-sections by averaging individual ρ coefficients for each state.
Table 18 shows the results for the corresponding panel cointegration tests. The
statistics are distributed standard normal.27 Notice that there is overwhelming ev-
idence supporting the existence of cointegration since each of the seven statistics is
significantly different from zero, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion.
Given significant evidence in favor of cointegration there are typically three esti-
mators that have been used to estimate panel cointegrated models including, OLS,
Dynamic OLS (DOLS), and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS). However, according to
Pedroni (2000), OLS estimates of the cointegrating vector is biased and its standard
distribution depend on the nuisance parameters associated with the underlying short-
run dynamics. FMOLS corrects the dependent variable using long-run covariance
matrices to remove the nuisance parameters and then applies OLS to the corrected
26Cointegration among the variables in the budget constraint is a necessary condition for budget
deficit sustainability (Quintos, 1995; Martin, 2000; Cun˜ado et al., 2004).
27For more information on the the Pedroni panel cointegration test and calculations of the test
statistics see Pedroni (1999).
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Table 18: Pedroni’s Heterogeneous Panel Cointegration
tests
Panel v-statistic 3.74***
Panel ρ-statistic -7.83***
Panel PP-statistic -12.88***
Panel ADF-statistic -10.81***
Group ρ-statistic -6.87**
Group PP-statistic -14.24***
Group ADF-statistic -11.45***
Notes: All statistics are distributed standard normal and are weighted by
long-run variances. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
variables. DOLS uses leads and lags of the differenced regressors to correct the nui-
sance parameters. Although, the limiting distributions of both DOLS and FMOLS
are asymptotically normal as found by Kao & Chiang (2000), the finite sample prop-
erties of DOLS appear to be superior to both OLS and FMOLS. For example, Kao
& Chiang (2000) find that in finite samples OLS contains a bias and FMOLS does
not improve on OLS, thus DOLS may be the more promising estimator for estimat-
ing cointegrated panel models.28 Given the superiority of DOLS over the competing
estimation techniques, DOLS, augmented with one lead and lag of the differenced
regressors, is used here to obtain estimates for the cointegrating vectors in equa-
tion (16). Adding leads and lags of the differenced regressors circumvents problem
associate with endogenous feedback and serial correlation.29 Table 19 provides the
estimates for the cointegrating vectors.
Notice that the slope coefficients are positive and statistically significant, confirm-
ing the idea that expenditures at the state level are resource constrained. Consistent
with the tax-spend hypothesis, increases in taxes lead to increases in expenditures.
For example, a one percent increase in tax revenues increase expenditures by 0.42%.
This estimate is close to that found by WMF (0.524). Interestingly, the coefficient
on grants is significantly higher than personal income confirming the notion of the
flypaper effect. A one percent increase in grants and income stimulate expenditures
by 0.25% and 0.05%, repsectively. The coefficient on grants is much higher than
that found by WMF (0.058), perhaps suggestive of the increasing reliance on grants
28See Caldern (2002) for more details. Also, see Kao et al. (1999) for a demonstration of the
superiority of DOLS over FMOLS.
29It is assumed there exist only one cointegrating vector which is represented by the budget constraint
and therefore expenditures are normalized to one for identification.
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Table 19: Cointegration Estimates Using Dynamic
Ordinary Least Squares
Expenditures Estimate
Tax Revenues 0.419***
[0.000]
Grants 0.247***
[0.000]
Income 0.048**
[0.045]
Debt 0.038***
[0.000]
Other 0.221***
[0.000]
Observations 2,784
Adj. R-Squared 0.688
Number of States 48
Notes: Probability values are in brackets. Asterisks denote signifi-
cance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..
in finaincg expenditures post-1997. Furthermore, other revenues stimulate expendi-
tures by 0.22% for every one percent increase in other revenues. The results from
Table 19 provide the long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables and not
the adjustment towards equilibrium. If grants respond to past changes in grants
and expenditures this endogeneity distorts the flypaper effect as suggested by Bai-
ley & Connolly (1998). To examine the short-run dynamics and adjustment towards
budgetary equilibrium, the panel vector error correction model of equation (17) is
estimated.
4.4.4 Short-Run Dynamics
To estimate the system of equations represented by equation (17), many rely on
seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE) to allow for the contemporaneous error co-
variances to be freely estimated; however, given the large N and large T structure of
the data SURE is not feasible (Pesaran et al., 1999). Consequently, the mean-group
estimator is used to estimate the short-run adjustment parameters, the error correc-
tion parameter and the error covariances. The mean-group estimator estimates each
equation over each cross-section and creates an unweighted average of all the estima-
tors, and therefore does not impose homogeneity restrictions; however, the long-run
cointegrating vector is constrained to be equal across states.30 Given the large N and
30Given that states are constrained by both constitutional as well as legislative requirements to
maintain balanced budgets this is not an overbearing assumption.
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large T dimension of the panel, the mean-group estimator gives a consistent estimate
of the model parameters as shown by Pesaran & Smith (1995).31 To construct the
error correction model the panel analogue of the Engle & Granger (1987) two-step
method is employed. The Engle & Granger (1987) two-step method involves aug-
menting the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model with predicted residuals
(lagged one period) from the long-run equation to obtain the error correction model.
Following the logic set forth by WMF, each equation represented by (17) is esti-
mated separately to prevent from having to estimate all the parameters of the full
panel error correction model, thus inferences are based on the conditional model only.
According to WMF, this is feasible if the regression errors are independent of the ex-
planatory variables at all leads and lags. This is not restricted based on the correctly
specified model as long as the short-run dynamics are accounted for then the errors
will be independent of the explanatory variables by construction (WMF). To exam-
ine the short-run Granger-causality of equation (17) the Wald test is used to test the
joint significance of the lagged differenced variables in each equation. The short-run
results are reported in Table 20.
Panel A of Table 20 reports the error correction term for each equation.32 No-
tice expenditures, and not taxes, adjust to budget disequilibria. This result indi-
cates unidirectional causality from taxes to expenditures, thus favoring the tax-spend
hypothesis. However, debt, grants, income and other revenues respond to budget
disequilibria, with other revenues exhibiting the fastest speed of adjustment. Panel
B of Table 20 report short-run Granger-causality tests which reveal interesting pat-
terns of causality. For instance, the absence of joint significance with respect to taxes
in the expenditure equation and expenditures in the tax equation yield in favor of
the institutional separation hypothesis. However, expenditures exhibit bidirectional
causality with grants and other revenues. Also, there exists bidirectional causality
between expenditures and debt. Though, the short-run estimates reported in Panel
C of Table 20 reveal that a 1% increase in expenditures results in a 0.50% increase
in total debt outstanding and the absence of feedback from debt.33 Moreover, the
positive and statstically signficant effect of taxes on grants and other revenues sign-
fiy a complementarity relationship. Further, a 1% increase in grants increase other
revenues by 0.15%, which is consistent with Leviathan behavior. There also appears
to be negative inertia with respect to tax policy as the accumulated effect of tax rev-
enues on contemporaneous taxes are negative and this result applies to both grants
and other revenues as well. Alternatively, expenditures appear to be independent
from past expenditures.
The above analysis indicates clear evidence in favor of the tax-spend hypothesis
31Each specification includes a group-specific time trend and the estimates are the outlier-robust
mean of the parameter coefficients across groups.
32The error term represents budget disequilibrium. Construction of the error correction term, from
equation (16), is such that positive error terms signify budget deficits and negative error terms
indicate budget surplus.
33Short-run estimates are calculated as the sum of the coefficients on the lagged differences and the
standard errors are calculated using the “delta method.”
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Table 20: Long-Run Error Correction & Short-Run Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Expenditures Tax Grants Income Debt Other
Panel A: Long-Run Error Correction
t−1 -0.297*** 0.024 0.154** -0.047*** 0.186** 0.419***
(0.028) (0.037) (0.071) (0.016) (0.083) (0.091)
Panel B: Wald Test of Short-Run Causal Dynamics
H0 : expt−1 = expt−2 = expt−3 = 0
F-stat 0.864 0.023 9.970** 4.664 9.143** 7.470*
[0.834] [0.999] [0.019] [0.198] [0.027] [0.058]
H0 : taxt−1 = taxt−2 = taxt−3 = 0
F-stat 2.368 75.205*** 12.388*** 0.637 2.071 4.551
[0.500] [0.000] [0.006] [0.888] [0.558] [0.208]
H0 : grantt−1 = grantt−2 = grantt−3 = 0
F-stat 22.025*** 1.248 142.283*** 2.923 1.183 4.792
[0.000] [0.741] [0.000] [0.404] [0.757] [0.188]
H0 : inct−1 = inct−2 = inct−3 = 0
F-stat 2.973 29.729*** 3.011 2.531 4.861 14.157***
[0.396] [0.000] [0.390] [0.470] [0.182] [0.003]
H0 : debtt−1 = debtt−2 = debtt−3 = 0
F-stat 17.169*** 4.647 3.288 0.495 17.191*** 10.457**
[0.001] [0.200] [0.349] [0.920] [0.001] [0.015]
H0 : othert−1 = othert−2 = othert−3 = 0
F-stat 44.821*** 2.023 3.157 1.110 2.915 157.948***
[0.000] [0.568] [0.368] [0.775] [0.405] [0.000]
Panel C: Accumulated Short-Run Estimates
Expenditures 0.035 -0.006 -0.096 -0.023 0.501*** -0.395**
(0.061) (0.069) (0.111) (0.028) (0.170) (0.153)
Taxes 0.026 -0.420*** 0.257*** -0.011 -0.139 0.279**
(0.045) (0.054) (0.093) (0.017) (0.130) (0.133)
Grants -0.129*** 0.009 -0.580*** 0.007 -0.010 0.152**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.054) (0.010) (0.089) (0.073)
Income 0.180 0.690*** 0.103 -0.038 -0.555 1.175***
(0.114) (0.153) (0.265) (0.059) (0.371) (0.350)
Debt 0.033* 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.035 0.071*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.007) (0.057) (0.038)
Other Revenues -0.103*** 0.005 0.047 -0.002 0.088* -0.795***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.007) (0.052) (0.066)
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and probability values in brackets. Asterisks denote significance at
the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..
brought forth by Friedman (1978) in the long run. However, other revenues appear to
bear the majority of the adjustment burden back to equilibrium. The combination of
grants responding to budget disequilibria illustrate the importance of grants in main-
taining a balanced budget. Alternatively, in the short run, there exists no discernible
causal relationship between expenditures and taxes, which favors the institutional sep-
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aration hypothesis. Consequently, states appear to place more emphasis on financing
expenditures through grants and other revenues. This behavior is consistent with
evidence by Skidmore (1999) that localities under fiscal restraints have a tendency to
shift to other revenues and away from tax revenues.
Overall, budgetary dynamics resemble strikingly different patterns of adjustment
in both the short and long run, therefore policy recommendations must coincide
with these differences taking into consideration different state subtleties. Austerity
measures in the short run should include some combination of tax and expenditure
adjustments and perhaps even reconnecting the tax-spend nexus to avert potential
budget shortfalls; however long-run austerity measures should include adjusting taxes.
According to Friedman (1978) any increase in tax revenue would lead to increases in
expenditures and so the best way to cut spending and balancing the budget is through
reducing revenue resources. The use of federal aid by states in maintaining a balanced
budget might warrant the federal government to assist in paying down debt levels and
encouraging balanced budgets by spreading the cost among all the states in the union.
However, caution should be given as not to encourage moral hazard on the side of the
states, which would result in further problems in the long run.34 Finally, the use of
debt in financing short-run expenditures should be curtailed as to inhibit significant
debt accumulation over time.
4.5 High Debt versus Low Debt States
The assumption so far has been that all states follow a common fiscal adjustment
process; however, incentives for fiscal adjustment may differ significantly across states
for reasons such as politics. The surge in budget shortfalls among states, even in
the presence of constitutional and legislative constraints, warrants an examination of
possible asymmetries relating to states with lower debt levels versus states with higher
debt levels. In this section, heterogeneity relating to the revenue-expenditure nexus is
compared and contrasted between high debt states and low debt states. The results
shed light on possible explanations for the evolution of large unsustainable debt levels
among certain states. Therefore, to check the robustness of the above results, the
sample is split based on the debt-to-population ratio to ascertain differences among
high versus low debt states relating to budgetary dynamics. To split the sample,
the state-specific mean of the debt-to-population ratio was determined for each state
and then the sample was split based on the median to ensure the same number of
cross-sections in each sample. States corresponding to each sample split are reported
in Table 21.35
34See Poterba (1995) for more discussion on the relationship between indebtedness and intergovern-
mental transfers.
35It is interesting to note that among high debt states sixteen were classified as blue states, seven
were red states and one was a purple (swing) state, whereas low debt states were comprised of
fourteen red states, four blue states and six purple states. Estimates from Wikipedia were used
to determine state color. These were based on compiling the average margins of victory in the
presidential elections between 1942 to 2008.
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Table 21: Stratified Samples
High Debt States Low Debt States
CA NM AL MS
CT NY AZ MO
DE ND AR NE
IL OR CO NV
KY RI FL NC
LA SC GA OH
ME SD ID OK
MD VT IN PA
MA WA IA TN
MT WV KS TX
NH WI MI UT
NJ WY MN VA
Summary statistics for each sample split are found in Table 22. Interestingly,
high debt states have higher levels of expenditures and federal grants compared to
low debt states.
Table 22: Summary Statistics for Sample Splits
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
High Debt States
Expenditures 1557.52 1990.58 10.14 10352.17
Taxes 698.92 882.03 5.27 4899.13
Grants 402.53 563.99 0.98 4069.20
Income 10.52 12.75 0.17 61.07
Debt 1133.96 1611.44 0.04 11928.84
Other Revenues 588.59 826.33 1.78 7064.07
Low Debt States
Expenditures 1228.78 1555.12 10.06 7116.39
Taxes 597.23 722.83 6.01 3802.95
Grants 311.14 424.15 1.33 3260.43
Income 9.73 11.50 0.13 47.86
Debt 459.88 655.61 0.10 3593.07
Other Revenues 429.75 604.74 1.41 4188.72
Notes: Values are per capita 2005 dollars. Each group has 1392 observations.
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4.5.1 Cointegration
Table 23: Pedroni’s Heterogeneous Panel Cointegration
Tests
High Debt Low Debt
Panel v-statistic 2.78*** 2.51**
Panel ρ-statistic -5.16*** -5.90***
Panel PP-statistic -8.51*** -9.69***
Panel ADF-statistic -7.52*** -7.77***
Group ρ-statistic -4.56*** -5.15***
Group PP-statistic -9.56*** -10.58***
Group ADF-statistic -8.24*** -7.96***
Notes: All statistics are distributed standard normal and are weighted by long
run variances. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results from the Pedroni’s cointegration tests for each sample are given in Table
23. Consistent with the full sample, both samples exhibit statistically significant
evidence in favor of cointegration, which is consistent with the weak form of budget
deficit sustainability.
Table 24: Cointegration Estimates Using Dynamic Ordinary
Least Squares
Variable High Debt Low Debt
Taxes 0.397*** 0.479***
[0.000] [0.000]
Grants 0.248*** 0.230***
[0.000] [0.000]
Income 0.057*** -0.008***
[0.084] [0.412]
Debt 0.038*** 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000]
Other Revenues 0.204*** 0.227***
[0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,392 1,392
R-Squared 0.811 0.908
Number of States 24 24
Notes:Proabaility values are in brackets. Asterisks denote significance at the fol-
lowing levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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DOLS estimation is used to estimate the cointegrating equation for each sample
split which uncovers interesting disparities that exist between high debt and low debt
states as shown in Table 24. For instance, low debt states rely more heavily on tax
revenues to finance expenditures as compared to high debt states. A 1% increase in
tax revenues increase expenditures by 0.48% in low debt states and only 0.40% in
high debt states. On the other hand, a 1% increase in grants increases expenditures
by 0.25% for high debt states and only 0.23% in low debt states. Low debt states
also appear to rely more heavily on other revenues to finance expenditures with an
elasticity of 0.20 compared to 0.23 for high debt states. Overall, the long-run estimates
show differences in the revenue-expenditures nexus related to debt levels in the long-
run, the next section provides estimates of the short-run adjustments for low and high
debt states.
4.5.2 Short-Run Results
The short-run dynamics for low debt states and high debt states are given in Table 25
and 26, respectively. Results for the low debt states in Panel A of Table 25 show that
both expenditures and tax revenues respond to budget disequilibria, thus favoring
the synchronization hypothesis. Also, other revenues adjust to budget disequilibrium
and bear the majority of the adjustment burden, whereas debt and grants show signs
of weak exogeneity given their lack of adjustment to disequilibrium. Panel B and
C of Table 25 provide results for the tests of Granger causality and accumulated
short-run estimates. Consistent with the full sample, the short-run Granger-causality
results favor the institutional separation hypothesis given by the absence of a causal
relationship between taxes and expenditures in each equation as shown in columns
1 and 2, respectively. Interestingly, debt is not effected by expenditures and even
decreases with increases with tax revenues (although this is not significant at conven-
tional levels). There also appears to be a complementarity among other revenues and
grants as shown by the positive relationship shown in Panel C, which consistent with
the full sample. With respect to persistence, taxes exhibit negative inertia given by
the negative and significant accumulative effect of lagged taxes on contemporaneous
taxes in column 2 and expenditure exhibit an absence of inertia as shown in column
1.
Focusing our attention on states with high debt levels, Table 26 reveals strikingly
different patterns of budgetary dynamics in the short and long run. As opposed to
low debt states, long-run adjustment favors the tax-spend hypothesis as expenditures
adjust to budgetary disequilibrium and taxes reveal signs of weak exogeneity. Also,
expenditures, and not other revenues, bear the majority of the adjustment burden.
Remaining robust across samples is the lack of a causal relationship between taxes
and expenditures in the short run and that other revenues and expenditures bear the
majority of the adjustment burden. Surprisingly, there exhibits negative inertia with
respect to taxes and positive inertia with respect to expenditures, as shown in Panel
C of Table 26, suggesting a divergence in short-run revenue-expenditure policies.
Conceivably, this break in the revenue-expenditure nexus and the divergence between
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Table 25: Low Debt: Long-Run Error Correction & Short-Run Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Expenditures Tax Grants Income Debt Other
Panel A: Long-Run Error Correction
t−1 -0.285*** 0.089** 0.116 -0.051** 0.180 0.724***
(0.052) (0.043) (0.105) (0.024) (0.171) (0.182)
Panel B: Wald Test of Short-Run Causal Dynamics
H0 : expt−1 = expt−2 = expt−3 = 0
F-stat 3.432 3.350 9.328** 3.150 1.261 19.189***
[0.330] [0.341] [0.025] [0.369] [0.738] [0.000]
H0 : taxt−1 = taxt−2 = taxt−3 = 0
F-stat 3.083 27.089*** 6.737* 2.128 5.716 2.399
[0.379] [0.000] [0.081] [0.546] [0.126] [0.494]
H0 : grantt−1 = grantt−2 = grantt−3 = 0
F-stat 14.822*** 0.006 83.448*** 3.569 2.066 7.305*
[0.002] [1.000] [0.000] [0.312] [0.559] [0.063]
H0 : inct−1 = inct−2 = inct−3 = 0
F-stat 2.986 25.369*** 1.531 3.242 7.584* 9.921**
[0.394] [0.000] [0.675] [0.356] [0.055] [0.019]
H0 : debtt−1 = debtt−2 = debtt−3 = 0
F-stat 9.501** 0.583 0.977 2.020 13.268*** 11.859***
[0.023] [0.900] [0.807] [0.568] [0.004] [0.008]
H0 : othert−1 = othert−2 = othert−3 = 0
F-stat 18.244*** 10.889** 5.510 4.864 7.164* 71.309***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.138] [0.182] [0.067] [0.000]
Panel C: Accumulated Short-Run Estimates
Expenditures -0.087 -0.085 -0.175 0.005 0.290 -0.964***
(0.084) (0.093) (0.162) (0.040) (0.314) (0.227)
Tax 0.002 -0.301*** 0.166 -0.034 -0.361 0.246
(0.063) (0.073) (0.121) (0.027) (0.229) (0.159)
Grants -0.163*** -0.003 -0.625*** 0.013 0.104 0.307***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.077) (0.014) (0.158) (0.115)
Income 0.244 0.762*** -0.113 -0.100 -1.465*** 1.382***
(0.160) (0.202) (0.386) (0.090) (0.565) (0.478)
Debt 0.032*** 0.001 0.003 0.011 -0.012 0.055
(0.019) (0.022) (0.034) (0.009) (0.080) (0.041)
Other -0.083*** 0.060*** 0.074* 0.012 0.243*** -0.825***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.038) (0.008) (0.093) (0.099)
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296
Number of States 24 24 24 24 24 24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and probability values in brackets. Asterisks denote significance
at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
taxes and expenditures may perhaps result in unsustainable revenue-expenditure poli-
cies that could set the stage for generating considerable amounts of debt over time.
Moreover, opposed to low debt states, increases in expenditures cause increases in
debt by approximately 0.77% for every 1% increase in expenditures, as shown in col-
umn 5 of Panel C. High debt states rely on federal aid, as opposed to own revenues,
to offset debt increases, as shown in column 5, such that a 1% increase in federal aid
reduces debt by 0.15%. From this result one could infer that low debt states are to
a certian degree subsidizing high debt states. As Wildasin (2010) points out, grants
83
can “weaken local fiscal discipline” if localities perceive ever increasing grants that
then result in unsustainable revenue-expenditure policies. As is shown, grants play
a much larger role in the revenue-expenditure nexus for high debt states than low
debt states.36 These contrasting results shed light on possible explanations for the
large debt accumulation across many states. Specifically, the combination of the lack
of causal dynamics between taxes and expenditures, the divergence between tax and
expenditure policies in the short-run and states’ reliance on grants to finance debt,
are all conducive to debt accumulation.
Results from the stratified sample reveal significant differences in the dynamics
between high debt and low debt states. High debt states rely on riskier budget
setting dynamics given the lack of response from tax revenues to budgetary shortfall,
whereas low debt states display more fiscal prudent budgetary dynamics in that both
expenditures and taxes respond to budgetary shortfalls. Furthermore, the the short-
run divergence between tax and expenditure policies in high debt states exacerbates
the break in the revenue-expenditure nexus further causing problems maintaining a
balanced budget. Also, the role of federal grants in high debt states –as opposed to
taxes or other revenues directly controlled by state governments–serve to retire debt
obligations, which demonstrates the reliance on the federal government to finance
debt.
Policy makers need to take these disparities into account when formulating policies
relating to state-level budgets. In particular, the evidence suggests that grants are
potentially creating a moral hazard since they are largely used to pay down debt
among high debt states, therefore grants need to be continuously reevaluated in order
to minimize moral hazard. Also, policy makers in high debt states need to focus on
establishing the short-run nexus between tax revenues and expenditures by reversing
the current divergent paths of taxes and expenditures in order to promote a long-run
sustainable path. Policy makers in low debt states should also focus on establishing
the link between taxes and expenditures in order to maintain control in balancing
their budgets, but long-run goals should be a combination of tax and expenditure
adjustments.
Overall, the budgetary dynamics suggest significant heterogeneity among states
with respect to adjustments in tax revenues and expenditures in both the short run
and long run. However, there are some similarities among all samples. For instance,
in all samples long-run adjustment occurs through expenditures and other revenues.
This result remains robust to sample splits and suggests that states under consti-
tutional and legislative constraints rely on other revenues to maintain a balanced
budget. Also, the lack of causal relationships between taxes and expenditures in the
short run remains robust across sample splits. Conceivably, this break in the revenue-
expenditure nexus could result from a number of issues relating to state finances (e.g.
public pensions) and then exacerbated by the current recession as tax revenues de-
36Interestingly, high debt states have a much larger average population density compared to low
debt states suggesting high debt states are more urban like. According to Buettner & Wildasin
(2006), larger citities are be able to lobby higher level governments for fiscal assistance or other
special treatments.
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Table 26: High Debt: Long-Run Error Correction & Short-Run Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Exp Tax Grants Inc Debt Other
Panel A: Long-Run Error Correction
t−1 -0.340*** 0.001 0.114 -0.043* 0.112 0.286**
(0.037) (0.063) (0.091) (0.023) (0.081) (0.113)
Panel B: Wald Test of Short-Run Causal Dynamics
H0 : expt−1 = expt−2 = expt−3 = 0
F-stat 5.484 0.773 3.309 4.040 22.579*** 1.633
[0.140] [0.856] [0.346] [0.257] [0.000] [0.652]
H0 : taxt−1 = taxt−2 = taxt−3 = 0
F-stat 0.321 42.182*** 7.573* 1.395 0.200 2.066
[0.956] [0.000] [0.056] [0.707] [0.978] [0.559]
H0 : grantt−1 = grantt−2 = grantt−3 = 0
F-stat 9.065** 3.293 61.426*** 0.286 3.046 1.394
[0.028] [0.349] [0.000] [0.963] [0.385] [0.707]
H0 : inct−1 = inct−2 = inct−3 = 0
F-stat 2.502 9.562** 2.676 5.261 1.651 4.055
[0.475] [0.023] [0.444] [0.154] [0.648] [0.256]
H0 : debtt−1 = debtt−2 = debtt−3 = 0
F-stat 7.187* 11.236** 1.741 1.461 5.962 3.576
[0.066] [0.011] [0.628] [0.691] [0.113] [0.311]
H0 : othert−1 = othert−2 = othert−3 = 0
F-stat 29.714*** 4.016 2.069 5.722 0.946 107.264***
[0.000] [0.260] [0.558] [0.126] [0.814] [0.000]
Panel C: Accumulated Short-Run Estimates
Expenditures 0.171** -0.010 0.050 -0.061 0.771*** 0.060
(0.086) (0.104) (0.152) (0.038) (0.173) (0.206)
Taxes 0.010 -0.516*** 0.300** 0.011 -0.018 0.300
(0.066) (0.084) (0.144) (0.022) (0.139) (0.212)
Grants -0.104*** 0.038 -0.539*** 0.002 -0.152* -0.019
(0.037) (0.045) (0.074) (0.014) (0.090) (0.085)
Income 0.102 0.545*** 0.327 0.029 -0.126 0.858
(0.158) (0.202) (0.386) (0.074) (0.468) (0.527)
Debt 0.044 0.026 0.011 -0.001 0.083 0.091
(0.031) (0.030) (0.051) (0.011) (0.084) (0.067)
Other Revenues -0.124*** -0.049 0.026 -0.017 -0.047 -0.785***
(0.024) (0.034) (0.048) (0.011) (0.056) (0.088)
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296 1,296
Number of States 24 24 24 24 24 24
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and probability values in brackets. Asterisks denote signifi-
cance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..
clined due to the decrease in household wealth, increased savings among individuals
and sluggish economic growth. Thus, going forward, establishing the link between
short-run taxes and expenditures should be of primary concern for policy makers.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Mounting budget deficits by US states can be explained by the budget setting behavior
of political officials. Using a panel of US states over five decades, the results in this
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study suggest differences in the short and long-run behavior of fiscal adjustment.
Short-run dynamics favor the institutional separation hypothesis; however, long-run
adjustment primarily occurs through expenditures along with adjustments by both
grants and other revenues. This result favors the tax-spend hypothesis in which
tax revenues encourage expenditures in the long run. These results highlight the
importance of recognizing disparities in the revenue-expenditure nexus along with
the importance of federal aid, that need to be accounted for to ensure the enactment
of policies that are favorable for budget sustainability.
Results from the stratified sample based on the debt-to-population ratio, reveal
distinct causal relationships between tax revenues and expenditures. The short-run
and long-run evidence signal significant heterogeneity. For example, in the short run,
both low debt and high debt states favor the the institutional separation hypothesis;
however, with respect to high debt states, tax and expenditure policies are diverging
thus exacerbating the break in the revenue-expenditure nexus. Moreover, low debt
states appear rely on tax revenues to decrease debt levels in the short-run whereas
high debt states instead rely on federal aid. These results are consistent with the idea
that high debt states display more precarious budget setting dynamics which could
explain their potentially risky debt position relative to low debt states. Furthermore,
high debt states should relieve their reliance on grants and instead focus on being
more autonomous by relying more on own revenue sources.
The diverse dynamics among samples unveil important policy implications. As
state budget deficits intensify the correct action to rectify budgetary imbalances de-
pends on the causal linkages between revenues, expenditures and grants. For in-
stance, establishing the short-run nexus between taxes and expenditures would be
appropriate to correct short-run budgetary imbalances and avert unsustainable debt
accumulation, but a long term approach should include adjustments in tax revenues.
Specifically, in order to effectively shrink state budgets, permanent tax cuts would
be necessary to force spending cuts. On the other hand, policies in high debt states
aimed at controlling budget deficits should focus on reversing the time paths of tax
revenues and expenditures to further prevent unsustainable budget paths, while long-
run policies should focus adjusting taxes to reduce state budgets. For low debt states,
along with establishing the short-run relationship between taxes and expenditures,
focus should be on adjusting both expenditures and tax revenues to correct for bud-
getary imbalances in the long run. The role of grants in offsetting debt for high debt
states sheds light on the federal government’s role in securing budgetary equilibrium
in the short run. State reliance on these grants as a means of retiring debt obligations
can exacerbate risky behavior, as high debt states rely more heavily on grants than
low debt states, thus the moral hazard attributes of grants should be examined more
carefully. Perhaps a more efficient strategy over the long-run for all states would be
to substitute away from federal grant financing and toward a devolution of taxing
responsibilities down to states. This strategy should effectively “harden” state bud-
gets and invoke tax competition that would, in theory, drive down tax rates and,
according to the results in this chapter, reduce spending (See Rodden et al., 2003 for
a more thorough discussion).
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5 An Empirical Investigation of Fiscal Interactions and the Flypaper Effect
5.1 Introduction
Many researchers have assumed that governments make decisions in isolation; how-
ever, recent research has shown that the activities of other governments both hor-
izontally and vertically play a very active role in the decision making process. In
understanding state level spending behavior it is important to account for the feed-
back from the activities of other governments within a federation. Of course there are
many reasons for accounting for such activities. For instance, states’ fiscal decisions
impose externalities on their neighbors by encouraging the mobility of the factors
of production which ultimately influences the tax base, or neighboring state fiscal
policies can serve as informational externalities in the form of yardstick competition.
The literature on the flypaper effect outlined in Chapter 1 has, for the most part,
disregarded the externalities imposed by neighboring governments and instead as-
sumed these governments decide on the optimal level of public spending in isolation.
However, if the median voter benefits from neighboring jurisdictions’ public spending
or use the fiscal policies in neighboring jurisdictions as a mechanism for evaluating
current policy maker performance then actions of neighboring jurisdictions will be an
important determinant of public spending. According to Hines & Thaler (1995), for
instance, failure to account for decisions made by other jurisdictions is one reason
behind finding a flypaper effect. Furthermore, Case et al. (1993) also believe that the
size of the flypaper effect can be attributed to these spillovers by neighboring states.
Indeed, Acosta (2010) uses data from Argentina and finds evidence that ignoring
spatial interdependence overestimates the flypaper effect.
The purpose of this study is to better understand the flypaper effect as it relates to
state level spending. Addressing the current omissions in the literature as described
by Inman (2008), such as omitted variables relating to neighboring state fiscal poli-
cies, this study sheds light on the determinants of the flypaper effect. Specifically,
fiscal interactions with respect to expenditures and grants, proves to be an impor-
tant omission when estimating the flypaper effect. Federal grants are shown to have
important informational externalities that inform voters and policy makers on the
behavior of neighboring state policies that then influence their own state’s fiscal poli-
cies. Furthermore, public services in neighboring states can emit significant spillover
benefits thereby effectively linking public spending levels across states. Case et al.
(1993) offer a number of examples of this such as, spending on highways that provide
benefits to neighboring residents that use these roads; school expenditures that can
benefit neighboring states as well-educated people migrate to these states or compete
with workers in other states; and residents in one state could benefit from neighboring
states’ welfare expenditures provided they care about the poor.
In the wake of fiscal federalism, policy makers and researchers are becoming aware
of the importance in understanding the dynamic nature of fiscal policy adjustment to
changes in other government fiscal policies, both horizontally and vertically. There-
fore, in addition to accounting for fiscal interactions this chapter relaxes the assump-
tion of instantaneous adjustment and instead allows for partial adjustment in public
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spending levels. Indeed, the mobility of resources following changes in state fiscal
policy necessitates a dynamic framework to allow for adjustment time. In fact, esti-
mation of a reaction function implicitly assumes dynamic responses by states to rival
state activities, yet most studies instead estimate a steady-state reaction function
(Baicker, 2005). Finally, in this chapter I use a relatively new econometric technique
to address the issue of endogeneity and that is conducive to studying the underlying
dynamics. Overall, the results yield in favor of a strong flypaper effect; however,
the flypaper effect appears to be generated from omitted variable bias resulting from
ignoring fiscal interactions in the form of yardstick competition and budget spillovers.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 documents
the current literature; Section 5.3 discusses the theoretical foundation; Section 5.4
outlines the data and methodology; Section 5.5 provides the results; and concluding
remarks are given in the final section.
5.2 Strategic Interactions and the Flypaper Effect
The flypaper effect has been a robust finding in the literature. Table 27 provides
estimates of early empirical estimates of the flypaper effect. These range anywhere
from 0.40 to 1.00, whereas the propensity to spend out of community income ranges
from 0.05-0.10. Using similar data to this study, Case et al. (1993) find that the
propensity to spend grant money is 0.65. The empirically strategy as well as the data
vary across studies, but consistently find evidence of the flypaper anomaly.
Table 27: Summary of the Flypaper Effect
Author Sample Estimate
Inman (1971) Panel study of 41 city budgets 1.00
Weicher (1972) State aid to 106 municipal governments 0.90
Weicher (1972) State grants to independent school districts 0.40
Gramlich and Galper (1973) Federal grants to local and state governments 0.43
Gramlich and Galper (1973) Federal and state aid to 10 large urban governments 0.25
Bowman (1974) Federal education grants to West Virginia school districts 1.06
Bowman (1974) State grants to West Virginia school districts 0.50
Feldstein (1975) State grants to Massachusetts towns 0.60
Olmsted, Denzau and Roberts (1993) Missouri state aid to local school districts 0.58
Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) Federal grants to 48 states, 1970-1985 0.65
Source: This table is a replica of Table 1 found in Hines & Thaler (1995).
According to the relatively recent literature on fiscal federalism there is ample
evidence to suggest extensive governmental interaction, both horizontally and ver-
tically.37 Of course, these interactions can be passive in that the actions by one
jurisdiction do not intentionally affect their neighbors or they could be active in
which governments utilize a strategic set of policy instruments to attract the mo-
bile tax bases. Brueckner (2003) classifies the two aforementioned cases as either
“resource flow” models or “spillover” models, where the former refers to models of
fiscal competition and the latter as fiscal externalities (e.g. yardstick competition).
Two possible explanations for such interactions include the exit mechanism and the
37For an overview of empirical studies concerning fiscal strategic interactions consult Brueckner
(2003).
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vote mechanism. Tiebout (1956) argued that efficient levels of public services can be
generated through households sorting themselves among heterogeneous jurisdictions
that provide public goods and corresponding tax prices that match their preferences.
The ability of households to “vote with their feet” (i.e. the exist mechanism) is the
mechanism through which governments can compete for mobile households by low-
ering the tax price of public services relative to their neighbor. However, it has been
warned that this behavior encourages a “race to the bottom” in tax rates and, sub-
sequently, sub-optimal levels of public goods. Numerous studies have been carried
out to examine the effect of tax competition within a theoretical framework such as
Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) ,Wilson (1986), and Wildasin (1991).38
Using spatial econometric methods, reaction functions have been estimated with
respect to both tax rates and expenditures. For instance, focusing on the US, Baicker
(2005) found that for each $1 increase in neighboring state expenditures, own-state
expenditures increased by $0.90; with the degree of population mobility being most
predictive measure of neighborliness. Others have found similar upward sloping re-
action functions with respect to tax rates. For example, Buettner (2001) examines
local business taxes in Germany; Brueckner & Saavedra (2001) focuses on property
tax rates in the Boston area; and Brett & Pinkse (2000) look at local property taxes
in British Columbia. Others, such as Ladd (1992) and Revelli (2001), find additional
evidence of strategic behavior among localities.
Another possible mechanism for state interaction is that of yardstick competition,
resulting from the vote mechanism. In this case, expenditure mimicking behavior
is tied to the political process. This idea, first expressed by Salmon (1987), claims
that since voters do not know the production function for public goods they rely on
fiscal policies in neighboring jurisdictions as a benchmark. If the voters find that the
expenditure levels (or tax rates) in their jurisdiction is set significantly above that
of their neighbors they will be inclined to vote that politician out of office. Rational
politicians will therefore mimic their neighbor’s fiscal policies to prevent from being
voted out of office. Case (1993) was the first to study the potential source of tax
mimicking. With respect to the US, Case (1993) finds positive strategic interaction
among tax rates of neighboring jurisdictions when the governor is up for re-election.
Also, Besley & Case (1995a) find that tax rates are only affected by neighboring tax
rates when the governor is eligible for re-election. They find that the probability of a
governor being unseated increases with increases in tax rates of their own jurisdiction
and falls when tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions increase.
Although most of the literature to date has focused on either tax competition or
yardstick competition, there is little research done on the role of intergovernmental
transfers in a strategic interactive environment. When states are part of a fiscal
union, as in the US, transfers have the potential to alter the incentives faced by
policy makers under fiscal competition. For example, transfers are typically used
to mitigate horizontal externalities imposed by tax competition; however, states can
alter their policy instruments to attract more federal funds. Kothenburger (2004)
shows that states can “see-through” the federal transfer policy and perceive transfers
38For a review of the literature on fiscal competition see Wilson (1999).
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to depend on expenditures or tax rates. Consequently, governments could select
inefficient policies in order to attract discretionary fiscal funds (see, e.g., Wildasin,
1997; Qian & Roland, 1998; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2010).
When dealing within a multi-tiered system, vertical interactions become increas-
ingly important as externalities can develop from upper tiered governments as pre-
viously described. With few exceptions most of the studies to date examine only
the effect of own-state federal grants on own-state expenditures and disregard the
horizontal fiscal linkages that may distort this relationship. To fill this void, Boar-
net & Glazer (2002) use data on the forty-eight contiguous states from 1970 to 1985
and find strong evidence in favor of grants awarded to neighboring states serving
as a yardstick mechanism for which citizens use to evaluate policy makers. Conse-
quently, grants awarded to neighboring states reduce own-state expenditures. The
evidence provided by Boarnet & Glazer (2002) suggests that federal grant awards
provide valuable information that inform voters about the competence or ability of
their government relative to other governments in the form of yardstick competition.
Alternatively, Kothenburger (2004) finds that besides tax and yardstick competition,
transfers offer a third channel of interaction that is capable of explaining expenditure
(or tax rate) interactions among subnational governments. For instance, equilibrium
expenditures can be generated by federal transfers even in the presence of capital
mobility. Both cases highlight the importance of grants serving as a means of linking
local governments within a federation. If fiscal interactions are present and influence
own-state expenditures then failure to a account for these interactions will overstate
the stimulative effect of grants on expenditures. Therefore, grant income received
by neighboring states effectively serve to constrain state government spending by
informing the median voter on the performance of their policy makers.
This chapter exploits the horizontal and vertical interactions among governments
in the US in order to examine the relationship between federal grants and state level
expenditure policy. Following Case et al. (1993), state governments are assumed to
spatially interact over expenditures to account for budget spillovers from neighbor-
ing jurisdictions. Furthermore, the informational externalities associated with federal
grants are accounted for following Boarnet & Glazer (2002), which assumes the me-
dian voter uses federal grants awarded to neighboring states as a yardstick for gauging
the performance of their own policy makers. The next section generates the median
voter model augmented with spillover externalities.
5.3 Theoretical Model
The state government is assumed to maximize the utility of the median voter,
maxU(x, gi) (20)
subject to the median voter’s budget constraint:
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Yi = Ii + h ∗ zi = x+ pg ∗ gi (21)
where x is the private good; gi is the public good in state i; I is private income (tax
base); and h is the median voter’s share of the transfers zi. The price of private goods
is the numeraire and pg is the tax price for government services gi. The first order con-
ditions from maximizing the median voter’s utility subject to the budget constraint in
equation (21) provide the median voter’s demand for public services. However, there
is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting the existence of spillovers with respect
to state expenditures (see, Case et al., 1993). Furthermore, evidence by Boarnet &
Glazer (2002) and Kothenburger (2004) suggest that grants awarded to neighboring
states provide important informational content used by neighboring states in deter-
mining the level of public services.39 Following Case et al. (1993), spending spillovers
as well as grants in neighboring states can be incorporated into the current model by
allowing these to enter into the utility function of the median voter in state i.
maxU(x, gi, gj, zj) (22)
where gj is the amount of public services in state j from which the median voter
in state i receives utility (i.e. spillover effects) and zj include grants awarded to
neighboring states that capture informational externalities. The first order conditions
from maximizing the median voter’s utility in the above equation subject to the
budget constraint in equation (21) provide the median voter’s demand for public
goods inclusive of spending and informational spillovers. The median voter’s demand
for public services is described by the following function in expenditure form (where
Eit = git ∗ pit):
Eit = f(Ejt, zit, Iit, zjt, Xit) (23)
where expenditures in state i at time t are a function of expenditures in neighbor-
ing state j (Ejt); grants in state i (zit); income in state i (Iit); grants awarded to
neighboring states (zjt); and exogenous factors that determine state expenditures
(Xit). Differentiating the first order condition with respect to the variables of in-
terest, namely, Ejt, zit, Iit and zjt, provide the response function for state i. The
expected sign on Ejt is positive indicating positive spillover benefits. The expected
sign on zjt is negative suggesting voter’s perceive a relative increase in grants to state
j, and not state i, as a signal for awarding prudent fiscal policies, thus serving to con-
strain own-state expenditures. Also, within this framework, the equivalence theorem
of Bradford & Oates (1971) states that the stimulative effect of federal grants and
income should be equal.
39Cited in Boarnet & Glazer (2002), others have argued that policies can signal competence, such
as, Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990).
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5.4 Data and Empirical Methodology
The data for this study contain the forty-eight contiguous US states over the period
1980 to 2008. Variables include intergovernmental grants from the federal govern-
ment, personal income, and total expenditures. Control variables for the unemploy-
ment rate, debt outstanding, the poverty rate, dependency ratio, a dummy variable
equal to one if the governor is a democrat and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable
equal to one corresponding to a gubernatorial election year and zero otherwise. As
discussed in the Chapter 2, cross-sectional averages were subtracted from each vari-
able to mitigate other forms of cross-sectional dependence and focus on only spatial
relationships.
To facilitate estimation I make use of a linearized versions of function (23) and
define the following linear stochastic reaction function:
E∗it = ui + γE−it + β1zit + β2Iit + φz−it + λXit + it (24)
where i and t index state and time, respectively. The variables E∗it is the steady-
state level of total expenditures; zit is intergovernmental revenue from the federal
government, Iit is personal income, and Xit is a vector of control variables. All
variables are converted to real per capita terms. Individual intercepts used to capture
time-invariant heterogeneity are given by ui and the white noise error term is given
by it. The spatial interaction term for expenditures is denoted by E−i =
∑
j wijEj
which is defined as the average expenditures of neighboring states weighted by the
predetermined weights, wij; where wij is an element in the 48x48 matrix W. The
predetermined weights define “neighborliness” and for this study include two measures
of geographic reference (i.e. contiguity and distance) and two measures of economic
distance (i.e. population and income). For contiguity weights, wij = 1 if state i and
j share a border and zero otherwise, and by convention, wii = 0. In other words,
it is assumed that states that share a border interact and those that do not share
a border do not interact. Inverse distance weights are defined as 1
d2
, where d is the
distance from each state’s centroid. Income and population matrices are calculated as
wijt = mjt, where mjt is neighbor j’s level of population or real income per capita in
year t, and the set of neighboring states is defined by the contiguity matrix described
above. With respect to the time-varying weights, such as income and population,
the diagonal is (W1, ...,WT ), where the weight matrix is a (NTxNT) block-diagonal
matrix of spatial weights with T (i.e. number of time periods) copies of W along the
diagonal.40
Equation (24) is state i’s reaction function with respect to expenditures, which
could broadly be interpreted as steady-state responses to actions of neighboring states
(Baicker, 2005). When the weights are standardized the spatial lag term represents
the average expenditures of rival states and therefore the coefficient γ measures the
response of own-state spending to changes in rival state spending. A positive (neg-
ative) sign on the spatial lag indicates that expenditures are strategic complements
40The weights are standardized so that their row sums equal unity for each i.
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(substitutes); and consistency with a Nash equilibrium requires that |γ| < 1, where
the magnitude of the effect depends on the weights.
Boarnet & Glazer (2002) argue that federal grants to neighboring states can pro-
duce informational externalities informing citizens of the performance of their govern-
ment which then translates to changes in own-state expenditure policies. Likewise,
Kothenburger (2004) shows that states may compete for grants from the federal gov-
ernment by altering their fiscal policies. Consequently, state governments set their
expenditures according to their neighbors’ expenditures as well as the level of grants.
These informational spillovers from grants have the ability to influence and provoke
strategic competition across states. To allow for possible vertical externalities from
federal grants, equation (24) includes a spatial lag on grants, z−i =
∑
j wijzj, there-
fore, the estimator φ captures informational spillovers from intergovernmental grants
awarded to neighboring states.41 The expected sign on φ is negative suggesting states
decrease their expenditures relative to their neighbors to prevent the perception of
waste by the median voter. In other words, consistent with yardstick competition,
policy makers will respond to a rival state’s grant award by decreasing their expen-
ditures to ward off any perception of wasteful spending with the hopes of increasing
their likelihood of re-election.
To relax the assumption that policy makers adjust their expenditures instanta-
neously the partial adjustment mechanism of Hayashi & Boadway (2001) is assumed
as follows:
Et − Et−1 = λ(E∗t − Et−1) (25)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant parameter, and a value of one indicates instantaneous
adjustment and a value of zero indicates no adjustment. Hayashi & Boadway (2001)
mention that partial adjustment can arise from such things as institutional rigidities
or incrementalism. Plugging in equations (24) into (25) eliminates E∗ and therefore
the following equation describes the reaction function allowing for partial adjustment
in expenditures.
Eit = ϕEi,t−1 + γE−it + β1zit + β2Iit + φz−it + λXit + ui + it (26)
where ϕ = (1− λ) and ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, a high value of ϕ indicates a slower
adjustment process. Using equation (26), both short-run and long-run responses of
expenditures can be examined. For example, in equation (26), the short-run response
to a rival state’s expenditure change is give by γ and the long-run response is given
by γ
1−ϕ .
Prior to estimating the spatial lag equations, two econometric issues are addressed
(see, e.g., Anselin, 1988). First, tests of spatial autocorrelation are employed to check
for the existence of spatial autocorrelation with respect to expenditures and grants.
Evidence of spatial autocorrelation across the two variables confirms the model set
41Weights are the same as those defined for expenditures.
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up. Next, the use of spatial lag models induce a problem of endogeneity with respect
to the spatial lag term, which causes biased and inconsistent estimates. These two
issues are confronted in the next two sections.
5.4.1 Spatial Autocorrelation
The Moran’s I and Geary’s C tests are used to test for the existence of spatial au-
tocorrelation with respect to expenditures and federal grants across each weighting
matrix (i.e. contiguity, inverse distance, population and income). The Moran’s I test
statistic is calculated as follows:
I =
1
n2
∑
i
∑
j wij(Yi − Y¯ )(Yj − Y¯ )
( 1
n2
∑
i
∑
j wij)((
1
n
∑
i(Yi − Y¯ )2)
(27)
where Y is the variable of interest and wij is the corresponding weight matrix. Neg-
ative (positive) values indicate negative (positive) spatial autocorrelation and a zero
value indicates a random spatial pattern. The Geary’s C statistic is calculated as
follows:
C =
1
n2
∑
i
∑
j wij(Yi − Yj)2
2( 1
n2
∑
i
∑
j wij)(
1
n−1
∑
j(Yi − Y¯ )2)
(28)
here a value of one indicates no spatial autocorrelation, zero indicates positive spatial
autocorrelation, and two indicates negative spatial autocorrelation. Both the Moran’s
I statistic and the Geary’s C statistic are converted to Z-scores and the null hypothesis
of no spatial correlation is tested against the alternative of spatial dependence.
Table 28: Tests for Spatial Autocorrelation
Moran’s I Geary’s C
Variables I z p-value I z p-value
Expenditures
Contiguity 0.243 12.898 [0.000] 0.752 -12.461 [0.000]
Distance 0.222 10.133 [0.000] 0.776 -9.749 [0.000]
Income 0.244 12.911 [0.000] 0.752 -12.425 [0.000]
Population 0.267 12.87 [0.000] 0.724 -11.295 [0.000]
Federal Grants
Contiguity 0.209 11.134 [0.000] 0.776 -9.945 [0.000]
Distance 0.206 9.422 [0.000] 0.796 -7.933 [0.000]
Income 0.21 11.15 [0.000] 0.774 -9.975 [0.000]
Population 0.229 11.047 [0.000] 0.735 -8.066 [0.000]
Notes: All tests are conducted as 1 tailed test. Asterisks denote signifi-
cance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The Moran’s I statistic is inversely related to Geary’s C, with the main difference
being that the Moran’s I tests for global spatial autocorrelation and the Geary C test
is more sensitive to local spatial autocorrelation. The results for both tests are found
in Table 28. All test statistics are statistically significant meaning expenditures, and
federal grants display strong statistical evidence of spatial autocorrelation regardless
of how neighborliness is defined. Consistent with the model setup, these results
confirm the hypothesis that states spatially interact across expenditures and grants.
5.4.2 Endogeneity of Regressors
In equations (24) and (26) E−it and Eit are simultaneously determined, causing E−it
to be correlated with the error term. In order to circumvent problems of endogeneity,
the spatial lag equations are typically estimated using instrumental variables (IV)
(see, e.g., Kelejian et al., 2006), maximum likelihood estimation of the reduced form
equation (MLE) (see, e.g., Easterly & Levine, 1998), or general methods of moments
(GMM) (see, e.g., Conley, 1999).42 More recently, Allers & Elhorst (2005) propose
to first-difference the equation and then estimate using an unconditional likelihood,
which they claim is superior to GMM estimation. However, the spatial lag equations
here incorporate additional endogenous variables (e.g. z−it and zit), therefore, both
MLE and IV are inconsistent. Furthermore, the number of cross-sections is greater
than the number of time periods (N > T ) prohibiting estimation of the disturbance
covariance matrix which render MLE and IV infeasible, leaving GMM estimation
as the only technique that overcomes these issues (Madariaga & Poncet, 2007 and
Kukenova & Monteiro, 2008).43
5.4.3 System General Methods of Moments
In lieu of IV and MLE estimation, Arellano & Bond (1991) advocate GMM estimation
using lags of the explanatory variables as instruments, which is conducive to stud-
ies where N > T and when there exists multiple endogenous explanatory variables.
Difference-GMM uses lags of the first differenced regressors from at least two periods
earlier as instruments. The instruments, instead of the regressors, are differenced in
order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects according to Arellano & Bover
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). Alternatively, system-GMM involves estimat-
ing each equation as a system of equations, one in levels and one in first differences.
Lagged first differences of the regressors are used as instruments in the levels equa-
tion and lagged levels of the regressors are used as instruments in the first differenced
equation. The use of instruments provides consistent estimators and the addition of
42Studies that use IV approach include Ladd (1992), Kelejian & Robinson (1993), Brett & Pinkse
(1997) Brett & Pinkse (2000), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Figlio et al. (1999), Fredriksson &
Millimet (2002), Buettner (2001), Revelli (2001) and Revelli (2002). Studies that use MLE include
Case (1993), Murdoch et al. (1993), Besley & Case (1995b), Bivand & Szymanski (1997), Bivand
& Szymanski (2000), Brueckner (1998), Saavedra (2000), and Brueckner & Saavedra (1997).
43There is also the possibility of spatial autocorrelation in the error term; however, as discussed by
Kelejian & Prucha (1998) IV estimation generates consistent estimates even in the presence of
spatial error dependence.
95
the second equation allows for additional instruments to be obtained, thus increas-
ing efficiency.44 Kukenova & Monteiro (2008) apply the system-GMM procedure to
equations with spatial dynamics in what they call ‘’extended system-GMM.” They
test (extended) system-GMM against spatial MLE, spatial dynamic MLE, spatial dy-
namic QMLE, difference-GMM and find that (extended) system-GMM outperforms
all the rest in terms of unbiasedness based on the RMSE criterion.45
System-GMM offers a number advantages over traditional estimation techniques.
As already mentioned, system-GMM corrects for endogeneity of the spatial lags as
well as other possible endogenous explanatory variables. System-GMM also controls
for other econometric problems such as measurement error and weak instruments. On
a more practical note, system-GMM precludes the need to invert large spatial weight
matrices which becomes more cumbersome as the number of cross-sections and time
periods increase.
To obtain consistent system-GMM estimators the following moment conditions
must be satisfied (Kukenova & Monteiro, 2008):
E(∆Ei,t−1it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T (29)
E(∆EXi,t−1it) = 0; for t = 2, ..., T (30)
E(∆zt−1it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T (31)
E(∆Wt−1Et−1it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T (32)
E(∆Wt−1zt−1it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T (33)
E(Ei,t−m∆it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T and 2 ≤ m ≤ t− 1 (34)
E(EXi,t−m∆it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T and 2 ≤ m ≤ t− 1 (35)
E(zi,t−m∆it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T and 2 ≤ m ≤ t− 1 (36)
E(Wt−mEt−m∆it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T and 2 ≤ m ≤ t− 1 (37)
44For more information on system and difference GMM consult Roodman (2006).
45Other studies that employ system-GMM include Madariaga & Poncet (2007), Foucault et al.
(2008), and Hong et al. (2008).
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E(Wt−mzt−m∆it) = 0; for t = 3, ..., T and 2 ≤ m ≤ t− 1 (38)
where the first four conditions relate to the levels equation and the latter four relate to
the first differenced equation. Notice for the extended version of system-GMM addi-
tional moment conditions (i.e. equations 32, 33, 37 and 38) are necessary to generate
consistent estimates in the presence of endogenous spatial lags. While estimating
the reaction equations, the two-step procedure is employed since it is asymptotically
more efficient than the one-step; however, the two-step method suffers from severe
downward bias (see, e.g., Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998).46 To
compensate for this bias Windmeijer (2005)’s finite-sample correction to the two-step
covariance matrix is used.47
5.4.4 Validity Tests
Consistency of system-GMM estimators depends on the validity of the instruments,
namely, the lagged levels and lagged first differences of the endogenous variables. Va-
lidity of the moment conditions depends on the absence of serial correlation in the
level residuals and exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Moreover, efficiency relies
on the “proper” choice of instruments. In order to ensure these validity conditions
are satisfied three specification tests are employed: Hansen J test, Arellano-Bond test
for serial correlation, and difference-in-Hansen test. Hansen’s test of over-identifying
restrictions analyzes the sample analogue of the moment conditions. The values are
distributed χ2 with the null hypothesis declaring a valid specification. Although ro-
bust, the Hansen test is weakened by many instruments. Further specification checks
involve tests of first and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residu-
als using the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation. Correctly specified instru-
ments require significant negative first-order serial correlation in the residuals and no
evidence of second-order correlation. Evidence of second-order serial correlation is
indicative of serial correlation in the original residuals implying the instruments are
misspecified and longer lagged instruments should be considered. Thus, significant
first order serial correlation and the absence of second-order serial correlation suggests
that the moment conditions are satisfied. Finally, in order to test whether system-
GMM, as opposed to difference-GMM, is appropriate the difference-in-Hansen test is
reported. The difference-in-Hansen tests the exogeneity assumption for the subset of
instruments with respect to the differenced instruments used in the levels equation.
Rejection of the null is evidence that difference, rather than system, GMM should be
used.
46The two-step procedure includes estimating the covariance matrix under the assumption of i.i.d
errors in the first step and then use the estimate of the covariance matrix in the second step which
assumes the errors are correlated within individuals and not across them.
47Following the advice of Roodman (2006) the maximum number of instrumental lags are restricted
to below the number of cross-sections (48), and the instrument set is collapsed. Collapsing the
instrument set prevents generating one column for each time period and lag available.
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5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Steady-State Reaction Function
Table 29 reports the results from estimating the steady-state reaction equation (23)
for each weight matrix (labeled at the top of each column). Column 1 provides the
baseline estimates without considering strategic interactions from neighboring states.
The coefficient on income (0.07) falls within the range commonly found in the lit-
erature; however, the coefficient on grants (1.83) is considerably higher than that
found in the literature even after accounting for its endogeneity. The following four
columns consider strategic interactions using various definitions of “neighborliness.”
Column 2 shows that the stimulative effect of grants on expenditures is positive and
highly significant with a value of $1.68. Private income stimulates expenditures by
about $0.03 for every dollar increase. These results confirm the longstanding flypaper
effect. The coefficient on the spatial lag on grants is negative and statistically signifi-
cant in all specifications, consistent with grants possessing informational externalities.
Consequently, grants awarded to neighboring states reduce own-state spending by as
much as $1.29, thereby substantially limiting the flypaper effect. As a result, grants
given to as single state have a much larger stimulative effect compared to grants dis-
tributed equally among all states. For example, $1 awarded to an individual state
would stimulate that state’s expenditures by as much as $1.70; however, if the federal
government issues $1 grant to every state the stimulative effect for each state would
be only $0.59. The positive and significant spatial lag term implies an upward sloping
reaction function which suggests positive expenditure spillovers. Therefore, if state j
raises their expenditures by $1, state i responds by increasing their expenditures by
$0.59. These estimates are largely consistent with those found by Boarnet & Glazer
(2002). With respect to control variables, the unemployment rate is positive and sta-
tistically significant in all specifications. Also, the dummy variable used to indicate
election years is negative and significant in every specification indicating states reduce
their spending during election years..
A review of the diagnostic tests indicate the model is correctly specified. The
Hansen’s J test is insignificantly different from zero, meaning the moment condi-
tions are satisfied. Further confirmation of a correctly specified model is given by
the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in which there is significant first or-
der serial correlation and an absence of second order serial correlation. Finally, the
difference-in-Hansen test shows up statistically insignificant indicating system-GMM
is the preferred estimation technique.
5.5.2 Reaction Function Allowing for Partial Adjustment
Table 30 provides the results from estimating equation (26) allowing for partial adjust-
ment in expenditures. Column 1 shows the baseline estimates without incorporating
strategic interactions from neighboring states. The positive and significant coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable confirms partial adjustment in expenditures. The
speed of adjustment in expenditures is 0.35 (1-0.65), which translates to 35% of the
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Table 29: Steady-State Reaction Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable:
Total Expenditures Baseline Contiguity Distance Income Population
Income 0.069*** 0.034** 0.035*** 0.032** 0.036***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Grants 1.830*** 1.676*** 1.654*** 1.705*** 1.564***
(0.269) (0.164) (0.185) (0.156) (0.141)
Spatial Lag Dependent —- 0.737*** 0.557*** 0.733*** 0.568***
(0.115) (0.098) (0.117) (0.112)
Neighbor’s Grants —- -1.285*** -0.889*** -1.290*** -0.700**
(0.317) (0.237) (0.317) (0.280)
Unemployment Rate 58.343*** 33.421** 31.335** 32.465** 37.022***
(17.133) (14.087) (13.354) (14.125) (13.336)
Debt 0.168** 0.06 0.094** 0.056 0.047
(0.074) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048)
Population Density -378.936 -331.805 -208.203 -283.139 -91.969
(413.122) (308.638) (280.029) (315.562) (289.370)
Dependency Ratio -1,077.793 -873.037 98.505 -820.033 -742.933
(1,346.317) (1404.940) (1190.250) (1388.000) (1056.140)
Election Year -23.272** -19.804** -22.524*** -20.173** -22.145***
(9.968) (8.236) (7.658) (8.588) (7.105)
Poverty Rate -17.831 -2.073 -9.043 -1.612 -3.214
(16.484) (14.913) (12.446) (15.270) (11.946)
Democrat 53.366 21.319 4.877 22.868 31.311
(55.439) (41.000) (40.692) (41.880) (42.819)
Constant 215.486 -91.847 -346.913 -76.523 -81.372
(691.799) (775.270) (718.062) (771.518) (647.491)
Observations 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48
AR(1) -2.170** -2.137** -2.209** -2.149** -2.052**
AR(2) 0.061 -0.534 -0.657 -0.568 -0.349
Hansen’s J Test 13.34 32.12 26.63 32.18 25.55
[0.020] [0.124] [0.322] [0.123] [0.376]
Difference-in-Hansen Test 12.07 23.71 21.79 22.71 20.28
[0.017] [0.307] [0.411] [0.360] [0.504]
Number of Instruments 15 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and probability values are in brackets. Asterisks denote
significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
difference between the equilibrium and actual level of expenditures being eliminated
in one year. Interestingly, the coefficient on grants is 0.67, which is very simliar to
the estimate found by Case (1993); and the coefficient on income is now only 0.03.
The following four columns provide the estimates allowing for strategic interac-
tions using different definitions of “neighborliness.” The positive and significant coef-
ficient on the lagged dependent variable confirms the existence of partial adjustment
in expenditures. When accounting for strategic interactions, the partial adjustment
is slower than in the base case. The coefficient on grants is positive and significant
with a magnitude of approximately $0.53 in the short run and $1.90 in the long
run. Meaning, for every dollar increase in federal grants, expenditures increase by
$0.53 immediately and over time translates to a total increase in expenditures by
$1.90. A dollar increase in private income increases expenditures by only $0.01 in the
short run and $0.04 in the long run. The large difference between the short-run and
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long-run propensity to spend grants and private income reveal an extended period
of adjustment. Surprisingly, grants awarded to neighboring states completely offset
the expenditure increase brought about by grants awarded to own state. Therefore,
equal grants distributed among all states simultaneously will be counter productive
in stimulating expenditures. However, grants awarded to a single state will stimulate
expenditures by $0.53, all else constant, which is consistent with the flypaper effect.
Lastly, in agreement with the existence of budget spillovers, the coefficient on the spa-
tial lag on expenditures is positive and significant. Interestingly, the control variables
have limited significance in the short run. According to the diagnostic tests the mod-
els are correctly specified. There exists significant first order serial correlation and
no evidence of second order serial correlation. Also, the Hansen and Difference-in-
Hansen test statistics are insignificant suggesting that the instruments are exogenous
and that system-GMM is the correct estimation procedure.
To illustrate the dynamics underlying the partial adjustment model a phase dia-
gram is generated based of the estimates in column 2 of Table 30. Figure 27 plots
the response of state expenditures to a one-time shock in income and grants. The
line labeled “total effect” includes state i’s response to state j’s actions when their
grants and expenditures increase by one dollar. First note the length of time before
expenditures return to equilibrium following the stimulus. Following a one-time shock
to grants it takes expenditures approximately ten years to return to equilibrium, and
slightly faster response following an income shock. The dotted line represents the
response from expenditures following the grant stimulus (holding constant income,
and neighbor’s activities) which produces an initial increase in expenditures in the
amount of $0.53, which is consistent with the estimates found in the flypaper liter-
ature. The solid line represents the response of expenditures to a one-time shock in
income, all else constant. The difference between these two lines illustrate the flypa-
per phenomenon. In contrast, if state i also reacts to neighboring state j’s expenditure
decisions and grant awards then the flypaper phenomenon almost completely disap-
pears as shown by the dashed line. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 28, which
shows the difference between the stimulative effect of income and grants, after al-
lowing neighboring states’ grants and expenditures to change, amounts only to $0.01
.
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Table 30: Reaction Function with Partial Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable:
Total Expenditures Baseline Contiguity Distance Income Population
Lagged Dependent 0.648*** 0.720*** 0.712*** 0.721*** 0.770***
(0.076) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.080)
Grants 0.665*** 0.534*** 0.526*** 0.530*** 0.431***
(0.131) (0.097) (0.122) (0.099) (0.146)
Spatial Lag Dependent —- 0.339*** 0.307*** 0.335*** 0.223***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065)
Neighbor’s grants —- -0.848*** -0.649*** -0.828*** -0.529***
(0.120) (0.124) (0.118) (0.134)
Income 0.025** 0.011** 0.003 0.010* 0.010**
(0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Unemployment Rate 18.683 2.838 0.911 3.383 3.827
(14.297) (7.197) (7.283) (7.371) (6.331)
Debt 0.048 0.017 0.038* 0.016 0.006
(0.036) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016)
Population Density 40.902 -161.264 -125.556 -154.425 -1.725
(155.896) (130.310) (128.869) (130.441) (93.479)
Dependency Ratio 302.005 41.53 234.192 21.775 229.136
(612.023) (373.829) (348.919) (378.830) (271.191)
Election Year -13.261 1.548 -1.308 1.717 6.905
(12.627) (9.901) (9.514) (9.832) (9.956)
Poverty Rate -4.977 4.573 3.115 4.375 6.181*
(9.041) (4.206) (4.205) (4.334) (3.535)
Democrat 27.035 8.468 4.133 7.081 15.36
(31.339) (19.267) (20.965) (19.664) (16.015)
Constant -278.928 -291.758 -244.805 -270.145 -379.856*
(382.074) (225.673) (217.313) (228.273) (193.065)
Steady State Values
Grants 1.89*** 1.905*** 1.827*** 1.901*** 1.874***
(0.289) (0.201) (0.170) (0.202) (0.211)
Income 0.07*** 0.038** 0.012 0.035** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Spatial Lag Dependent —- 1.208 1.065 1.201 0.969
(0.214) (0.196) (0.218) (0.227)
Neighbor’s Grants —- -3.023*** -2.252*** -2.971*** -2.299***
(0.619) (0.414) (0.608) (0.746)
Observations 1,344 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392
Number of States 48 48 48 48 48
AR(1) -4.762 -2.137** -2.209** -2.149** -2.052**
AR(2) -0.270 -0.534 -0.657 -0.568 -0.349
Hansen’s J Test 35.27*** 32.12 26.63 32.18 25.55
[0.000] [0.124] [0.322] [0.123] [0.376]
Difference-in-Hansen Test 18.25** 29.15 30.02 30.33 28.24
[0.019] [0.258] [0.224] [0.212] [0.297]
Number of Instruments 21 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and probability values are in brackets. Asterisks de-
note significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 27: State Expenditure Response
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Figure 28: State Expenditure Response
In sum, the results confirm the longstanding flypaper effect; however, this effect
is mitigated by grants awarded to neighboring states. For example, holding constant
grants to other state governments, in the steady state, a $1 increase in grants increase
state expenditures by $1.68, but if $1 of grants is distributed to all states then the
total effect on state government spending amounts to only $0.59. Evidence here shows
that allowing state’s to react to their neighboring states is sufficient in explaining the
flypaper phenomenon. These results highlight the importance of fiscal interactions
in state spending decisions. Furthermore, the evidence favors an adjustment process
in which it takes several years before expenditures return to equilibrium following
shocks to either income or grants.
In developing grant policies, the results from this chapter show that fiscal poli-
cies in neighboring states must be considered given their influence on own-state fiscal
policy. For example, a one time dispersement of grants to a single state will have
a greater stimulative effect compared to a single dispersement to all states. Fiscal
competition effectively constrains state governments spending, but potentially pre-
vents grants from ameliorating interstate externalities. Moreover, the use of grants by
the federal government to stimulate aggregate demand at the state level is effectively
diluted by fiscal competition. For instance, without accounting for fiscal interactions
a one dollar dispersement of grants to all states would stimulate total state expen-
ditures by $80.64 (1.68X48); however, when allowing for fiscal interactions a one
dollar dispersement of grants would stimulate total state expenditures by only $28.32
(0.59X48). A clear understanding of the ramifications of fiscal competition on state
spending policies will help produce more efficient grant policies.
5.5.3 Expenditure Spillovers and the Flypaper Effect
This section calculates the indirect effect of spending spillovers on estimates of the
flypaper effect. For instance, Baicker (2005) finds that the indirect effect from inter-
state spending spillovers is as large as the direct effect from own-state expenditures.
If state i is receiving positive expenditure spillovers from neighboring states it seems
plausible their reaction to a grant increase will be conditional on the level of spending
spillovers. To test this, equation (26) is augmented with an interaction term captur-
ing the indirect effect of expenditure spillovers on the stimulative effect of grants on
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own-state expenditures. Equation (26) now becomes the following:
Eit = ϕEi,t−1 + γE−it + β1zit + δzit ∗ E−it + β2Iit + φz−it + λXit + u1i + 1it (39)
According to (39) the flypaper effect can be decomposed into the direct and indi-
rect effect of grants on expenditures as follows:
∂Eit
∂zit
= β1 + δE−it (40)
where β1 measures the direct effect and δE−it measures the indirect effect resulting
from spending spillovers. In other words the flypaper effect is conditional on the
level of expenditure spillovers generated from neighboring states. Table 31 provides
the results from estimating equation (39). The interaction term is evaluated at the
minimum, mean, and maximum levels of the weighted average of neighboring state
expenditures. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction
term indicates that the flypaper effect is diluted by spending spillovers. For instance,
estimates of the flypaper effect are greatest when expenditure spillovers are minimized.
However, when evaluated at the maximum level of expenditure spillovers the flypaper
effect becomes insignificantly different from zero.
Figures 29 and 30 illustrate the time path of expenditures following a one-time
shock to grants including the indrect effect of spending spillovers evaluated at three
different levels. The line labeled “flypaper effect (minimum)” is the response by
expenditures following a one dollar shock in federal grants with a minimum level of
expenditure spillovers. This reaches a peak around the high estimates found in the
flypaper literature at about one dollar. When evaluated at the mean level of spending
spillovers the grant stimulus reduces to $0.64 which is incidentally approximately the
average flypaper effect found in the literature. Finally, spending spillovers amounting
to the maximum level reduce the grant stimulus down to only $0.12, which is close
to the high end of the average income effect found in the literature. The following
graph, Figure 30, highlights the difference between the income effect and the stimulus
from grants when spending spillovers are maximized. The difference between these
two series is now only $0.10.
Overall, the results suggest extensive fiscal interactions among states across both
expenditures and grants. Consistent with yardstick comparisons, grants awarded to
neighboring states effectively induce own state expenditure cuts. Consequently, the
stimulative impact of grants on spending is mitigated by grants distributed to all
states simultaneously, effectively limiting estimates of the flypaper effect. Further-
more, expenditures exhibit significant interstate spillovers. In fact, higher levels of
interstate expenditure spillovers limit estimates of the flypaper effect to the point
of providing little stimulus beyond a pure income effect. The results reveal the im-
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Table 31: Reaction Function with Partial Adjustment and Asymmetries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weights Contiguity Distance Income Population
Panel A: Estimates
Lagged Expenditures 0.698*** 0.666*** 0.691*** 0.752***
(0.0633) (0.0690) (0.0662) (0.0684)
Grants 1.458*** 1.546*** 1.463*** 1.248***
(0.301) (0.331) (0.306) (0.383)
Interaction term -0.000204*** -0.000213*** -0.000205*** -0.000189**
(6.66e-05) (6.65e-05) (6.81e-05) (8.20e-05)
Spatial Lag on Expenditures 0.420*** 0.382*** 0.410*** 0.336***
(0.0878) (0.0942) (0.0893) (0.105)
Spatial Lag on Grants -0.758*** -0.500*** -0.706*** -0.543***
(0.156) (0.155) (0.159) (0.149)
Income 0.0180*** 0.0142*** 0.0176*** 0.0159***
(0.00502) (0.00404) (0.00500) (0.00561)
Panel B: Estimates of the Flypaper Effect
Total Effect Evaluated at the Minimum ($2161.79)
∂Eit
∂zit
= β1 + δEE
Min
−it 1.017*** 1.087*** 1.020*** 0.840***
(0.172) (0.202) (0.174) (0.216)
Total Effect Evaluated at the Mean ($4032.17)
∂Eit
∂zit
= β1 + δEE
Mean
−it 0.636*** 0.689*** 0.636*** 0.486***
(0.102) (0.121) (0.103) (0.104)
Total Effect Evaluated at the Maximum ($6580.88)
∂Eit
∂zit
= β1 + δEE
Max
−it 0.116 0.147 0.114 0.005
(0.185) (0.171) (0.189) (0.193)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and probability values are in brackets. The diagnostic tests all
agree the model is correctly specified. Asterisks denote significance at the following levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
portance of interstate relations and dynamics in the development and distribution of
transfers and in estimating the flypaper effect. Once allowing for partial adjustment
and interstate interactions the flypaper effect is sufficiently accounted for.
5.6 Concluding Remarks and Further Research
Using data on a panel of US states over the period 1980 to 2008, the results in this pa-
per highlight a number of important aspects with respect to state responses to federal
grants. First, strategic interactions across states prove to be a robust determinant
of state level spending both in terms of yardstick comparisons among grants and ex-
penditure spillovers. Once accounting for state reaction to neighboring state policies,
the flypaper effect ceases to exist. Moreover, another neglected element in estimating
the flypaper effect includes accounting for the underlying dynamics. Approximately
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Figure 29: State Expenditure Response
Figure 30: State Expenditure Response
thirty percent of the difference between actual expenditures and equilibrium expendi-
tures is depleted within one year leaving seventy percent adjustment left to take place
over the span of approximately ten years. Policy makers in the construction of grants
and in the distribution thereof need to be vigilant as to how states are utilizing grants
in order to develop more efficient transfer systems. Not only do grants stimulate ex-
penditures, but they also serve as an effective signal to evaluate the competence of
state government officials, which serve to constrain governments from overspending.
Moreover, states are interconnected by spending spillovers which also limits the stim-
ulating effects of grants. The results provided in this chapter suggest that the effect
of grants used for the purposes of ameliorating interstate externalities or stimulating
aggregate demand at the state level will be mitigated by fiscal competition. Fur-
thermore, grants distributed to states produce their own information externalities.
On the other hand, the evidence in this chapter favor a considerable amount of fiscal
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competition across two dimensions is likely to impose efficiency enhancing constraints
on Leviathan governments that engage in excessive spending (Hines, 2010).
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6 Conclusion
Over the past several decades intergovernmental transfers have become a large rev-
enue source for state governments. Understanding how states spend these transfers
is of interest to policy makers and researchers alike. Given this fact, this dissertation
focused on the role of intergovernmental transfers in the US. Using panel data on
the 48 contiguous US states along with nonstationary panel and spatial economet-
ric techniques, the three essays within this dissertation examined a unique question
relating to the role served by intergovernmental transfers. For instance, the first
essay examined the extent to which states serve as a conduit for federal funds to
local governments; the second essay examined the influence of federal transfers on
both revenues and expenditures; and the third essay looked at how federal transfers
awarded to neighboring states influence on spending within a state.
The results from these essays contribute a number of interesting perspectives on
how states spend federal transfers. The first essay shows significant evidence in favor
of states serving as a conduit for funds from the federal to local governments in the
long run, as opposed to using federal aid to finance state-level projects or distribute
them as tax cuts. Furthermore, states use federal transfers to fund projects far re-
moved from their intended allocation. For example, federal transfers for welfare and
health and hospital are used to fund education transfers to local governments. Con-
sequently, cuts to either welfare of health and hospital transfers to state governments
could induce cuts to education funding to local governments.
The second essay shows how federal transfers play an active role in returning
budgets to equilibrium. I also show that among states with relatively high amounts
of debt, transfers are used to finance outstanding debt. Furthermore, federal trans-
fers and own revenues display a complementarity relationship. Overall, these results
suggest that federal grants display a very active role within state budgets.
Finally, the third essay shows that federal transfers awarded to neighboring states
and spending spillovers dilute the effects of the grant stimulus. The omitted variable
bias resulting from ignoring both neighboring state policies and dynamic relationships
provide a sufficient explanation for finding a flypaper effect.
As the results of this dissertation suggest, federal transfers provide a number
of important functions within a federation. The state is an interesting case given
their intermediary position between the central government and local governments.
Given the knowledge problem often found in any discussion of fiscal federalism and
existence of spillovers from public goods among decentralized governments, the state
provides a means of bridging the “cognitive distance” between the needs of the many
decentralized local governments and the central government. States are conceivably
in a better position to possess greater knowledge as to the efficient level of pubic
goods and therefore better able to internalize local spillovers. Consistent with this
idea states do in fact contribute to cross-program substitutions with respect to federal
aid and aid to local governments discussed in Chapter 3, where states use federal aid
for purposes of public welfare and health and hospitals to fund education expenditures
at the local level.
Federal grants also produce possible perverse effects such as softening the budget
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of subnational governments. The results from Chapter 4 find that states use grants to
return their budget to equilibrium and, specific to states with relatively high amounts
of debt, grants are used to finance debt obligations. In contrast, states with relative
low debt levels rely more on own revenue sources to finance debt. Furthermore,
high debt states support the tax-spend hypothesis (i.e. tax revenue increases encour-
age expenditure increases), where low debt states support the fiscal synchronization
hypothesis (i.e. bidirectional relationship between tax revenues and expenditures),
therefore high debt states are more likely to exploit tax revenues and use them to
increase expenditures. These results combined with the fact that tax revenues and
expenditures are fiscally separated in the short run support the devolution of taxing
authority down to state governments thereby encouraging states to rely more on own
revenue sources and less on grant revenues. In this case, tax competition should ef-
fectively limit over taxation and therefore over spending, with the added benefit of
forcing states to be more fiscally responsible in matching the taxes with the bene-
fits. These reforms, at least in principle, should help curb debt accumulation among
states.
Related to the information problem inherent in fiscal federalism, Chapter 5 es-
timates the informational externality produced by federal grants given to neighbor-
ing states. Similar to federal grants awarded to universities and university depart-
ments provide information as to their competence which then encourages further
grant awards, the same could be said with respect to federal grants awarded to state
governments (see (Boarnet & Glazer, 2002)). The informational externalities given off
by grants is one mechanism which enables voters to hold elected officials accountable
thereby preventing wasteful spending and over taxation. For instance, citizens may
view grants awarded to neighboring states, instead of their own-state, to reflect poor
policy decisions of elected officials and therefore the citizens may choose to reduce
their demand for expenditures. Furthermore, spending spillovers from neighboring
states mitigate the stimulus associated with federal grants. These results suggest
agree with Rodden et al. (2003) that in order to get Once thought of as an empirical
anomaly, the results in this chapter suggest that the flypaper effect is a result of ig-
noring fiscal interactions that alter the spending patterns in response to federal grant
stimulus.
Although this dissertation provides an empirical understanding of state-level fiscal
relationships, it also opens the door to many other interesting and important research
questions. Specifically, there are five main extensions from this dissertation that I am
in the processes of pursuing.
First, we consider whether or not there is evidence of a “flypaper effect” as it
relates to foreign aid distributed to developing countries.48 A parallel can be drawn
regarding the existence of a flypaper effect domestically within a country and inter-
nationally between countries. For instance, the central government issuing grants to
local governments is analogous to developed countries supplying foreign aid to devel-
oping countries. The focus of this paper is to expand the current literature on the
48This study is a work in progress with fellow graduate student, Emily Marshall, and was an outcome
from thoughtful discussions with Professor Wildasin.
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flypaper effect to an international setting. Extending the discussion of the flypaper
effect to an international environment will provide more variation in political and so-
cial factors to better inform a discussion of why the flypaper effect exists empirically.
Exploiting the heterogeneity across countries, as opposed to using relatively homoge-
neous U.S. states for example, will enhance our understanding of why governments
behave asymmetrically with respect to changes in lump-sum grants and income. Fur-
thermore, this analysis will inform on the the appropriate design and distribution of
foreign aid grants as well as domestic intergovernmental transfers. The preliminary
results suggest evidence of flypaper behavior with respect to foreign aid. Moreover,
political institutions, specifically the degree of executive recruitment and participa-
tion similar to the US, play key roles in generating a flypaper effect. We find that
countries with regulated, competitive, and open election processes exhibit signs of
flypaper behavior with respect to foreign aid.
The second extension relates to the effect of federal transfers on the size of state
governments. According to Peacock & Wiseman (1979), idealized Keynesian policies
advocate spending increases during recessions and spending reductions during times
of economic boom, thus balancing the budget in the long run. However, realized
Keynesian policies show an increase in government spending during recessions, but
no offsetting spending cuts during economic booms. This results in a “ratchet” up-
ward in the size of federal governments measured by government spending per real
GDP. A similar case can be made with respect to federal transfers given to state gov-
ernments. For example, an increase in federal transfers encourage funding to state
level programs, but if decreases in federal transfers do not equally reduce funding to
these programs, replaced instead with increases in own revenues or debt, then this can
also generate a “ratchet” upward in the size of state governments. Especially since
federal governments use federal grants to increase aggregate demand at the state and
local levels during times of recession (Hines, 2010).
The third extension, relates to the effect of cross-sectional dependence (CSD) on
estimates of the flypaper effect. For example, state i may be non-spuriously correlated
with state j due to unobserved factors common to all states. Standard panel studies
disregard the presence of common shocks and spillovers and instead assume cross-
sectional independence or control for CSD using time dummies. If CSD is neglected it
can lead to imprecise estimates and problems of identification. Therefore, neglecting
CSD is one possible reason behind such a large flypaper effect (or a small income
effect). Following the methodology set forth in Moscone & Tosetti (2010), I will use
non-stationary and cointegration techniques to test the flypaper effect associated with
the stimulative effect of federal grants on expenditures. Specifically, I will estimate the
flypaper effect by relaxing the assumption of parameter homogeneity in the short and
long-run and by accounting for a multi-factor error structure capturing both global
and local spillovers using Pesaran’s (2006) correlated common factor approach.
The fourth extension will examine the relationship between own revenues and
federal transfers. Results found in this dissertation suggest a complementarity be-
tween own revenues and federal aid. Consequently, increases in federal aid result in
increases in own-revenues rather than inducing a tax cut as expected. Given this
relationship and the informational externalities associated with grants awarded to
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neighboring states, I hypothesize that that grants awarded to states inform voters on
the competence of their government, and therefore grants awarded to state i increase
own revenues due to increasing the tax base as a results of migration into the state.
Likewise, the increased perception of a competent government increases the ability of
state governments to raise taxes and extract rents.
The last extension will focus on the link among the three layers of government
in the US. The question of interest is how does the degree of decentralization effect
estimates of the flypaper effect. Conceivably, a higher degree of decentralization per-
mits greater control and accountability by the citizens over elected officials mitigating
instances of wasteful spending. Similarly, citizens in decentralized governments are
less likely to succumb to fiscal illusion for the same reasons. If this is the case then
we should find a larger flypaper effect associated with federal grants to state govern-
ments than with state grants to local governments. These results can be checked for
robustness using cross-country data and an index of decentralization.
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Sustainability.” with J. E. Payne, International Journal of Economics & Busi-
ness, 1(1), April 2011, 1-10. [LEAD ARTICLE]
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